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CHAPTER 2 
International Status and Navigation of 
Warships and Military Aircraft 
2.1 STATUS OF WARSHIPS 
2.1.1 Warship Defined. International law defines a warship as a ship belonging 
to the armed forces of a nation bearing the external markings distinguishing the 
character and nationality of such ships, under the command of an officer duly 
commissioned by the government of that nation and whose name appears in the 
appropriate service list of officers, and manned by a crew which is under regular 
armed forces discipline.1 In the U.S. Na'i.' those ships designated "uss" are 
"warships" as defined by international law. U.S. Coast Guard vessels designated 
"USCGC" under the command of a commissioned officer are also "warships" 
under internationallaw.3 
1. High Seas Convention, art. 8(2); 1982 LOS Convention, art. 29; Hague Convention No. 
VII Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into Warships, The Hague, 18 October 1907, 2 
Am.]. Int'IL. (Supp.) 133, Schindler & Toman 591, arts. 2-5; GP I, art. 43. The service list for U.S. 
naval officers is the Register of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the United States Navy and 
Naval Reserve on the active duty list (NA VPERS 15018); the comparable list for the U.S. Coast 
Guard is COMDTINST M1427.1 (series), Subj: Register of Officers. 
2. U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, art. 0406; SECNAVINST 5030.1 (series), Subj: 
Classification of Naval Ships and Aircraft. It should be noted that neither the High Seas 
Convention nor the LOS Convention requires that a ship be armed to be regarded as a warship. 
Under the LOS Convention, however, a warship no longer need belong to the "naval" forces of a 
nation, under the command of an officer whose name appears in the "Navy list" and manned by a 
crew who are under regular "naval" discipline. The more general reference is now made to 
"armed forces" to accommodate the integration of different branches of the armed forces in 
various countries, the operation of seagoing craft by some armies and air forces, and the existence 
of a coast guard as a separate unit of the armed forces of some nations. Oxman, The Regime of 
Warships Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 24 Va.]. Int'l L. 813 
(1984). 
3. The U.S. Coast Guard is an armed force of the United States. 10 U.S.C. sec. 1 01 (1988),14 
U.S.C. sec. 1 (1988). U.S. Coast Guard cutters are distinguished by display of the national ensign 
and the union jack. The Coast Guard ensign and Coast Guard commission pennant are displayed 
whenever a USCG vessel takes active measures in connection with boarding, examining, seizing, 
stopping, or heaving to a vessel for the purpose of enforcing the laws of the United States. U.S. 
Coast Guard Regulations, 1985, secs. 10-2-1, 14-8-2 & 14-8-3; 14 U.S.C. secs. 2 & 638 (1988); 
33 C.F.R. part 23 (distinctive markings for USCG vessels and aircraft). 
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2.1.2 International Status. A warship enjoys sovereign immunity from 
interference by the authorities of nations other than the flag nation. 4 Police 
and port authorities may board a warship only with the permission of the 
commanding officer. A warship cannot be required to consent to an 
onboard search or inspection,S nor may it be required to fly the flag of the 
host nation. 6 Although warships are required to comply with coastal nation 
traffic control, sewage, health, and quarantine restrictions instituted in 
conformance with the 1982 LOS Convention, a failure of compliance is subject 
only to diplomatic complaint or to coastal nation orders to leave its territorial sea 
immediately.7 Moreover, warships are immune from arrest and seizure, whether 
in national or international waters, are exempt from foreign taxes and regulation, 
and exercise exclusive control over all passengers and crew with regard to acts 
performed on board.8 
2.1.2.1 Nuclear Powered Warships. Nuclear powered warships and 
conventionally powered warships enjoy identical international legal status.9 
4. High Seas Convention, art. 8; 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 32, 58(2), 95 & 236. The rules 
applicable in anned conflict ate discussed in Part II, particularly Chapters 7 and 8. The historic basis 
of this rule ofinternationallaw is evidenced in TIle SdlOoner Exdwnge v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 
(1812). 
5. U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, art. 0828. CNO Washington DC message 032330Z MAR 
88, NA VOP 024/88, regarding foreign port visits, points out that the United States also will not 
respond to host nation requests for specific information on individual crew members including 
crew lists and health records, and will not undertake other requested actions upon which the 
Commanding Officer's certification is definitive. See also Annex A2-1 (p. 155) for a more recent 
summary of U.S. sovereign immunity policy regarding U.S. warships, auxiliaries and military 
aircraft promulgated as ALP ACFLT message 016/94, 020525Z J un 94. 
6. The U.S. Navy has provided, as a matter of policy and courtesy, for the display ofa foreign 
flag or ensign during certain ceremonies. See U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, arts. 1276-78. 
7. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 23; 1982 LOS Convention, art. 30; U.S. Navy 
Regulations, 1990, art. 0832, 0859, & 0860. Quarantine is discussed in paragraph 3.2.3 (p. 216). As 
stated in paragraph 2.3.2.1 (p. 116), force may also be used, where necessary, to prevent passage 
which is not innocent. 
8. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 22; High Seas Convention, art. 8(1); 1982 LOS 
Convention, arts. 32, 95 & 236. While on boatd ship in foreign waters, the crew of a warship ate 
immune from local jurisdiction. Their status ashore is the subject of SECNAVINST 5820.4 
(series), Subj: Status of Forces Policies, Procedure, and Infonnation. Under status of forces 
agreements, obligations may exist to assist in the arrest of crew members and the delivery of them to 
foreign authorities. See AFP 110-20, chap. 2; U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, art. 0822; and JAG 
Manual, sec. 0609. 
9. C£ 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 21(1), 22(2) and 23, and U.S.-U.S.S.R. Unifonn 
Interpretation of Rules ofInternational Law Governing Innocent Passage, Annex A2-2 (p. 161), 
para. 2. For further infonnation and guidance see OPNAVINST C3000.5 (series), Subj: Operation 
of Naval Nuclear Powered Ships (U). See also Roach & Smith, at 160-1. 
The Department of State has noted that: 
(continued ... ) 
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2.1.2.2 Sunken Warships and Military Aircraft. Sunken warships and 
military aircraft remain the property of the flag nation until title is formally 
relinquished or abandoned, whether the cause of the sinking was through 
accident or enemy action (unless the warship or aircraft was captured before it 
9.( ... continued) 
[I]n recognition of the sovereign nature of warships, the United States pennits their 
[nuclear powered warships] entry into U.S. ports without special agreements or 
safety assessments. Entry of such ships is predicated on the same basis as U.S. nuclear 
powered warships' entry into foreign ports, namely, the provision of safety 
assurances on the operation of the ships, assumption of absolute liability for a nuclear 
accident resulting from the operation of the warship's reactor, and a demonstrated 
record of safe operation of the ships involved .... 
1979 DigestofU.S. Practice in International Law 1084 (1983). Exec. Order 11,918, IJune 1976,3 
C.F.R. part 120 (1976), 42 U.S.C. sec. 2211n (1988), was issued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 2211 
to provide prompt, adequate, and effective compensation in the unlikely event ofinjury or damage 
resulting from a nuclear incident involving the nuclear reactor of a U.S. warship. 1976 Digest of 
U.S. Practice in International Law 441-42 (1977). 
Although nuclear powered warships frequendy pass through the Panama Canal, they have 
transitted the Suez Canal only infrequendy. The transit by USS ARKANSAS (CGN 41) on 3 
November 1984 was the first (U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., May 1985, at 48); the transit by USS 
ENTERPRISE (CVN 65) from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal on 28 
April 1986 was the second (U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., May 1987, at 38). A request for ENTERPRISE 
to return to the Pacific via the Suez Canal was denied by Egypt "because it is reviewing its new 
rules governing passage ... Washington Post, 4 July 1986, at A21. The Egyptian President noted in a 
newspaper interview that safety of the waterway and residents on both banks had to be considered, 
along with a possible surcharge for the passage of nuclear ships, as well as a guarantee for 
compensation in case of nuclear accidents. USS EISENHOWER (CVN-69) on 7 August 1990 
and USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN-71) on 14 January 1991 transited the Suez Canal 
into the Red Sea in response to Iraq's attack on Kuwait on 2 August 1990. See paragraph 2.3.3.1, 
note 36 (p. 124) for a discussion of canals. 
With regard to nuclear armed warships and aircraft, U.S. policy is to neither confirm nor deny the 
presence of nuclear weapons on board specific U.S. ships and aircraft. The firmness of the U.S. 
policy is illustrated by the U.S reaction to the February 1985 decision of the Government of New 
Zealand to deny permission for USS BUCHANAN (DDG 14) to enter Auckland Harborsince the 
U.S. would not confirm the absence of nuclear weapons in BUCHANAN. The U.S. suspended all 
military cooperation with New Zealand, including the ANZUS agreement, training, foreign 
military sales, and intelligence exchange. Dep't St. Bull., Sep. 1986, at 87; Note, The 
Incompatibility of ANZUS and a Nuclear-Free New Zealand, 26 Va. J. Int'l L. 455 (1986); 
Woodlife, Port Visits by Nuclear Armed Naval Vessels: Recent State Practice, 35 Int'l & Compo 
L.Q. 730 (1986); Recent Developments, International Agreements: United States' Suspension of 
Security Obligations Toward New Zealand, 28 Harv. Int'l LJ. 139 (1987); Chinkin, Suspension 
of Treaty Relationship: The ANZUS Alliance, 7 UCLA Pac. Bas. LJ. 114 (1990). Cj. FIacco, 
Whether to Confirm or Deny?, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc.,Jan. 1990, at 52. See also Thies & Harris, An 
Alliance Unravels: The United States and Anzus, Nav. War Coll. Rev., (Spring 1993), at 98. On 
27 September 1991, President Bush ordered the removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from all 
U.S. surface ships, tactical submarines and land-based naval aircraft bases, reserving the right to 
return them during a crisis. The President also ordered the elimination of ground-launched tactical 
nuclear weapons, stood down strategic bombers from alert and stood down all ICBM's scheduled 
for deactivation under START. See N.Y. Times, 28 Sept. 1991, atAl; id. 29 Sept. 1991, sec. I, at 1 
& 10; Dep't State Dispatch, 30 Sep. 1991, at 715. 
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sank}. As a matter of policy, the U.S. Government does not grant pennission to 
salvage sunken U.S. warships or military aircraft that contain the remains of 
deceased service personnel or explosive material. Requests from foreign 
countries to have their sunken warships or military aircraft, located in U.S. 
national waters, similarly respected by salvors, are honored. 10 
2.1.3 Auxiliaries. Auxiliaries are vessels, other than warships, that are owned by 
or under the exclusive control of the armed forces. Because they are state owned 
or operated and used for the time being only on government noncommercial 
service, auxiliaries enjoy sovereign immunity. This means that, like warships, 
10. 9 Whiteman 221 & 434; Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State letter to Deputy 
General Counsel, Maritime Administration, 30 December 1980, reprinted in 1980 Digest of U.S. 
Practice in International Law 999-1006; Roach, France Concedes United States Has Title to CSS 
ALABAMA, 85 Am.]' Int'l L. 381 (1991); 29 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 114-15, 185-87 (1986); 30 id. 
182-83 (1987). Under analogous reasoning, on 12 November 1976 Japan returned a MiG-25 
Foxbat flown by LT Victor 1. Belenko from Chuguyevka, U.S.S.R., to Hakodate Airport, 
Hokkaido,Japan on 4 September 1976, albeit the Foxbat was returned disassembled. Barron, MiG 
Pilot: The Final Escape of LT. Belenko 129, 180 (1980); 28 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 142-43, 146-47 
(1985). See paragraph 3.9 (p. 228) regarding attempts by other nations to recover U.S. government 
property at sea, and paragraph 4.3.2 (p. 259) regarding the right ofself-defense. 
The procedures for abandonment of sunken U.S. warships and aircraft located outside the territory 
of the United States are set forth in 40 U.S.c. sec. 512 (1987 Supp. V), and its implementing 
regulation, 41 CFR sec. 101-45.9 (1989). Hatteras, Inc. v. 771e U.S.S. Hatteras, her engines, etc., ill 
rem, and the United States of America, ill personam, 1984 AMC 1094 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (failure to 
follow disposal procedures renders null purported abandonment by the Secretary of the Navy), 
affd wlo opinion 698 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 464 U.S. 815 (1983). Government and 
military vessels are exempt from the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to Salvage of Vessels at Sea, 23 September 1910, 37 Stat. 1658, T.I.A.S 576, art. 14; the 
1989 International Convention on Salvage, art. 4; and 46 U.S.c. sec. 731 (1982).46 U.S.C. App. 
sec. 316(d) (1988) forbids foreign vessels from engaging in salvaging operations within the 
territorial or inland waters of the United States, except pursuant to treaty or 46 U.S.C. App. sec. 
725. However, the United States is subject to claims for salvage outside U.S. territorial waters. 
Vemicos Shipping Co. v. United States, 223 F. Sur;. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), tif/'d, 349 F.2d 465 (2d 
Cir. 1965) (tugs prevented USS ALTAIR and USS MERCHANT from sinking in Piraeus harbor, 
Greece); B. V. Bureau Wijsmullerv. United States, 487 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), tif/'d 633 F.2d 
202 (2d Cir. 1980); 8]. Mar. L. & Com. 433 (1977) (tugs pulled USSJULIUSA. FURER from a 
sandbar off the Dutch coast). The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of1987, 43 U.S.c. sec. 2101 etseq. 
(1988), is not applicable to sunken warships which have not been affirmatively abandoned. 
H. Rep. 100-514(1), at 3, 4 U.S.C.C.A.A.N. 367-68 (1988); H. Rep. 100-514(II), at 5, 4 
U.S.C.C.A.A.N. 374 & 381. 
Control over shipwrecks and sunken aircraft is distinguished from control over the environs 
surrounding a wreck. When a sovereign immune vessel or aircraft lies \vithin what is or becomes 
the territorial sea or internal waters of a foreign nation, the flag State retains control over the 
disposition of the vessel or aircraft, while the coastal nation controls access to its situs. As a practical 
matter, such situations may be the subject of cooperative arrangements for the preservation or 
exploration of the site. See, for example, the U.S.-French agreement concerning the CSS 
ALABAMA, 3 Oct. 1989,85 Am.]. Int'l L. 381 (1991). 
See also Roach, Sunken Warships and Military Aircraft, 20 Marine Policy 351 (1996). 
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they are immune from arrest and search, whether in national or international 
waters. Like warships, they are exempt from foreign taxes and regulation, and 
exercise exclusive control over all passengers and crew with respect to acts 
performed on board.11 
U.S. auxiliaries include all vessels which comprise the Military Sealift 
Command (MSC) Force. The MSC Force includes: (1) United States Naval 
Ships (USNS) (i.e., U.S. owned vessels or those under bareboat charter, and 
assigned to MSC); (2) the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) and the 
Ready Reserve Force (RRF) (when activated and assigned to MSC); (3) 
privately owned vessels under time charter assigned to the Afloat Prepositioned 
Force (APF); and (4) those vessels chartered by MSC for a period of time orfor a 
specific voyage or voyages.12 The United States claims full rights of sovereign 
immunity for all USNS, APF, NRDF and RRF vessels. As a matter of policy, 
however, the U.S. claims only freedom from arrest and taxation for those MSC 
Force time and voyage charters not included in the APF.13 
11. Territorial Seas Convention, art. 22; High Seas Convention, art. 9; 1982 LOS 
Convention, arts. 32, 96 & 236. The right of self-defense, explained in paragraph 4.3.2 (p. 259), 
applies to auxiliaries as well as to warships. Auxiliaries used on commercial service do not enjoy 
sovereign immunity. See Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 21-22; High Seas Convention, art. 9; 
1982 LOS Convention, arts. 27-28, 32 & 236. 
12. Commander Military Sealift Command Force Inventory, MSC Rep. 3110-4, Pub. 8 (8 
Aug. 1988); Whitehurst, The U.S. Merchant Marine 113-27 (1983) (describing U.S. 
government-owned shipping). 
13. 1985 SECSTATE Washington DC message 317062, Subj: Status ofMSC vessels. The 
United States also claims sovereign immunity for the ships belonging to the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the Department of Commerce. See Leonard, NOAA 
and the Coast Guard Ark, U.S. Naval Inst. Proceedings, Dec. 1990, at 81. 
Merdwllt Ships. In international law , a merchant ship is any vessel, including a fishing vessel, that is 
not entitled to sovereign immunity, i.e., a vessel, whether privately or publicly owned or 
controlled, which is not a warship and which is engaged in ordinary commercial activities. For an 
excellent discussion on the distinction between commercial and non-commercial service, see 
Knight & Chiu, The International Law of the Sea: Cases, Documents, and Readings at 364-69 
(1991). 
III IlItematiolUl/ Waters (i.e., beyond the territorial sea). Merchant ships, save in exceptional 
cases expressly provided for in international treaties, are subject to the flag nation's exclusive 
jurisdiction in international waters. High Seas Convention, art. 6(1}; 1982 LOS Convention, art. 
92(1). Unless pursuant to hot pursuit (see paragraph 3.11.2.2.1 (p. 235», merchant vessels in 
international waters may not be boarded by foreign warship personnel without the master's or flag 
nation consent, unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that the ship is engaged in piracy, 
unauthorized broadcasting, or the slave trade, that the ship is without nationality, or that, though 
flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the 
warship, High Seas Convention, art. 22; 1982 LOS Convention, art. 110. Warship's right of 
approach and visit is discussed in paragraph 3.4 (p. 221). The belligerent right of visit and search is 
discussed in paragraph 7.6 (p. 387). On flags of cOllvell;erue, see 1982 LOS Convention, art. 91, and 
Mertus, The Nationality of Ships and International Responsibility: The Reflagging of the Kuwaiti 
Oil Tankers, 17 Den.]. Int'l L. & Pol'y 207 (1988). 
(continued ... ) 
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u.s. Navy and u.s. Coast Guard vessels which, except for the lack of a 
commissioned officer as conunanding officer would be warships, also are auxiliaries. 
2.2 STATUS OF Mll.ITARY AIRCRAFT 
2.2.1 Military Aircraft Defined. International law defines military aircraft to 
include all aircraft operated by commissioned units of the anned forces of a nation 
bearing the military markings of that nation, commanded by a member of the 
anned forces, and manned by a crew subject to regular anned forces discipline.14 
2.2.2 International Status. Military aircraft are "state aircraft" within the 
meaning of the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944 (the 
"Chicago Convention"), and, like warships, enjoy sovereign immunity from 
foreign search and inspection. Subject to the right of transit passage, archipelagic 
sea lanes passage, and entry in distress (see paragraph 2.5.1), state aircraft may not 
enter national airspace (see paragraph 1.8i or land in the sovereign territory of 
another nation without its authorization. 5 Foreign officials may not board the 
13.{ ... continued) 
The coastal nation may, in the exercise ofits economic resource rights in the EEZ, take 
such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest, and judicial proceedings against foreign flag 
merchant vessels as are necessary to ensure compliance with coastal nation rules and regulations 
adopted in conformity with the Convention. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 73. Compare id., art. 220. 
In the Territorial Sea. Foreign merchant vessels exercising the right of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea have the duty to comply with coastal nation rules and regulations, as 
discussed in paragraph 2.3.2.2 (p. 118). On board the transiting vessel, the coastal nation may 
exercise its criminal jurisdiction, if a crime is committed on board the ship during its passage and: 
a. the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal nation; 
b. the crime is a kind which disturbs the peace of the coastal nation or the good order 
of the territorial sea; 
c. assistance oflocal authorities has been requested by the flag nation or the master of 
the ship transiting the territorial sea; or 
d. such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit drug trafficking. 
The above circumstances do not affect the broader right of the coastal nation to take any steps 
authorized by its laws for the purpose of an arrest or investigation on board a foreign merchant ship 
passing through the territorial sea after leaving that coastal nation's internal waters. Territorial Sea 
Convention, art. 19; 1982 LOS Convention, art. 27. See Nordquist, Vol. II, at 237-43. 
14. AFP 110-31, para. 2-4b, at 2-4 to 2-5. Commissioned units of U.S. military aircraft are 
c:;lled squadrons and are established pursuant to the authority of the chief of service concerned. All 
aircraft, like ships, assume the nationality of the nation in which they are registered, and are marked 
with symbols or designations of their nationality. The markings of military aircraft should differ 
from those of other state aircraft and of civil aircraft. AFP 110-31, para. 2-4d. 
15. "State aircraft" include aircraft used in "military," "customs" and "police" service. 
Chicago Convention, art. 3{b). Transit passage through intemational straits and archipelagic sea 
lanes passage are discussed in paragraphs 2.3.3 (p. 121) and 2.3.4.1 (p. 127) respectively. See also 
paragraph 2.3.2.5 (p. 120) regardi.ng the right of assistance entry. 
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aircraft without the consent of the aircraft commander. Should the aircraft 
commander fail to certify compliance with local customs, immigration or 
quarantine requirements, the aircraft may be directed to leave the territory and 
national airspace of that nation immediately.16 
2.2.3 Military Contract Aircraft. Civilian owned and operated aircraft, the 
full capacity of which has been contracted by the Air Mobility Command 
(AMC) and used in the military service of the United States, qualify as "state 
aircraft" if they are so designated by the United States. In those circumstances 
they too enjoy sovereign immunity from foreign search and inspection. 17 As a 
matter of policy, however, the United States normally does not designate 
AMC-charter aircraft as state aircraft. 
2.3 NAVIGATION IN AND OVERFIlGHT OF NATIONAL WATERS 
2.3.1 Internal Waters.18 As discussed in the preceding chapter, coastal 
nations exercise the same jurisdiction and control over their internal waters and 
supeljacent airspace as they do over their land territory. Because most ports and 
harbors are located landward of the baseline of the territorial sea, entering a 
port ordinarily involves navigation in internal waters. Because entering 
internal waters is legally equivalent to entering the land territory of another 
nation, that nation's pennission is required. To facilitate international 
maritime commerce, many nations grant foreign merchant vessels standing 
pennission to enter internal waters, in the absence of notice to the contrary. 
Warships and auxiliaries, and all aircraft, on the other hand, require specific and 
advance entry pennission, unless other bilateral or multilateral arrangements 
have been conduded.19 
16. AFP 110-31, paras. 2-2a & 2-5a, at 2-3 & 2-5. CNO Washington DC message 032330Z 
MAR 88, NA VOP 024/88, reinforced the u.s. position that detailed lists of personnel embarked 
in military aircraft visiting foreign airfields may not be released to foreign governments. See also 
Annex A2-1 (p. 155). See paragraph 2.3.1 (p. 115) regarding entry in distress. Quarantine is 
discussed in paragraph 3.2.3 (p. 216). Self-defense is discussed in paragraph 4.3.2 (p. 259). 
17. Taylor, Fed. B.J., Winter 1968, at 48. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet is distinguished from 
military contract aircraft and discussed in Bristol, CRAF: Hawks in Doves Clothing? 20 A.F. L. 
Rev. 48 (1978). 
18. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 5, 1982 LOS Convention, art. 8. 
19. For further information and guidance, see OPNAVINST 3128.3 (series), Subj: Visits by 
U.S. Navy Ships to Foreign Countries, and OPNAVINST 3128.10 (series), Subj: Clearance 
Procedures for Visits to United States Ports by Foreign Naval Vessels. 
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Exceptions to the rule of non-entry into internal waters without coastal nation 
pennission, whether ~ecific or implied, arise when rendered necessary by force 
majeure or by distress, 0 or when straight baselines are established that have the 
effect of enclosing, as internal waters, areas of the sea previously regarded as 
territorial seas or high seas.21 In the latter event, international law provides that the 
right of innocent Rassage (see paragraph 2.3.2.1)22 or that of transit passage in an 
international strait23 (see paragraph 2.3.3.1) may be exercised by all nations in 
those waters. 
2.3.2 Territorial Seas24 
2.3.2.1 Innocent Passage. International law provides that ships (but not 
aircraft) of all nations enjoy the right of innocent passage for the purpose of 
continuous and expeditious traversing of the territorial sea or for proceeding to 
or from internal waters. Innocent passage includes stopping and anchoring, but 
only insofar as incidental to ordinary navigation, or as rendered necessary by force 
majeure or by distress.25 Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the 
peace, good order, or security of the coastal nation.26 Military activities 
considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order, and security of the coastal 
nation, and therefore inconsistent with innocent passage, are: 
1. Any threat or use offorce against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or 
political independence of the coastal nation 
2. Any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind 
3. The launching, landing, or taking on board of any aircraft or of any 
military device 
4. Intelligence collection activities detrimental to the security of that coastal 
nation 
20. Force majeure includes a ship forced into internal waters by distress or bad weather. The 
distress must be caused by an uncontrollable event which creates an overwhelming or grave 
necessity to enter port or risk loss of the vessel or her cargo. See paragraph 3.2, note 1 (p. 213). See 
also TIle New York, 3 Wheat. 59 (16 U.S. 59) (1818); see also O'Connell 853-58; Restatement 
(Third) sec. 48. See paragraph 3.2.2 (p. 215) regarding safe harbor, and paragraph 4.4 (p. 265) 
regarding interception of intruding aircraft. 
21. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 8(2). 
22. [d. 
23. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 35(a). 
24. Navigation by foreign vessels in the territorial sea is regulated by the regimes of innocent 
passage, assistance entry, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage which are discussed in 
paragraphs 2.3.2.1 (p. 116),2.3.2.5 (p. 120),2.3.3.1 (p. 121), and 2.3.4.1 (p. 127), respectively. 
25. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(2), (3) & (6); 1982 LOS Convention, art. 18. Stopping 
or anchoring is also permitted to assist those in danger or distress. 
26. What constitutes prejudice under art. 14(4) of the Territorial Sea Convention was left 
undefined. The 1982 LOS Convention endeavors to eliminate the subjective interpretative 
difficulties that have arisen concerning the innocent passage regime of the Territorial Sea 
Convention. 
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5. The carrying out of research or survey activities 
6. Any act aimed at interfering with any system of communication of the 
coastal nation 
7. Any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defense or security of the 
coastal nation 
8. The loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person 
contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of 
the coastal nation 
9. Any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to the 1982 LOS 
Convention 
10. Any fishing activities 
11. Any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.27 
27. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 19. This is an "exhaustive list of activities that would render 
passage not innocent." Joint Interpretation of the Rules ofIntemational Law Governing Innocent 
Passage, attached to the Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 23 September 1989, Dep't St. Bull., Nov. 1989, at 
25,28 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1445 (1989), 84 Am.]. Int'l L. 239 (1990), AnnexA2-2, para. 3 (p. 161). 
On the other hand, 1 O'Connell 270 suggests the list may not be complete since the list does not 
say "only" the listed actions are prejudicial. The Territorial Sea Convention contains no 
comparable listing. See Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea: the 1975 Geneva Session, 69 Am.]. Int'l L. 763, 771-72 (1975); Froman, Uncharted 
Waters: Non-innocent Passage of Warships in the Territorial Sea, 21 San Diego L. Rev. 625, 659 
(1984); Gramrnig, The YoronJima Submarine Incident of August 1980: A Soviet Violation of the 
Law of the Sea, 22 Harv. Int'l LJ. 331, 340 (1981). See also Nordquist, Vol. II, at 164-178. 
Since these activities must occur "in the territorial sea" (LOS Convention, art. 19(2», any 
determination of noninnocent passage by a transiting ship must be made on the basis of acts 
committed while in the territorial sea. Thus cargo, destination, or purpose of the voyage can not be 
used as a criterion in determining that passage is not innocent. Professor H.B. Robertson 
testimony, House Merchant Marine & Fisheries Cornm., 97th Cong., hearing on the status of the 
law of the sea treaty negotiations, 27 July 1982, Ser. 97-29, at 413-14. Accord Oxman, paragraph 
2.1.1, note 2 (p. 109), at 853 (possession of passive characteristics, such as the innate combat 
capabilities of a warship, do not constitute "activity" within the meaning of this enumerated list). 
The 1983 Soviet "Rules for Navigation and Sojourn of Foreign Warships in the Territorial Waters 
and Internal Waters and Ports of the USSR," trallSlation in 24 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1717 (1985), were 
not entirely consistent with the relevant provisions of the 1982 LOS Convention. Buder, 
Innocent Passage and the 1982 Convention: The Influence of Soviet Law and Policy, 81 Am.]. 
Int'l L. 331 (1987). In particular, the Soviet claim to limit the innocent passage of warships to five 
"routes ordinarily used forintemational navigation" was inconsistent with the Convention's terms 
and negotiating history, and prior Soviet support therefor. Neubauer, The Right of Innocent 
Passage for Warships in the Territorial Sea: A Response to the Soviet Union, Nav. War Coll. 
Rev., Spring 1988, at 49; Franckx, Further Steps in the Clarification of the Soviet Position on the 
Innocent Passage of Foreign Warships through its Territorial Waters, 19 Ga.]. Int'l & Compo L. 
535 (1990). That portion of the 1983 Rules was amended effective 23 September 1989 to conform 
to the Uniform Interpretation, Annex A2-2 (p. 161). See paragraph 2.6, note 105 (p. 143) 
regarding U.S. challenges to this and other excessive maritime claims. 
Since coastal nations are competent to regulate fishing in their territorial sea, passage of foreign 
fishing vesseIs engaged in activities that are in violation of those laws or regulations is not innocent. 
Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(5}; 1982 LOS Convention, art. 21(l)(e}. 
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Foreign ships, including warships, exercising the right of innocent passage are 
required to comply with the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal nation in 
conformity with established principles of international law and, inlarticular, 
with such laws and regulations relating to the safety of navigation. 2 Innocent 
passage does not include a right of overflight. 
The coastal nation may take affirmative actions in its territorial sea to prevent 
passage that is not innocent, including, where necessary, the use of force. If a 
foreign ship enters the territorial sea and engages in non-innocent activities, the 
appropriate remedy, consistent with customary international law, is first to 
inform the vessel of the reasons why the coastal nation questions the innocence 
of the passage, and to provide the vessel a reasonable opportunity to clarify its 
intentions or to correct its conduct in a reasonably short period of time. 29 
2.3.2.2 Pennitted Restrictions. For purposes such as resource conservation, 
environmental protection, and navigational safety, a coastal nation may establish 
certain restrictions upon the right of innocent passage of foreign vessels. Such 
restrictions upon the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea are not 
prohibited by international law, provided that they are reasonable and necessary; 
do not have the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent 
passage; and do not discriminate in form or in fact against the ships of any nation or 
those carrying cargoes to, from, or on behalf of any nation. The coastal nation may, 
where navigational safety dictates, require foreign ships exercising the ri~ht of 
innocent passage to utilize designated sea lanes and traffic separation schemes. 0 
28. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 16(1} & 17; 1982 LOS Convention, art. 21(1} &21(4}. 
29. This concept of customary intemationallaw was incorporated into the U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
Uniform Interpretation of the Rules ofInternational Law Governing Innocent Passage. See Annex 
A2-2, para. 4 (p. 161). See also Kinley, The Law of Self-Defense, Contemporary Naval Operations, 
and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 19 L. Sea Inst. Proc. 10, 12-15 (1987) 
discussing coastal nation enforcement options in light of the U.N. Charter and the law of the sea, 
particularly articles 25,27,28 and 30 of the 1982 LOS Convention. 
30. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 21. Tankers, nuclear powered vessels, and ships carrying 
dangerous or noxious substances may be required, for safety reasons, to utilize designated sea lanes. 
1982 LOS Convention, art. 22(2}. These controls may be exercised at any time. 
Art. 21 of the 1982 LOS Convention empowers a coastal nation to adopt, with due publicity, laws 
and regulations relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea in respect of all or any of the 
following eight subject areas (which do not include security, but see art. 25(3) re temporary closure 
of the territorial sea for security purposes}: 
1. The safety of navigation and the regulation of marine traffic (including traffic separation 
schemes). 
2. The protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities or installations. 
3. The protection of cables and pipelines. 
4. The conservation ofliving resources of the sea. 
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2.3.2.3 Temporary Suspension of Innocent Passage. A coastal nation may 
suspend innocent passage temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea when 
it is essential for the protection of its security. Such a suspension must be 
preceded by a published notice to the international community and may not 
discriminate in form or in fact among foreign ships.31 
2.3 .2.4 Warships and Innocent Passage. All warships, including submarines, 
enjoy the right of innocent passage on an unimpeded and unannounced basis.32 
Submarines, however, are required to navigate on the surface and to show their 
30.( ... continued) 
5. The prevention of infringement of the fisheries regulations of the coastal nation. 
6. The preservation of the environment of the coastal nation and the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution thereof. 
7. Marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys. 
8. The prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary 
regulations of the coastal nation. 
This list is exhaustive and inclusive. 
The coastal nation is required to give appropriate publicity to any dangers to navigation of which it 
has knowledge within its territorial sea. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 15; 1982 LOS 
Convention, art. 24. The u.S. Inland Rules are discussed in paragraph 2.7.2.1 (p. 146). 
31. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(3); 1982 LOS Convention, art. 25(3). Authorization to 
suspend innocent passage in the U.S. territorial sea during a national emergency is given to the 
President in 50 U.S.C. sec. 191 (1988). See also 33 C.F .R. part 127. "Security" includes suspending 
innocent passage for weapons testing and exercises. 
For instances in which innocent passage has been suspended, see 4 Whiteman 379-86. 
The Conventions do not define how large an area of territorial sea may be temporarily closed off. 
The 1982 LOS Convention does clearly limit the maximum breadth of the territorial sea to 12 
nautical miles, and thus any nation claiming to close areas beyond 12 NM during such a suspension 
would be in violation of international law. The Conventions do not explain what is meant by 
"protection of its security" beyond the example of "weapons exercises" added in the 1982 LOS 
Convention. Further, how long "temporarily" may be is not defined, but it clearly may not be 
factually permanent. Alexander, 39-40; McDougal & Burke 592-93. The prohibition against 
"discrimination in form or fact among foreign ships" clearly refers to discrimination among flag 
nations, and, in the view of the United States, includes direct and indirect discrimination on the 
basis of cargo, port of origin or destination, or means of propulsion. This position is strengthened 
by the provisions of the LOS Convention explicidy dealing with nuclear powered and nuclear 
capable ships (arts. 22(2) & 23). 
See the last subparagraph of paragraph 2.3.3.1 (p. 126) regarding the regime ofnonsuspendable 
innocent passage in international straits. 
32. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(1); 1982 LOS Convention, art. 17. Some nations view 
the mere passage offoreign warships through their territorial sea per se prejudicial (e.g., because of 
the military character of the vessel, the flag it is flying, its nuclear propulsion or weapons, or its 
destination), and insist on prior notice and/or authorization before foreign warships transit their 
territorial sea. See the list of such nations at Table A2-1 (p. 204). The United States' position, 
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flag when passing through foreign territorial seas.33 If a warship does not comply 
with coastal nation regulations that conform to established principles of 
international law and disregards a request for compliance which is made to it, the 
coastal nation may require the warship immediateI; to leave the territorial sea in 
which case the warship shall do so immediately.3 
2.3.2.5 Assistance Entry. All ship and aircraft commanders have an obligation 
to assist those in danger of being lost at sea. See paragraph 3.2.1. This 
long-recognized duty of mariners permits assistance entry into the territorial sea 
by ships or, under certain circumstance~, aircraft without permission of the 
coastal nation to engage in bona fide efforts to render emergency assistance to 
those in danger or distress at sea. This right applies only when the location of the 
danger or distress is reasonably well known. It does not extend to entering the 
32.( ... continued) 
consistent with the travaux preparatoires of the Territorial Sea Convention and the 1982 LOS 
Convention, is that warships possess the same right ofinnocent surface passage as any other vessel in 
the territorial sea, and that right cannot be conditioned on prior coastal nation notice or 
authorization for passage. Oxman, paragraph 2.1, note 2 (p. 109), at 854; Froman, paragraph 
2.3.2.1, note 27 (p. 117), at 625; Harlow, Legal Aspects of Claims to Jurisdiction in Coastal Waters, 
JAG]., Dec. 1969-Jan. 1970, at 86; Walker, What is Innocent Passage?, Nav. War ColI. Rev., Jan. 
1969, at 53 & 63, reprinted in 1 Lillich & Moore, at 365 & 375. The Soviet Union (now Russia) has 
accepted the United States' position. See para. 2 of the Uniform Interpretation of the Rules of 
International Law Governing Innocent Passage, Annex A2-2 (p. 161), and Franckx, Innocent 
Passage ofWarships: Recent Developments in US-Soviet Relations, Marine Policy, Nov. 1990, at 
484-90. For the earlier Soviet views, see Franckx, The U.S.S.R. Position on the Innocent Passage 
of Warships Through Foreign Territorial Waters, 18]. Mar. L. & Com. 33 (1987), and Butler, 
Innocent Passage and the 1982 Convention: The Influence of Soviet Law and Policy, 81 Am.]. 
Int'l L. 331 (1987). Attempts to require prior authorization or notification of vessels in innocent 
passage during the Third LOS Conference were focused on warships. All attempts were defeated: 
3d session, Geneva 1975; 4th session, New York 1976; 9th session, New York 1980; 10th session 
1981; 11th session, New York 1982; and 11th resumed session, Montego Bay 1982. The United 
States' views on innocent passage in the territorial sea were set forth in its 8 March 1983 statement 
in right of reply, 17 LOS Documents 243-44, Annex Al-l (p. 27). 
33. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(6); 1982 LOS Convention, art. 20. Unless the coastal 
nation has consented to submerged passage, which none has done publicly to date Ganuary 1997). 
For discussions of the incident in which the Soviet Whiskey-class submarine U-137 grounded 
outside the Swedish naval base of Karls krona, after having entered Swedish territorial and internal 
waters submerged without Swedish permission, see Sweden and the Soviet Submarine--A Diary 
of Events, 112 Army Q. & Def.]. 6 (1982); Leitenberg, Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish 
Waters 1980-1986 (1987); Bildt, Sweden and the Soviet Submarines, Survival, Summer 1983, at 
168; Lofgren, Soviet Submarines Against Sweden, Strategic Review, Winter 1984, at 36; Delupis, 
Foreign Warships and Immunity for Espionage, 78 Am. J. Int'l L. 53 (1984); Amundsen, Soviet 
Submarines in Scandinavian Waters, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1985, at Ill. 
34. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 23; 1982 LOS Convention, art. 30. A warship required to 
leave for such conduct shall comply with the request to leave the territorial sea immediately. 
Uniform Interpretation of the Rules ofInternational Law Governing Innocent Passage, para. 7, 
Annex A2-2 (p. 161). 
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territorial sea or superjacent airspace to conduct a search, which requires the 
consent of the coastal nation.35 
2.3.3 International Straits 
2.3.3.1 International Straits Overlapped by Territorial Seas. Straits used 
for international navigation through the territorial sea between one part of the 
high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an 
exclusive economic zone are subject to the legal regime of transit passaJte.36 
34.{ ... continued} 
Under art. 23 of the 1982 LOS Convention, foreign nuclear-powered ships, and ships carrying 
nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances, exercising the right of innocent 
passage must "carry documents and observe special precautionary measures established for such 
ships by international agreements," such as Chap. VIII of the 1974 International Convention for 
the Safety of Life at Sea {SaLAS}. 32 U.S.T. 275-77, 287-91, T.I.A.S. 9700 {nuclear passenger 
ship and nuclear cargo ship safety certificates}. These provisions of the 1974 SaLAS are specifically 
not applicable to warships. 
35. Art. 0925, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990; COMDTINST 16100.3, Subj: Search and 
Rescue in Foreign Territory and Territorial Seas, 3 December 1987; National Search and Rescue 
Manual, vol. I, COMDTINST M16120.5A, para. 1222 {1991}. The U.S. Department of State is 
of the view that the right of assistance entry for aircraft is not as fully developed as that for vessels. 
The efforts to render emergency assistance must be undertaken in good faith and not as a 
subterfuge. See Statement of Policy by The Department of State. the Department of Defense, and 
the United States Coast Guard Concerning Exercise of the Right of Assistance Entry, Annex A2-3 
(p. 163). That Statement of Policy, extended to include assistance entry into archipelagic waters, is 
implemented within the Department of Defense by ClCSI 2410.01A, Subj: Guidance for the 
Exercise of Right of Assistance Entry, of23 April 1997. Annex A2-4 (p. 165). 
36. Under the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, international straits overlapped by territorial 
seas were subject to a regime providing only nonsuspendable innocent surface passage. Territorial 
Sea Convention, arts. 14 & 16{4}. Part III of the 1982 LOS Convention establishes the regime of 
transit passage for international straits overlapped by territorial seas. Transit passage also applies in 
those straits where the high seas or exclusive economic zone corridor is not suitable for 
international navigation. See 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 36 & 37. See also Nordquist, Vol. II at 
279-396. 
The United States' view regarding the status of the transit passage regime as existing law is reflected 
in its 3 March 1983 Statement in Right of Reply, Annex Al-l (p. 27), and Presidential 
Proclamation 5928, AnnexAl-6 (p. 78). The right of transit passage was fully recognized in art. 4 
of the Treaty offielimitation between Venezuela and the Netherlands, 21 March 1978, an English 
translation of which is set out in Annex 2 to U.S. Dep't of State, Limits in the Seas No. 105, 
Maritime Delimitations, and in Art. VI of the Agreement on the Delimitation of Maritime and 
Submarine Areas between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago, 18 April 1990, reprinted in U.N. 
LOS Bull., No. 19, Oct. 1991, at 24. Although the term "transit passage" was not used in the 
statement in connection with extension of Great Britain's territorial sea to 12 NM (apparently to 
preclude any implication of incorporation by reference of the entire straits regime, 37 Infl & 
Compo L.Q. 415 (1988», the "transit passage" regime was used in a Declaration issued by 
France and GreatBritain setting out the governing regime of navigation in the Dover Straits in 
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36.( ... continued) 
conjunction with signature on 2 November 1988 of an Agreement establishing a territorial sea 
boundary in the Straits of Dover. U.K. White Paper, France No.1, Cm. 557 (1989); FCO Press 
Release No. 100, 2 Nov. 1988. 
Straits used for internationailiavigation: In the opinion of the International Court of Justice in the 
Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.CJ. 4, reprinted in U.S. Naval War College, International Law 
Documents 1948-1949, "Blue Book" series, 1950, v. 46, at 108 (1950), the decisive criterion in 
identifYing international straits was not the volume of traffic flowing through the strait or its 
relative importance to international navigation, but rather its geographic situation connecting, for 
example, the two parts of the high seas, and the fact ofits being "used for international navigation." 
/d. at 142. This geographical approach is reflected in both the Territorial Sea Convention (art. 
16(4» and the 1982 LOS Convention (arts. 34(1), 36 & 45). The geographical definition appears to 
contemplate a natural and not an artificially constructed canal, such as the Suez Canal. Efforts to 
define "used for international navigation" with greater specificity have failed. Alexander, 153-54. 
The United States holds that all straits susceptible of use for international navigation are included 
within that definition. Grunawalt, United States Policy on International Straits, 18 Ocean Dev. & 
Int'l LJ. 445, 456 (1987). 
Part III of the 1982 LOS Convention addresses five different kinds of straits used for international 
navigation, each with a distinct legal regime: 
1. Straits connecting one part of the high seaslEEZ and another part of the high seas/EEZ 
(art. 37, governed by transit passage, see paragraph 2.3.3.1 (p. 121». 
2. Straits connecting a part of the high seas/EEZ and the territorial sea of a foreign nation 
(art. 45(1)(b), regulated by nonsuspendable innocent passage, see paragraph 2.3.3.1, last 
subparagraph (p. 126». 
3. Straits connecting one part of the high seas/EEZ and another part of the high seas/EEZ 
where the strait is formed by an island of a nation bordering the strait and its mainland, if there exists 
seaward of the island a route through the high seas/EEZ of similar convenience with regard to 
navigation and hydrographical characteristics (art. 38(1), regulated by nonsuspendable innocent 
passage). (Table A2-2 (p. 204) lists 22 such straits, including the Strait of Messina (between the 
Italian mainland and Sicily). Difficulties in defining "mainland" and alternate routes are discussed 
in Alexander, 157-61.) 
4. Straits regulated in whole or in part by international conventions (art. 35(c». The 1982 
LOS Convention does not alter the legal regime in straits regulated by long-standing international 
conventions in force specifically relating to such straits. While there is no agreed complete list of 
such straits, the Turkish Straits and the Strait of Magellan are generally included: 
- the Turkish Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, governed by the Montreux 
Convention of20 July 1936, 173 L.N.T.S. 213, 31 Am.). Int'l L. Supp. 4; and 
- the Straits of Magellall, governed by article V of the Boundary Treaty 
between Argentina and Chile, 23 July 1881, 82 Brit. Foreign & State Papers 1103, 
159 Parry's T.S. 45 (Magellan Straits are neutralized forever, and free navigation is 
assured to the flags of all nations), and article 10 of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship 
between Argentina and Chile, 29 November 1984, 24 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 11, 13 (1985) 
("the delimitation agreed upon herein, in no way affects the provisions of the 
Boundary Treaty 0[1881, according to which the Straits of Magellan are perpetually 
neutralized and freedom of navigation is assured to ships of all flags under the terms of 
ArtS of said Treaty"). 
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Alexander 140-50 and Moore, The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea, 74 Am.]. Int'lL. 77,111 (1980) also list in this category TI,e Oresund and tile 
Belts, governed by the Treaty for the Redemption of the Sound Dues, Copenhagen, 14 March 
1857,116 Parry's T.S. 357, 47 Brit. Foreign & State Papers 24, granting free passage of the Sound 
and Belts for all flags on 1 April 1857, and the U.S.-Danish Convention on Discontinuance of 
Sound Dues, 11 April 1857, 11 Stat. 719, T.S. 67, 7 Miller 519, 7 Bevans 11, guaranteeing "the free 
and unencumbered navigation of American vessels, through the Sound and the Belts forever" (see 
Figure A2-1 (p. 190». Warships were never subject to payment of the so-called "Sound Dues," 
and thus it can be argued that no part of these "long-standing international conventions" are 
applicable to them. 7 Miller 524-86; 2 Bmel, International Straits 41 (1947). The U.S. view is that 
warships and State aircraft traverse the Oresund and the Belts based either under the conventional 
right of "free and unencumbered navigation" or under the customary right of transit passage. The 
result is the same: an international right of transit independent of coastal nation interference. The 
Danish view is, however, to the contrary. Alexandersson, The Baltic Straits 82-86 & 89 (1982). 
Both Denmark and Sweden (Oresund) maintain that warship and State aircraft transit in the Baltic 
Straits are subject to coastal nation restrictions. They argue that the "longstanding international 
conventions" apply, as "modified" by longstanding domestic legislation. The United States does 
not agree. SeeTableA2-3 (p. 205) (listing the Bosporus, Dardanelles, Magellan, Oresund and Store 
Baelt) and Alexander, 140-50. 
Sweden and Finland claim Aland's Hav, the 16 NM wide entrance to the Gulf ofBothnia, 
as an exception to the transit passage regime, since passage in that strait is regulated in part by the 
Convention relating to the Non-fortification and Neutralization of the Aaland Islands, Geneva, 20 
Oct. 1921, 9 L.N.T .S. 211, art. 5 ("The prohibition to send warships into [the waters of the Aaland 
Islands] or to station them there shall not prejudice the freedom ofinnocent passage through the 
territorial waters. Such passage shall continue to be governed by the international rules and usage in 
force.") Declarations on signature of the 1982 LOS Convention, 10 December 1982. It should be 
noted that under art. 4.11 of the 1921 Convention, the territorial sea of the Aaland Islands extends 
only "three marine miles" from the low-water line and in no case extends beyond the outer limits 
of the straight line segments set out in art. 4.1 of that convention. The 1921 Convention is therefore 
not applicable to the remaining waters that form the international strait. The United States, which 
is not a party to this Convention, has never recognized this strait as falling within art. 35(c) of the 
LOS Convention. The parties to the 1921 Convention include Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Italy, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Estonia and Latvia. 
It may be noted that free passage of the Strait oj Gibraltar was agreed to in a series of 
agreements between France, Spain and Great Britain in the early 20th Century. Article VII of the 
Declaration between the United Kingdom and France respecting Egypt and Morocco, London, 8 
April 1904, 195 Parry's T.S. 198, acceded to by Spain in the Declaration of Paris, 3 Oct. 1904, 196 
Parry's T.S. 353; Declarations on Entente on Mediterranean Affairs, Paris, 16 May 1907, 204 
Parry's T.S. 176 (France and Spain) and London, 16 May 1907, 204 Parry's T.S. 179 (United 
Kingdom and Spain); and art. 6 of the France-Spain Convention concerning Morocco, Madrid, 27 
Nov. 1912, 217 Parry's T.S. 288. 
5. Straits through archipelagic waters governed by archipelagic sea lanes passage (art. 53(4) 
(see paragraph 2.3.4.1 (p. 127». For a listing of nations claiming the status of archipelagic States in 
accordance with the 1982 LOS Convention see Table Al-7 (p. 101). 
There are a number of straits connecting the high seas/EEZ with claimed historic waters (see Table 
A2-4 (p. 206». The validity of those claims is, at best, uncertain (see paragraph 1.3.3.1 (p. 11». The 
regime of passage through such straits is discussed in Alexander, at 155. 
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2.3.3.1 International Straits Overlapped by Territorial Seas. Straits used 
for international navigation through the territorial sea between one part of the 
high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an 
1 . . b· h 1 gal . f· 36 exc USlve econonuc zone are su ~ect to tee regtme 0 transIt passaJte. 
Transit passage exists throughout the entire strait and not just the area overlapped 
by the territorial sea of the coastal nation(s). 
36.( ... continued} 
Canals. Man-made canals used for international navigation by definition are not "straits used for 
international navigation," and are generally controlled by agreement between the countries 
concerned. They are open to the use of all vessels, although tolls may be imposed for their use. 
They include: 
- the Panama Canal, governed by the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty, 33 U.S. T. 
1, T.LA.S. 10,029, ("in time of peace and in time of war it shall remain secure and 
open to peaceful transit by the vessels of all nations on terms of entire equality .... 
Vessels of war and auxiliary vessels of all nations shall at all times be entided to transit 
the Canal, irrespective of their internal operation, means of propulsion, origin, 
destination or armament"); 
- the Suez Canal, governed by the Convention respecting the Free 
Navigation of the Suez Canal, Constantinople, 29 October 1888, 79 Brit. Foreign & 
State Papers 18, 171 Parry's T.S. 241, 3 Am.]. Int'l L. Supp. 123 (1909) ("the Suez 
maritime canal shall always be free and open, in time of war and in time of peace, to 
every vessel of commerce or war, without distinction offlag"), reaffirmed by Egypt in 
its Declaration on the Suez Canal, 24 April 1957, U.N. Doc. A/3576 (S/3818), and 
U.N. Security Council Res. 118, S/3675, 13 Oct. 1956 ("There should be free and 
open transit through the Canal without discrimination, overt or covert-this covers 
both political and technical aspects"), Dep't St. Bull., 22 Oct. 1956, at 618; and 
- the Kiel Canal, governed by art. 380 of the Treaty of Versailles, 28 June 
1919, T.S. 4,13 Am.]. Int'IL. 128, Malloy 3329, 2 Bevans 43, 225 Parry'sT.S. 188 
("the Kiel Canal and its approaches shall be maintained free and open to the vessels of 
commerce and of war of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of entire 
equality"). The Federal Republic of Germany does not consider the Treaty of 
Versailles to apply to the Kiel Canal. Alexander, at 181. See also TIle SS Wimbledon, 
P.C.!J., Sere A, No.1, 1923. 
The passage of nuclear powered warships through the Suez Canal is discussed in paragraph 2.1.2.1, 
note 9 (p. 110). Canals are further discussed in Alexander, at 174-81. Other canals may involve 
internal waters only, such as the U.S. Intracoastal Waterway, and the Cape Cod and Erie Canals. 
37. The great majority of strategically important straits, i.e., Gibraltar (Figure A2-2 (p. 191», 
Bab el Mandeb (Figure A2-3 (p. 192», Hormuz (Figure A2-4 (p. 193», and Malacca (Figure A2-5 
(p. 194» fall into this category. Transit passage regime also applies to those straits less than six miles 
wide previously subject to the regime of nonsuspendable innocent passage under the Territorial 
Sea Convention, e.g., Singapore and Sundae See Table A2-5 (p. 207). It should be noted that transit 
passage exists throughout the entire strait and not just the area overlapped by the territorial seas of 
the littoral nation(s}. Navy JAG message 061630Z]UN 88 (Annex A2-5, (p. 175». See, e.g., 
Figure A2-4 (p. 193). 
38. 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 38(2} & 39(1}(c}; Moore, The Regime of Straits and The 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 74 Am.J. Int'lL. 77, 95-102 (1980); 1 
O'Connell 331-37 . Compare art. 53(3} which defines the parallel concept of archipelagic sea lanes 
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Under international law, the ships and aircraft of all nations, including 
warships, auxiliaries, and military aircraft, enjoy the right of unimpeded transit 
passage through such straits and their approaches.37 Transit passage is defined as 
the exercise of the freedoms of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of 
continuous and expeditious transit in the normal modes of operation utilized by 
ships and aircraft for such passage.38 This means that submarines are free to transit 
international straits submerged, since that is their normal mode of operation, and 
that surface warships may transit in a manner consistent with sound navigational 
practices and the security of the force, including formation steaming and the 
launching and recovery of aircraft.39 All transiting ships and aircraft must 
proceed without delay; must refrain from the threat or the use offorce against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of nations bordering 
the strait; and must otherwise refrain from any activities other than those incident 
to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit. 40 
Transit passage through international straits cannot be hampered or suspended 
by the coastal nation for any purpose during peacetime.4 This principle of 
international law also applies to transiting ships (including warships) of nations at 
peace with the bordering coastal nation but involved in armed conflict with 
h . 42 anot er natton. 
Coastal nations bordering international straits overlapped by territorial seas may 
designate sea lanes and prescribe traffic separation schemes to promote navigational 
safety. However. such sea lanes and separation schemes must be approved by the 
38.( ... continued) 
passage as "the exercise ... of the rights of navigation and overflight in the nomla/mode solely for the 
purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit between one part of the high seas or 
an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone." The 
emphasized words do not appear in art. 38(2), but rather in the plural in art. 39(1)(c); art. 39 also 
applies mutatis mutandis to archipelagic sea lanes passage. 
39. Burke, Submerged Passage Through Straits: Interpretations of the Proposed Law of the Sea 
Treaty Text, 52 Wash. L. Rev. 193 (1977); Robertson, Passage Through International Straits: A 
Right Preserved in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 20 Va.]. Int'l L. 
801 (1980); Clove, Submarine Navigation in International Straits: A Legal Perspective, 39 Naval 
L. Rev. 103 (1990). But see Reisman, The Regime of Straits and National Security: An Appraisal of 
International Lawmaking, 74 Am.]. Int'l L. 48 (1980). See also Nordquist, Vol. II at 342. 
40. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 39(1). 
41. Id., at art. 44. 
42. Warships and other targetable vessels of nations in armed conflict with the bordering 
coastal nation may be attacked within that portion of the international strait overlapped by the 
territorial sea of the belligerent coastal nation, as in all high seas or exclusive economic zone waters 
that may exist within the strait itsel£ 
43. 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 41(1) & 41(3). Traffic separation schemes have been adopted 
for the Bab el Mandeb (Figure A2-3, (p. 192)), Hormuz (Figure A2-4, (p. 193)), Gibraltar (Figure 
A2-2, p. (191)), and Malacca-Singapore straits (Figure A2-5, (p. 194)). 
44. Merchant ships and government ships operated for commercial purposes must respect 
properly designated sea lanes and traffic separation schemes. Warships, auxiliaries and government 
ships operated for non-commercial purposes, e.g., sovereign immune vessels (see paragraph 2.1 
(continued ... ) 
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competent international organization (the International Maritime Organization) 
in accordance with generally accepted international standards.43 Ships in transit 
must respect properly designated sea lanes and traffic separation schemes.44 
The regime of innocent passa~e (see paragraph 2.3.2.1), rather than transit 
passage, applies in straits used for international navigation that connect a part of 
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone with the territorial sea of a coastal 
nation. There may be no suspension of innocent passage through such straits. 45 
2.3.3.2 International Straits Not Completely Overlapped by Territorial 
Seas. Ships and aircraft transiting through or above straits used for international 
navigation which are not completely overlapped by territorial seas and through 
which there is a high seas or exclusive economic zone corridor suitable for such 
navigation, enjoy the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight while 
44.{ ... continued) 
(p. 109» are not legally required to comply with such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes while 
in transit passage. Sovereign immune vessels must, however, exercise due regard for the safety of 
navigation. Warships and auxiliaries may, and often do, voluntarily comply with IMO-approved 
routing measures in international straits when practicable and compatible with the military 
mission. When voluntarily using an IMO-approved traffic separation scheme, such vessels must 
omply with applicable provisions of the 1972 International Regulations for Preventing Collision at 
Sea (COLREGS). (Annex A2-6 (p. 179». 
45. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 45. These so-called "dead-end" straits include Head Harbour 
Passage, the Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Passage, and the Gulf of Honduras. Moore, The Regime of 
Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 74 Am.]. Int'l L. 112 
(1980). Alexander, 154-55 & 186 n.46, asserts the Strait of Juan de Fuca, which is capable of 
shallow water passage, would belong in this list when the U.S. clairns a 12 NM territorial sea, as it 
now does. 
As between Israel and Egypt at least, the Strait ofTiran (Figure A2-6, (p. 195» is governed by the 
Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, 26 March 1979,18 Int'ILeg. Mat'Is 362, art. V(2) ("the 
Parties consider the Strait ofTiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all 
nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight"). See the list at 
Table A2-4 (p. 206). Israel did not object to Part III of the LOS Convention "to the extent that 
particular stipulations and understandings for a passage regime for specific straits, giving broader rights to 
their users, are protected, as is the case for some of the straits in my country's region, or of interest to my 
country." 17 LOS Official Records 84, para. 19. Egypt's declaration accompanying its ratification of 
the LOS Convention on 26 August 1983 stated "[t]he provisions of the 1979 Peace Treaty Between 
Egypt and Israel concerning passage though the Strait ofTiran and the Gulf of Aqaba come within the 
framework of the general regime of waters forming straits referred to in part III of the Convention, 
wherein it is stipulated that the general regime shall not affect the legal status of waters forming straits 
and shall include certain obligations with regard to security and the maintenance of order in the State 
bordering the strait." At a 29 January 1982 press conference, U.S. LOS Ambassador Malone said, "the 
U.S. fully supports the continuing applicability and force offreedom of navigation and overflight for the 
Strait ofTiran and the Gulf of Aqaba as set out in the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. In the U.S. 
view, the Treaty of Peace is fully compatible with the LOS Convention and will continue to prevail. 
The conclusion of the LOS Convention will not affect these provisions in any way." 128 Congo Rec. 
S4089, 27 April 1982. Compare Lapidoth, The Strait ofTiran, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the 1979 Treaty of 
Peace Between Egypt and Israe~ 77 Am.]. Int'l L. 84 (1983) lIIith EI Baradei, The Egyptian-Israeli 
Peace Treaty and Access to the Gulf of Aqaba: A New Legal Regime, 76 id. 532 (1982). 
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operating in and over such a corridor. Accordingly, so long as they remain 
beyond the territorial sea, all ships and aircraft of all nations have the 
unencumbered right to navigate through and over such waters subject only to 
due regard for the right of others to do so as well.46 
2.3.4 Archipelagic Waters 
2.3.4.1 Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage. All ships and aircraft, including 
warships and military aircraft, enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage while 
transiting through, under or over archipelagic waters and adjacent territorial seas 
via all routes normally used for international navigation and overflight. 
Archipelagic sea lanes passage is defined under international law as the exercise of 
the freedom of navigation and overflight for the sole purpose of continuous, 
expeditious and unobstructed transit through archipelagic waters, in the normal 
modes of operations, by the ships and aircraft involved.47 This means that 
submarines may transit while submerged48 and that surface warships may carry out 
those activities normally undertaken during passage through such waters, 
including activities necessary to their security, such as formation steaming and the 
launching and recovery of aircraft. The right of archipelagic sea lanes passage is 
substantially identical to the right of transit passage through international straits (see 
paragraph 2.3.3.1).49 When archipelagic sea lanes are properly designated by the 
archipelagic nation, the following additional rules apply: 
1. Each such designated sea lane is defined by a continuous axis line from the 
point of entry into the territorial sea adjacent to the archipelagic waters, through 
those archipelagic waters, to the point of exit from the territorial sea beyond. 50 
2. Ships and aircraft engaged in archipelagic sea lanes passage through such 
designated sea lanes are required to remain within 25 nautical miles either side of 
the axis line and must approach no closer to the coast line than 10 percent of the 
distance between the nearest islands. See Figure 2_1.51 
46. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 36. See Table A2-5 (p. 207). Table A2-6 (p. 209) lists other 
straits less than 24 NM wide which could have a high seas route if the littoral nations continue to 
claim less than a 12 NM territorial sea. While theoretically the regime of transit passage would 
apply if the corridor is not suitable for passage, Alexander found no such strait. Alexander at 
151-52. Compare, however, the suitability for the passage of deep draft tankers through the waters 
in the vicinity of Abu Musa Island in the southern Persian Gul£ 
47. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 53(3). 
48. Nordquist, Vol. II at 342 (para. 39.10(e» and 476-77 (paras. 53.9(c) & 53.9(d». 
49. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 54. See discussion at paragraph 2.3.4.2, note 56 (p. 128). 
50. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 53(5). 
51. !d. 
52. ld., art 53(3). See also Nordquist, Vol. II at 476-77. 
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This right of archipelagic sea lanes passage, through designated sea lanes as 
well as through all nonnal routes, cannot be hampered or suspended by the 
hi l · . fc 52 arc pe aglc natlon or any purpose. 
2.3.4.2 Innocent Passage. Outside of archipelagic sea lanes, all ships, 
including warships, enjoy the more limited right of innocent fassage throughout 
archipelagic waters just as they do in the territorial sea.5 Submarines must 
remain on the surface and fly their national flag. Any threat or use of force 
directed against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of 
the archipelagic nation is prohibited. Lau~ching and recovery of aircraft are not 
allowed, nor may weapons exercises be conducted. The archipelagic nation may 
promulgate and enforce reasonable restrictions on the right of innocent passage 
through its archipelagic waters for reasons of navigational safe~ and for customs, 
fiscal, immigration, fishing, pollution, and sanitary purposes.5 Innocent passage 
may be suspended temporarily by the archipelagic nation in specified areas ofits 
archipelagic waters when essential for the protection of its security, but it must 
first promulgate notice of its intentions to do so and must apply the suspension in 
a nondiscriminating manner. 55 There is no right of overflifht through airspace 
over archipelagic waters outside of archipelagic sea lanes.5 
53. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 52(1). 
54. !d., arts. 52(1), 53 & 2l. 
55. !d., art. 52(2). 
56. Most of the essential elements of the transit passage regime in non-archipelagic 
international straits (paragraph 2.3.4.1 (p. 127)) apply in straits forming part of an archipelagic sea 
lane. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 54, applying mutatis mutandis art. 39 (duties of ships and aircraft 
during transit passage), 40 (research and survey activities), and 42 and 44 (laws, regulations and 
duties of the bordering State relating to passage). This right exists regardless of whether the strait 
connects high seas/EEZ with archipelagic waters (e.g., Lombok Strait) or connects two areas of 
archipelagic waters with one another (e.g., Wetar Strait). Alexander, 155-56. Although 
theoretically only the regime of innocent passage exists in straits within archipelagic waters not part 
of an archipelagic sea lane (paragraph 2.3.4.2 (p. 128); 1982 LOS Convention, art. 52(1); 
Alexander, 156), since archipelagic sea lanes "shall include all normal passage routes ... and all 
nonnal navigational channels ... " (art. 53(4)), the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage 
effectively applies to these straits as well. 
If a nation meets all the criteria but has not claimed archipelagic status, then high seas freedoms exist 
in all maritime areas outside the territorial seas of the individual islands; transit passage applies in 
straits susceptible of use for international navigation; and innocent passage applies in other areas of 
the territorial sea. See also u.S. Statement in Right of Reply, Annex A1-1 (p.27). 
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FIGURE 2-1. A Designated Archipelagic Sea Lane 
DISTANCE IETWEEN ISLAHDS A AND. II 4D NIl, SIIlPS AND AIR· 
CRAFT MUST APPItOACH NO CLOSER THAN .. NY TO EITHER 
ISLAND (1D P!JICENTOF DlSTANC! BETWEEN ISLANDS). 
2.4 NAVIGATION IN AND OVERFLIGHT OF 
INTERNATIONAL WATERS 
2.4.1 Contiguous Zones. The contiguous zone is comprised of international 
waters in and over which the ships and aircraft, including warships and military 
aircraft, of all nations enj oy the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight as 
described in paragraph 2.4.3. Although the coastal nation may exercise in those 
waters the control necessary to prevent and punish infringement of its customs, 
fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws that may occur within its territory 
(including its territorial sea), it cannot otherwise interfere with international 
.. d rfli h' d b h' 57 naVlgatlon an ove g t 10 an a ove t e contlguous zone. 
2.4.2 Exclusive Economic Zones. The coastal nation's jurisdiction and 
control over the exclusive economic zone are limited to matters concerning the 
exploration, exploitation, management, and conservation of the resources of 
those international waters. The coastal nation may also exercise-in the zone 
jurisdiction over the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations, and 
structures having economic purposes; over marine scientific research (with 
reasonable limitations); and over some aspects of marine environmental 
57. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24; 1982 LOS Convention, art. 33. See paragraph 2.4.4 
(p. 132) regarding security zones. 
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protection. Accordingly, the coastal nation cannot unduly restrict or impede the 
exercise of the freedoms of navigation in and overflight of the exclusive 
economic zone. Since all ships and aircraft, including warships and military 
aircraft, enjoy the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and other 
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms, in and over those 
waters, the existence of an exclusive economic zone in an area of naval 
operations need not, of itself, be of operational concern to the naval 
commander. 58 
2.4.2.1 Marine Scientific Research. Coastal nations may regulate marine 
scientific research conducted in marine areas under theirjurisdiction. This includes 
the EEZ and the continental she1£59 Marine scientific research includes activities 
undertaken in the ocean and coastal waters to expand knowledge of the marine 
environment for peaceful purposes, and includes: oceanography, marine biology, 
geological/geophysical scientific surveying, as well as other activities with a 
scientific purpose. The United States does not require that other nations obtain its 
consent prior to conducting marine scientific research in the U.s. EEZ.60 
2.4.2.2 Hydrographic Surveys and Military Surveys. Although coastal 
nation consent must be obtained in order to conduct marine scientific research in 
its exclusive economic zone, the coastal nation cannot regulate hydrographic 
surveys or military surveys conducted beyond its territorial sea, nor can it require 
notification of such activities.61 
A hydrographic survey is the obtaining of information in coastal or relatively 
shallow areas for the purpose of making navigational charts and similar products to 
support safety of navigation. A hydrographic survey may include measurements of 
the depth of water, configuration and nature of the natural bottom, direction and 
force of currents, heights and times of tides, and hazards to navigation.62 
58. 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 56, 58 & 60; see paragraph 1.5.2, note 49 (p. 21). A few 
nations explicidy claim the right to regulate the navigation offoreign vessels in their EEZ beyond 
that authorized by customary law reflected in the LOS Convention: Brazil, Guyana, India, 
Maldives, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan and the Seychelles. See Tables A2-7 (p. 210) and A2-8 
(p. 211); Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law 51-52,81 & 85-86 (1987); 
Rose, Naval Activity in the EEZ-Troubled Waters Ahead?, 39 Naval L. Rev. 67 (1990). The 
United States rejects those claims. U.S. Statement in Right of Reply, Annex A1-1 (p. 27), and 
1983 Oceans Policy Statement, Annex A1-3 (p. 43). 
59. 1982 LOS Convention art. 246. 
60. See Annex A1-7 (p. 80). 
61. See Commentary accompanying Letter of Transmittal, Oct. 7, 1994, Senate Treaty Doc. 
103-39 (Annex A1-2 (p. 32)), at 80. The Commentary may be found in U.S. State Department, 
Dispatch, Vol. 6, Supp. No.1 (Feb. 1995). 
62. Roach, Research and Surveys in Coastal Waters, Vol. 20 Center for Oceans Law and 
Policy, UV A, Annual Seminar (1996), at 187. 
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A military survey is the collecting of marine data for military purposes. A 
military survey may include collection of oceanographic, marine geological, 
geophysical, chemical, biological, acoustic, and related data.63 
2.4.3 High Seas. All ships and aircraft, including warships and military aircraft, 
enjoy complete freedom of movement and operation on and over the high seas. 
For warships, this includes task force maneuvering, flight operations, military 
exercises, surveillance, intelligence gathering activities, and ordnance testing and 
firing. All nations also enjoy the right to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the 
bed of the high seas as well as on the continental shelfbeyond the territorial sea, 
with coastal nation approval for the course of pipelines on the continental 
she1£64 All of these activities must be conducted with due regard for the rights of 
other nations and the safe conduct and operation of other ships and aircraft. 65 
63. !d., at 187-88. See also Roach, Marine Scientific Research and the New Law of the Sea, 27 
Ocean Dev. & Int'l L. 59 (1996) at 61. 
64. Submarine cables include telegraph, telephone and high-voltage power cables. 
Commentary of the International Law Commission on draft arts. 27 and 35 on the law of the sea, 
U.N. GAOR Supp. 9, U.N. Doc. A/3159, II Int'l L. Comm. Y.B. 278 & 281 (1956). See also 
Commentary accompanying Letters of Transmittal and Submittal in U.S. Department of State, 
Dispatch, Vol. 6, Supp. No.1 (Feb. 1995) at 19. All nations enjoy the right to lay submarine cables 
and pipelines on the bed of the high seas as well as on their own and other nations' continental 
shelves. Consequendy, SOSUS arrays can be lawfully laid on other nations' continental shelves -
beyond the territorial sea without notice or approval. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 79. 
Willfully or with culpable negligence damaging a submarine cable or pipeline, except in legitimate 
life-saving or ship-saving situations, is a punishable offense under the laws of most nations. In 
addition, provisions exist for compensation from a cable owner for an anchor, net or other fishing 
gear sacrificed in order to avoid injuring the cable. Warships may approach and visit a vessel, other 
than another warship, suspected of causing damage to submarine cables in investigation of such 
incidents. Convention on the Protection of Submarine Cables, Paris, 14 March 1884,24 Stat. 989, 
T .S. No. 380, as amended, 25 Stat. 1414, T .S. Nos. 380-1, 380-2, 380-3, reproduced in AFP 11 0-20 at 
36-1; Franklin, The Law of the Sea: Some Recent Developments 157-178 (U.S. Naval War 
College, International Law Studies 1959-1960, v. 53, 1961) (discussing the boarding 9fthe Soviet 
trawler NOVOROSSIISK by USS ROY O. HALE on 26 February 1959, 40 Dep't St. Bull. 555-58 
(1959)). The 1884 Submarine Cables Convention is implemented in 47 u.s.c. sec. 21 etseq. (1982). 
65. High Seas Convention, art. 2; Continental Shelf Convention, art. 4; 1982 LOS 
Convention, arts. 79 & 87; Chicago Convention, art. 3( d) (military aircraft). The exercise of any of 
these freedoms is subject to the conditions that they be taken with "reasonable regard", according 
to the High Seas Convention, or "due regard", according to the 1982 LOS Convention, for the 
interests of other nations in light of all relevant circumstances. The "reasonable regard" or "due 
regard" standards are one and the same and require any using nation to be cognizant of the interests 
of others in using a high seas area, and to abstain from nonessential, exclusive uses which 
substantially interfere with the exercise of other nations' high seas freedoms. Any attempt by a 
nation to impose its sovereignty on the high seas is prohibited as that ocean space is designated open 
to use by all nations. High Seas Convention, art. 2; 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 87 & 89. See 
MacChesney 610-29. Section 101(c) of the Deep Seabed and Hard Minerals Resources Act, 30 
U.S.C. sec. 1411(c) (1988), requires U.S. citizen licensees to exercise their rights on the high seas 
with reasonable regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high 
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2.4.3.1 Warning Areas. Any nation may declare a temporary warning area in 
international waters and airspace to advise other nations of the conduct of 
activities that, although lawful, are hazardous to navigation and/or overflight. 
The U.S. and other nations routinely declare such areas for missile testing, 
gunnery exercises, space vehicle recovery operations, and other purposes 
entailing some danger to other lawful uses of the high seas by others. Notice of 
the establishment of such areas must be promulgated in advance, usually in the 
form of a Notice to Mariners (NOTMAR) and/or a Notice to Airmen 
(NOT AM). Ships and aircraft of other nations are not required to remain outside 
a declared warning area, but are obliged to refrain from interfering with activities 
therein. Consequently, ships and aircraft of one nation may operate in a warning 
area within international waters and airspace declared by another nation, collect 
intelligence and observe the activities involved, subject to the requirement of 
due regard for the rights of the declaring nation to use international waters and 
airspace for such lawful purposes.66 
2.4.4 Declared Security and Defense Zones. International law does not 
recognize the right of any nation to restrict the navigation and overflight of 
65.( ... continued) 
seas. Section 111, codified at 30 U.S.C. sec. 1421, requires licensees to act in a manner that does 
not unreasonably interfere with interests of other States in their exercise of freedom of the high 
seas, as recognized under general principles of international law . 
A legislative history of the articles of the 1982 LOS Convention regarding navigation on the high 
seas (arts. 87, 89-94 and 96-98) may be found in U.N. Office for Oceans Affilirs and the Law of the 
Sea, The Law of the Sea: Navigation on the High Seas, U.N. Sales No. E.89.V.2 (1989). See also 
Commentary, paragraph 2.4.2.2, note 61 (p. 130) at 17-19; Nordquist, Vol. III at 72-86. 
66. Franklin, paragraph 2.4.3, note 64 (p. 131), at 178-91; SECNAVINST 2110.3 (series), 
Subj: Special Warnings to Mariners; OPNAVINST 3721.20 (series), Subj: The U.S. Military 
Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) System. 
For example, in response to the terrorist attacks on U.S. personnel in Lebanon on 18 April and 23 
October 1983, involving the use of extraordinarily powerful gas-enhanced explosive devices light 
enough to be carried in cars and trucks, single engine private aircraft, or small high-speed boats, 
U.S. forces in the Mediterranean off Lebanon and in the Persian Gulf took a series of defensive 
measures designed to warn unidentified ships and aircraft whose intentions were unknown from 
closing within lethal range of suicide attack. Warnings were promulgated through NOTMARS 
and NOT AMS requesting unidentified contacts to communicate on the appropriate international 
distress frequency and reflected NCA authorization of commanders to take the necessary and 
reasonable steps to prevent terrorist attacks on U.S. forces. See 78 Am.]. Int'l L. 884 (1984). 
The effectiveness of such attacks was firmly established by the 23 October 1983 levelling of the 
USMC BLT 1/8 Headquarters building at Beirut International Airport by a truck bomb 
generating the explosive power of at least 12,000 pounds effective yield equivalent of TNT. 
Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October23, 1983 
(Long Commission Report), 20 Dec. 1983, at 86; Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon 1982-1984, at 
152 (1987); Navy Times, 15 Dec. 1986, at 11. 
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foreign warships and military aircraft beyond its territorial sea. Although several 
coastal nations have asserted claims that purport to prohibit warships and military 
aircraft from operating in so-called security zones extending beyond the 
territorial sea, such claims have no basis in intemationallaw in time of peace, and 
are not recognized by the United States.67 
The Charter of the United Nations and general principles ofintemationallaw 
recognize that a nation may exercise measures of individual and collective 
self-defense against an armed attack or imminent threat of armed attack. Those 
measures may include the establishment of "defensive sea areas" or "maritime 
control areas" in which the threatened nation seeks to enforce some degree of 
control over foreign entry into those areas. Historically, the establishment of 
such areas extending beyond the territorial sea has been restricted to periods of 
war or to declared national emergency involving the outbreak of hostilities. 
Intemationallaw does not determine the geographic limits of such areas or the 
degree of control that a coastal nation may lawfully exercise over them, beyond 
laying down the general requirement of reasonableness in relation to the needs of 
national security and defense.68 
67. Leiner, Maritime Security Zones: Prohibited Yet Perpetuated, 24 Va.]. Int'l L. 967,980 & 
984-88 (1984). See paragraph 1.5.4, note 54 (p. 23). U.S. protest of the "restricted area" established 
by Libya within 100 NM radius of Tripoli is recorded in 1973 Digest of U.S. Practice in 
International Law 302-03. See also 1975 id. 451-52; 1977 id. 636; Note-Air Defense Zones, 
Creeping Jurisdiction in the Airspace, 18 Va.]. Int'l L. 485 (1978). Roach & Smith discuss 
so-called "security zones" at 104-106. 
68. Difense Zones. Measures of protective jurisdiction referred to in this paragraph may be 
accompanied by a special proclamation defining the area of control and describing the types of 
control to be exercised therein. Typically, this is done where a state of belligerence exists, such as 
during World War II. In addition, so-called "defensive sea areas," though usually limited in past 
practice to the territorial sea, occasionally have included areas of the high seas as well. See U.S. 
Naval War College, International Law Documents, "Blue Book" series, 1948-49, v. 46 (1950) at 
157-76, MacChesney 603-04 & 607. 
The statute authorizing the President to establish defensive sea areas by Executive Order (18 
U.S.C. sec. 2152 (1988)) does not restrict these areas to the territorial sea. Executive Orders 
establishing defensive sea areas are promulgated by the Department of the Navy in OPNA VINST 
5500.11 (series) and 32 C.F.R. part 761. It should also be noted that establishment of special control 
areas extending beyond the territorial sea, whether established as "defensive sea areas" or 
"maritime control areas," has been restricted in practice to periods of war or of declared nationhl 
emergency. On the other hand, in time of peace the United States has exercised, and continues to 
exercise, jurisdiction over foreign vessels in waters contiguous to its territorial sea consistent with 
the authority recognized in art. 24 of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention and art. 33 of the 1982 
LOS Convention. This limited jurisdiction has, of course, been exercised without establishing 
special defensive sea areas or maritime control areas covering such waters. NWlP 10-2, art. 413d 
n.21. See Woods, State and Federal Sovereignty Claims Over the Defensive Sea Areas in Hawaii, 
39 Nav. L. Rev. 129 (1990). 
Closed Seas and Zones rif Peace. Proposals have been advanced at various times to exclude 
non-littoral warships from "closed" seas such as the Black Sea or Baltic Sea, where water access is 
limited, or from the entire Indian Ocean as a designated "zone of peace." These claims have not 
gained significantlegal or political momentum orsupport and are not recognized by the United 
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2.4.5 Polar Regions 
2.4.5.1 Arctic Region. The U.S. considers that the waters, ice pack, and 
airspace of the Arctic region beyond the lawfully claimed territorial seas oflittoral 
nations have international status and are open to navigation by the ships and 
aircraft of all nations. Although several nations have, at times, attempted to claim 
sovereignty over the Arctic on the basis of discovery, historic use, contiguity 
(proximity), or the so-called "sector" theory, those claims are not recognized in 
international law. Accordingly, all ships and aircraft enjoy the freedoms of high 
seas navigation and overflight on, over, and under the waters and ice pack of the 
Arctic region beyond the lawfully claimed territorial seas of littoral states.69 
68.( ... continued) 
States. Views of the fonner-Soviet Union on closed seas are discussed in Darby, The Soviet 
Doctrine of the Closed Sea, 23 San Diego L. Rev. 685 (1986). See also paragraph 1.3.3.1, note 23 
(p. 11). The proposed Indian Ocean Zone of Peace is discussed in Alexander, at 339-40. 
Nuclear free zones are discussed in paragraph 2.4.6 (p. 136). 
69. Arctic operations are described in Lyon, Submarine Combat in the Ice, U.S. Naval Inst. 
Proc., Feb. 1992, at 33; Allard, To the North Pole!, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., Sept. 1987, at 56; 
LeSchack, ComNavForArctic, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., Sept. 1987, at 74; Atkeson, Fighting Subs 
Under the Ice, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., Sept. 1987, at 81; Le Marchand, Under Ice Operations, Nav. 
War Coli. Rev., May-June 1985, at 19; and Caldwell, Arctic Submarine Warfare, The Submarine 
Rev., July 1983, at 5. Alexander, Navigational Restrictions 311-19 & 358-59, notes the following 
unilateral claims that adversely impact on navigational freedoms through Arctic straits: 
- The [fonner] U.S.S.R. claims the White Sea and Cheshskaya Gulf to the 
east as historic waters, and has delimited a series of straight baselines along its Arctic 
coast closing off other coastal indentations, as well as joining the coastal islands and 
island groups with the mainland, thereby purporting to close off the major straits of 
the Northeast Passage. See Franckx, Non-Soviet Shipping in the Northeast Passage, 
and the Legal Status of Proliv Vil'kitskogo, 24 Polar Record 269 (1988). 
- Norway has delimited straight baselines about the Svalbard Archipelago 
that do not confonn to art. 7 of the 1982 LOS Convention. 
- Canada purports to close off its entire Arctic archipelago with straight 
baselines and declares that the waters within the baselines - including the 
Northwest Passage - are internal waters. 24 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 1728 (1985). See 
Figures A2-7 (p. 196) and A2-8 (p. 197). The United States has not accepted that 
claim. See the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government 
of the United States of America on Arctic Cooperation, 11 January 1988, 28 Int'l 
Leg. Mat'ls 142 (1989). The negotiation of this agreement is discussed in Howson, 
Breaking the Ice: The Canadian-American Dispute over the Arctic's Northwest 
Passage, 26 Colum. J. Trans. L. 337 (1988). The October 1988 transit by the 
icebreaker USCGC POLAR STAR pursuant to this agreement is discussed ill 83 
Am. J. Int'l L. 63 and 28 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 144-45 (1989); the POLAR STAR's 
August 1989 transit is summarized in West, Breaking Through the Arctic, U.S. 
Naval Inst. Proc., Jan. 1990, at 57. The Canadian claim is discussed in Pullen, What 
Price Canadian Sovereignty?, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., Sept. 1987, at 66 (Captain 
Pullen, Canadian Navy retired, argues that the Northwest Passage is the sea route 
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2.4.5.2 Antarctic Region. A number of nations have asserted conflicting and 
often overlapping claims to portions of Antarctica. These claims are premised 
variously on discovery, contiguity, occupation and, in some cases, the "sector" 
theory. The U.S. does not recognize the validity of the claims of other nations to 
. f hAn· 70 any pomon 0 t e tarctlc area. 
2.4.5.2.1 The Antarctic Treaty of 1959. The U.S. is a party to the 
multilateral treaty of1959 governing Antarctica.71 Designed to encourage the 
scientific exploration of the continent and to foster research and experiments in 
Antarctica without regard to conflicting assertions of territorial sovereignty, the 
1959 accord provides that no activity in the area undertaken while the treaty is in 
force will constitute a basis for asserting, supporting, or denying such claims. 72 
The treaty also provides that Antarctica "shall be used for peaceful purposes 
only," and that "any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of 
military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as 
the testing of any type of weapons" shall be prohibited.73 All stations and 
installations, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargo 
or personnel in Antarctica, are subject to inspection by designated foreign 
observers?4 Therefore, classified activities are not conducted by the U.S. in 
Antarctica, and all classified material is removed from U.S. ships and aircraft prior 
to visits to the continent?5 In addition, the treaty prohibits nuclear explosions 
and disposal of nuclear waste anywhere south of 600 South Latitude.76 The 
treaty does not, however, affect in any way the high seas freedoms of navigation 
69.( ... contined} 
that links the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans north of America, and lists the 36 transits of the Passage 
from 1906 to 1987}. See Figure A2-8 (p. 197). See also MacInnis, Braving the Northwest Passage, 
Nat'l Geog., May 1989, at 584-601 and Roach & Smith, at 207-215. 
Other Arctic straight baselines not drawn in conformity with the 1982 LOS Convention include 
those around Iceland and Danish-drawn lines around Greenland and the Faeroe Islands. 
70. Although the United States would be fully justified in asserting a claim to sovereignty over 
one or more areas of Antarctica on the basis of its extensive and continuous scientific activities 
there, it has not done so. See Joyner, Maritime Zones in the Southern Ocean: Problems conceming 
the Correspondence of Natural and Legal Maritime Zones, 10 Applied Geog. 307 (1990); 
Hinckley, Protecting American Interests in the Antarctic: The Territorial Claims Dilemma, 39 
Naval L. Rev. 43 (1990). 
71. Antarctic Treaty, Washington, 1 December 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794; 402 U.N.T.S. 71; 
T.1.A.S. 4780; text reprinted in AFP 110-20 at 4-21. Its provisions apply south of 60° South 
Latitude. 
72. Art. IV.2. 
73. Art. 1.1. 
74. Art. VI1.3. 
75. For further information and guidance, see DOD Directive 2000.6, Subj: Conduct of 
Operations in Antarctica, and OPNA VINST 3120.20 (series), Subj: Navy Policy in Antarctica and 
Support of the U.S. Antarctic Program. 
76. Arts. V and VI. 
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and overflight in the Antarctic region. Antarctica has no territorial sea or 
territorial airspace. 
2.4.6 Nuclear Free Zones. The 1968 Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation 
Treaty,77 to which the United States is a party, acknowledges the right of 
groups of nations to conclude regional treaties establishing nuclear free 
zones.
78 Such treaties or their provisions are binding only on parties to them or 
to protocols incorporating those provisions. To the extent that the rights and 
freedoms of other nations, including the .high seas freedoms of navigation and 
overflight, are not infringed upon, such treaties are not inconsistent with 
international law. 79 The 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 80 is an example of a nuclear free zone 
arrangement that is fully consistent with international law, as evidenced by 
U.S. ratification of its two Protocols.81This in no way affects the exercise by 
77. Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Washington, London & Moscow, 
1 July 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483; 729 U.N.T.S. 161; T.I.A.S. 6839. 
78. Id., Art. VII. 
79. The United States, therefore, does not oppose the establishment of nuclear free zones 
provided certain fundamental rights are preserved in the area of their application. These include 
non-interference with the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight beyond the territorial 
sea, the right of innocent passage in territorial seas and archipelagic waters, the right of transit 
passage of international straits and the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage of archipelagic waters. 
Parties to such agreements may, however, grant or deny transit privileges within their respective 
land territory, internal waters and national airspace, to nuclear powered and nuclear capable ships 
and aircraft of non-party nations, including port calls and overflight privileges. Dept St. Bull., Aug. 
1978, at 46-47; 1978 Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law 1668; 1979 Digest of Practice in 
International Law 1844. See also Rosen, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, Nav. War Coll. Rev., 
Autumn 1996, at 44. 
80. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty ofTlateloco), 
Mexico City, 14 February 1967, 22 U.S.T. 762; 64 U.N.T.S. 281, T.I.A.S. 7137; AFP 110-20 at 
4-9, entered into force 22 April 1968. The Treaty ofTlateloco consists of the Treaty and two 
Additional Protocols. The parties to the Treaty are listed in 28 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 1404 (1989). By its 
terms, the United States cannot be a party to the Treaty ofTlateloco since the United States does 
not lie within the zone ofits application. See Figure A2-9 (p. 198). The United States is, however. a 
party to both Additional Protocols. 
81. Additional Protocol I to the Treaty ofTlateloco, 33 U.S.T. 1972; T.I.A.S. 10147; 634 
U.N.T.S. 362, entered into force 11 December1969 (for the U.S., 23 November 1981), and calls 
upon nuclear-weapons nations outside the treaty zone to apply the denuclearization provisions of 
the Treaty to their territories in the zone. As of 1 January 1997, France, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States are parties to Additional Protocol I. Within the Latin 
American nuclear-weapons free zone lie the Panama Canal, Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba, the 
Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. Since Addition Protocol I entered into force for the United States 
on 23 November 1981, the U.S. may not store or deploy nuclear weapons in those areas, but its 
ships and aircraft may still visit these ports and airfields, and overfly them, whether or not these 
ships and aircraft carry nuclear weapons. In this regard, see also Articles III. 1 (e) and VI.l of the 1977 
Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operations of the Panama Canal, 33 U.S.T. 1; 
T.I.A.S. 10,029, which specifically guarantee the right of U.S. military vessels to transit the Canal 
regardless of their cargo or armament. This includes submarines as well as surface ships. The United 
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the U.S. of navigational rights and freedoms within waters covered by the Treaty 
of Tlatelolco. 82 
81.( ... continued) 
States also has the right to repair and service ships carrying nuclear weapons in ports in the Virgin 
Islands, Puerto Rico and Guantanamo when incident to transit through the area. Further, the 
United States retains the right to off-load nuclear weapons from vessels in these ports in the event 
of emergency or operational requirements if such off-loading is temporary and is required in the 
course of a transit through the area. 
The U.S. ratification of Protocol I (and of Protocol II discussed below) was subject to 
understandings and declarations that the Treaty ofTlateloco does not affect the right of a nation 
adhering to Protocol I to grant or deny transit and transport privileges to its own or any other 
vessels or aircraft irrespective of cargo or armaments, and that the treaty does not affect the rights of 
a nation adhering to Protocol I regarding exercise of the freedoms of the seas, or regarding passage 
through or over waters subject to the sovereignty of a Treaty nation. See 28 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 
1410-12 (1989). 
The terms "transit and transport" are not defined in the Treaty. These terms should be interpreted 
on a case-by-case basis, bearing in mind the basic idea that the Treaty was not intended to inhibit 
activities reasonably related to the passage of nuclear weapons through the zone. No Latin 
American party to the Treaty objected when the United States and France made formal statements 
confirming transit and transport rights when ratifYing Protocol II. No Latin American party has 
denied transit or transport privileges on the basis of the Treaty or its Protocols, notwithstanding the 
fact that U.S. military vessels and aircraft frequently engage in transit, port calls and overflights in 
the region, and that it is U.S. policy neither to confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons 
in such cases. 1978 Digest at 1624; Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Hearing 
before Sen. For. ReI. Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 22 Sept. 1981, at 18-20. 
Additional Protocol II to the Treaty ofTlateloco, 22 U.S.T. 754; T.I.A.S. 7137; 634 U.N.T.S. 
364; AFP 110-20 at 4-18, entered into force 11 December 1969 (for the U.S., 12 May 1971) and 
obligates nuclear-weapons nations to respect the denuclearized status of the zone, not to 
contribute to acts involving violation of obligations of the parties, and not to use or threaten to use 
nuclear weapons against the contracting parties (i.e., the Latin American countries). The United 
States ratified Protocol II subject to understandings and declarations, 22 U.S.T. 760; 28 Int'l Leg. 
Mat'ls at 1422-23 (1989), that the Treaty and its Protocols have no effect upon the international 
status of territorial claims; the Treaty does not affect the right of the Contracting Parties to grant or 
deny transport and transit privileges to non-Contracting Parties; that the United States would 
"consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a 
nuclear-weapon State, would be incompatible with the contracting Party's corresponding 
obligations under Article I of the Treaty;" and. although not required to do so, the United States 
will act, with respect to the territories ofProtocol I adherents that are within the Treaty zone, in the 
same way as Protocol II requires it to act toward the territories of the Latin American Treaty 
parties. China, France, the former-Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States are 
parties to Protocol II. 28 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 1413 (1989). See also id. at 1414-23. 
82. Both the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and the 1995 Mrican 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty seek the same goals as the Treaty ofTlateloco. The South 
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty ofRarotonga), Rarotonga, 6 August 1985, 24 Int'l Leg. 
Mat'ls 1442 (1985) entered into force 11 December 1986. The Treaty ofRarotonga consists of the 
Treaty and three Protocols. The Treaty itselfis open only to members of the South Pacific Forum 
(Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, 
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa, all but 
four of whom (Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau and Tonga) are parties. Modeled after the 
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2.5. AIR NAVIGATION 
2.5.1 National Airspace.83 Under international law, every nation has 
complete and exclusive sovereignty over its national airspace, that is, the airspace 
82.( ... continued) 
Treaty of Tlateloco, the Treaty of Rarotonga does not impinge on international freedoms of 
navigation and overflight in the area ofits application (See Figure A2-10 (p. 199». 
- Protocol! to the Treaty ofRarotonga (not in force as ofl January 1997) calls 
upon parties to apply the prohibitions of the Treaty to the territories for which they are 
internationally responsible within the zone. Protocol 1 is open to France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, all of whom are signatories. U.S. ratification of 
Protocol I was awaiting Senate advice and consent as ofl November 1997. 
- Protocol II to the Treaty ofRarotonga (not in force for the U.S. as of 
1 January 1997) calls upon the parties not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons 
against any party of the Treaty. Protocol II is open to China, France, the 
former-Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, all of whom are 
signatories. U.S. ratification of Protocol II was awaiting Senate advice and consent as 
ofl November 1997. 
- Protocol III to the Treaty ofRarotonga (not in force for the U.S. as of 
1 January 1997) calls upon the parties not to test any nuclear explosive device within 
the zone. Protocol III is open to China, France, the former-Soviet Union, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, all of whom are signatories. U.S. ratification 
of Protocol III was awaiting Senate advice and consent as ofl November 1997. 
Mrican Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), (Cairo), 11 April 
1996,35 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 698 (1996) (not in force as oflJanuary 1997). The Treaty ofPelindaba 
consists of the Treaty and three Protocols. The Treaty is open to all Mrican nations. As oflJanuary 
1997, Mauritius was the only African nation to have ratified the Treaty. The Treaty ofPelindaba 
explicitly upholds the freedoms of navigation and overflight of the international community in its 
area of application (see Figure A2-11 (p. 200). 
- Protocol I to the Treaty ofPelindaba (not in force as ofl January 1997) 
calls upon its parties not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons ,vithin the 
Mrican zone (see Figure A2-11 (p. 200). Protocol I is open to China, France, Russia, 
the United Kingdom and the United States, all of whom are signatories except 
Russia. U.S. ratification of Protocol I was awaiting the advice and consent of the 
Senate as ofl November 1997. 
- Protocol II to the Treaty ofPelindaba (not in force as oflJanuary 1997) calls 
upon its parties to refrain from testing any nuclear explosive device within the zone. 
Protocol II is open to China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, all of whom are signatories except Russia. U.S. ratification of Protocol II was 
awaiting the advice and consent of the Senate as ofl November 1997. 
- Protocol III to the Treaty ofPelindaba (not yet in force) applies to nations 
with dependent territories in the zone (e.g., France and Spain) and calls upon them to 
observe certain provisions of the Treaty in those territories. Although France is a 
signatory, neither France nor Spain are parties as of 1 November 1997. 
83. Under international law, airspace is classified under two headings: national airspace 
(airspace over the land, internal waters, archipelagic waters, and territorial sea of a nation) and 
international airspace (airspace over a contiguous zone, an exclusive economic zone, and the high 
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above its territory, its internal waters, its territorial sea, and, in the case of an 
archipelagic nation, its archipelagic waters.84 There is no right of innocent passage of 
aircrqft through the airspace over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters analogous to the 
right ofinnocent passage enjoyed by ships of all nations. 85 Accordingly, unless party to 
an international agreement to the contrary, all nations have complete discretion 
in regulating or prohibiting flights within their national airspace (as opposed to a 
Flight Information Region - see paragraph 2.5.2.2), with the sole exception of 
overflight of international straits and archipelagic sea lanes. Aircraft wishing to 
enter national airspace must identifY themselves, seek or confirm permission to 
land or to transit, and must obey all reasonable orders to land, tum back, or fly a 
prescribed course and/or altitude. Aircraft in distress are entitled to special 
consideration and should be allowed entry and emergency landing rights. 86 
Concerning the right of assistance entry, see paragraph 2.3.2.5. For jurisdiction 
over aerial intruders, see paragraph 4.4. 
2.5.1.1 International Straits Which Connect EEZ/High Seas to 
EEZ/High Seas. All aircraft, including military aircraft, enjoy the right of 
unimpeded transit passage through the airspace above international straits 
overlapped by territorial seas.87 Such transits must be continuous and 
expeditious, and the aircraft involved must refrain from the threat or the use of 
force against the sovereignty, territorial integrtty, or political independence of 
the nation or nations bordering the strait.88 The exercise of the right of 
overflight by aircraft engaged in the transit passage of international straits cannot 
be impeded or suspended in peacetime for any purpose.89 
In international straits not completely overlapped by territorial seas, all 
aircraft, including military aircraft, enjoy high seas freedoms while operating in 
the high seas corridor beyond the territorial sea. (See paragraph 2.5.2 for a 
83.( ... continued) 
seas, and over unoccupied territory (i.e., territory not subject to the sovereignty of any nation, 
suchas Antarctica». Airspace has, in vertical dimension, an upward (but undefined) limit, above 
which is outer space (see paragraph 1.1, note 1 (p. 1) and paragraph 2.9.2 (p. 149». 
84. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 2; Chicago Convention, art. 1; 1982 LOS Convention, 
art. 2. Effective upon the extension of the U.S. territorial sea on 27 December 1988, the Federal 
Aviation Administration extended seaward the limits of controlled airspace and applicability of 
certain air traffic rules. Amendment 91-207,54 Fed. Reg. 265,4 Jan. 1989, amending 14 C.F.R. 
parts 71 and 91, and 54 Fed. Reg. 34292,18 Aug. 1989. 
85. There is also no right of overflight of internal waters and land territory. 
86. Chicago Convention, arts. 5-16. 
87. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 38(1). 
88. !d., art. 38(2). All aircraft must, however, monitor the internationally designated air-traffic 
control circuit or distress radio frequency while engaged in transit passage. Art. 39. 
89. [d., art. 44. 
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discussion of permitted activities in international airspace.) If the high seas 
corridor is not of similar converience (e.g., to stay within the high seas corridor 
would be inconsistent with sound navigational practices), such aircraft enjoy the 
right of unimpeded transit passage through the airspace of the strait.90 
2.5.1.2 Archipelagic Sea Lanes. All aircraft, including military aircraft, enjoy the 
right of unimpeded passage through the airspace above archipelagic sea lanes. The 
right of overflight of such sea lanes is essentially identical to that of transit passage 
through the airspace above international straits overlapped by territorial seas.91 
2.5.2 International Airspace. International airspace is the airspace over the 
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone, the high seas, and territories not 
subject to national sovereignty (el' Antarctica). All international airspace is 
open to the aircraft of all nations. 2 Accordingly, aircraft, including military 
aircraft, are free to operate in international airspace without interference from 
coastal nation authorities. Military aircraft may engage in flight operations, 
including ordnance testing and firing, surveillance and intelligence gathering, 
and support of other naval activities. All such activities must be conducted with 
due re~rd for the rights of other nations and the safety of other aircraft and of 
vessels. 3 (Note, however, that the Antarctic Treaty prohibits military 
maneuvers and weapons testing in Antarctic airspace.94) These same principles 
apply with respect to the overflight of high seas or EEZ corridors through that 
part of international straits not overlapped by territorial seas.95 
2.5.2.1 Convention on International Civil Aviation. The United States is a 
party to the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (as are most 
nations). That multilateral treaty, commonly referred to as the "Chicago 
Convention," applies to civil aircraft.96 It does not apply to military aircraft or 
AMC-charter aircraft designated as "state aircraft" (see paragraph 2.2.2), other 
than to require that they operate with "due regard for the safety of navigation of 
civil aircraft.,,97 The Chicago Convention established the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) to develop international airnavigation principles 
90. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 38(1). See also, Nordquist, Vol. II at 312-315. 
91. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 53. As in the case of transit passage, all aircraft overflying 
archipelagic sea lanes must monitor the internationally designated air-traffic control circuit or 
distress radio frequency. 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 39 & 54. 
92. High Seas Convention, art. 2; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24; 1982 LOS Convention, 
arts. 87, 58 & 33. 
93. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 87(2), Chicago Convention, art. 3(d). 
94. See paragraph 2.4.5.2.1 (p. 135). 
95. 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 35(b), 87 & 58. 
96. Art. 3(a); text reprinted ill AFP 110-20, at 6-3. 
97. Art.3(d). 
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and techniques and to "promote safety of flight in international air 
. . ,,98 
naVlganon. 
Various operational situations do not lend themselves to ICAO flight 
procedures. These include military contingencies, classified missions, politically 
sensitive missions, or routine aircraft carrier operations. Operations not 
conducted under I CAO flight procedures are conducted under the" due regard" 
standard. (For additional information see DOD Dir. 4540.1 and OPNAVINST 
3770.4 (series) and the Coast Guard Air Operations Manual, COMDTINST 
M3710.1 (series).) 
2.5.2.2 Flight Information Regions. A Flight Information Region (FIR) is a 
\ 
defined area of airspace within which flight infonnation and alerting services are 
provided. FIRs are established by ICAO for the safety of civil aviation and 
encompass both national and international airspace. Ordinarily, but only as a 
matter of policy, U.s. military aircraft on routine point-to-point flights through 
international airspace follow ICAO flight procedures and utilize FIR services. As 
mentioned above, exceptions to this policy include military contingency 
operations, classified or politically sensitive missions, and routine aircraft carrier 
operations or other training activities. When U.S. military aircraft do not follow 
ICAO flight procedures, they must navigate with "due regard" for civil aviation 
safety.99 
Some nations, however, purport to require all military aircraft in international 
airspace within their FIRs to comply with FIR procedures, whether or not they 
utilize FIR services or intend to enter national airspace. 100 The U.s. does not 
recognize the right of a coastal nation to apply its FIR procedures to foreign 
military aircraft in such circumstances. Accordingly, U.S. military aircraft not 
intending to enter national airspace need not identify themselves or otherwise 
98. Art.44(h). 
99. Chicago Convention, art. 3 (d); DOD Directive 4540.1; 9 Whiteman 430-31; AFP 
110-31, at 2-9 to 2-10 n.29. Acceptance by a government of responsibility in international airspace 
for a FIR region does not grant such government sovereign rights in international airspace. 
Consequendy, military and State aircraft are exempt from the payment of en route or overflight 
fees, including charges for providing FIR services, when merely transiting international airspace 
located in the FIR. The normal practice of nations is to exempt military aircraft from such charges 
even when operating in national airspace or landing in national territory. The only fees properly 
chargeable against State aircraft are those which can be related direcdy to services provided at the 
specific request of the aircraft commander or by other appropriate officials of the nation operating 
the aircraft. 1993 State message 334332. 
100. The United States has protested such claims by Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Peru, and 
has asserted its right to operate its military aircraft in the international airspace of their FIRs without 
notice to or authorization from their Air Traffic Control authorities. See Roach & Smith at 
231-34. 
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comply with FIR procedures established by other nations, unless the U.S. has 
specifically agreed to do so.101 
2.5.2.3 Air Defense Identification Zones in International Airspace. 
International law does not prohibit nations from establishing Air Defense 
Identification Zones (ADIZ) in the international airspace adjacent to th-::ir 
territorial airspace. The legal basis for ADIZ regulations is the right of a nation to 
establish reasonable conditions of entry into its territory. Accordingly, an aircraft 
approaching national airspace can be required to identify itself while in 
international airspace as a condition of entry approval. ADIZ regulations 
promulgated by the U.S. apply to aircraft bound for U.S. territorial airspace and 
require the filing of flight plans and periodic position reports. 102 The U.S. does 
not recognize the right of a coastal nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to 
foreign aircraft not intending to enter national airspace nor does the U.S. apply 
its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter U.S. airspace. 
Accordingly, U.S. military aircraft not intending to enter national airspace need 
not identify themselves or otherwise comply with ADIZ procedures established 
by other nations, unless the U.S. has specifically agreed to do so.103 
It should be emphasized that the foregoing contemplates a peacetime or 
nonhostile environment. In the case of imminent or actual hostilities, a nation 
may find it necessary to take measures in self-defense that will affect overflight in 
. . al· 104 
mternauon alrspace. 
101. Chicago Convention, arts. 3(a), 11, 28; OPNAVINST 3770.4 (series), promulgating 
DOD Directive 4540.1, Subj: Use of Airspace by U.s. Military Aircraft and Firings Over the High 
Seas. Applicable ROE should also be consulted. See also ALLANTFLT 016/97 (CINCLANTFL T 
MSG 101900Z OCT 97). 
102. United States air defense identification zones have been established by Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) regulations, 14 C.F.R. part 99. (The ADIZs for the contiguous U.S. are set 
out in 14 C.F.R. part 99.42; for Alaska in 99.43; for Guam in 99.45 and for Hawaii in 99.47.) In 
order that the Administrator may properly carry out the responsibilities of that office, the authority 
of the Administrator has been extended into the airspace beyond the territory of the United States. 
U.S. law (49 U.S.C. sec. 1510) grants the president the power to order such extraterritorial 
extension when requisite authority is found under an international agreement or arrangement; the 
president invoked this power by Exec. Order 10,854, 27 November 1959, 3 C.F.R. part 389 
(1959-1963 Comp.). See also MacChesney 579-600; NWIP 10-2, art. 422b. 
103. Chicago Convention, art. 11; OPNAVINST 3770.4 (series), promulgating DOD 
Directive 4540.1, Subj: Use of Airspace by U.S. Military Aircraft and Firings Over the High Seas; 
OPNAVINST 3772.5 (series), Subj: Identification and Security Control of Military Aircraft; 
General Planning Section, DoD Flight Information publications. Appropriate ROE should also be 
consulted. 
104. See also paragraph 2.4.4, note 68 (p. 133). 
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2.6 EXERCISE AND ASSERTION OF NAVIGATION AND 
OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
As announced in the President's United States Oceans Policy statement ofl0 
March 1983, 
"The United States will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and 
freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of 
interests reflected in the [1982 LOS] convention. The United States will not, 
however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights 
and freedoms of the international conununity in navigation and overflight and 
other related high seas uses." 
When maritime nations appear to acquiesce in excessive maritime claims and 
fail to exercise their rights actively in the face of constraints on international 
navigation and overflight, those claims and constraints may, in time, be 
considered to have been accepted by the international community as reflecting 
the practice of nations and as binding upon all users of the seas and superjacent 
airspace. Consequently, it is incumbent upon maritime nations to protest 
diplomatically all excessive claims of coastal nations and to exercise their 
navigation and overflight rights in the face of such claims. The President's 
Oceans Policy Statement makes clear that the United States has accepted this 
responsibility as a fundamental element of its national policy. 105 
105. Annex Al-3 (p. 43). See U.S. Dep't State, GIST: US Freedom of Navigation Program, 
Dec. 1988, Annex A2-7 (p. 186); and DOD Instruction C2005.1, Subj: U.S. Program for the 
Exercise of Navigation and Overflight Rights at Sea (U). See also Roach & Smith, at 255; National 
Security Strategy of the United States, August 1991, at 15; and Rose, Naval Activity in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone--Troubled Waters Ahead?, 39 Naval L. Rev. 67,85-90 (1990). On 23 
September 1989 the United States and the former-Soviet Union issued a joint statement (Annex 
A2-2 (p. 161» in which they recognized "the need to encourage all States to harmonize their 
intemal laws, regulations and practices" with the navigational articles of the 1982 LOS 
Convention. 
The 1982 LOS Convention was designed in part to halt the creepingjurisdictional claims of coastal 
nations, or ocean enclosure movement. While that effort appears to have met with some success, it 
is clear that many nations currently purport to restrict navigational freedoms by a wide variety of 
means that are neither consistent with the 1982 LOS Convention nor with customary 
international law. See Negroponte, Who Will Protect the Oceans?, Dep't St. Bull., Oct. 1986, at 
41-43; Smith, Global Maritime Claims, 20 Ocean Dev. & Int'lL. 83 (1989). Alexander warns ofa 
continuation of the ocean enclosure movement. He particularly sees more unauthorized 
restrictions on the movement of warships , military aircraft and "potentially polluting" vessels in 
the territorial seas and EEZ, and on transit passage in international straits. Alexander 369-70. The 
United States' view regarding the consistency of certain claims of maritime jurisdiction with the 
provisions of the LOS Convention is set forth in its 3 March 1983 Statement in Right of Reply, 
Annex Al-l (p. 27). 
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105. ( ... continued) 
Since 1948, the Department of State has issued approximately 150 protest notes to other nations 
concerning their excessive maritime claims, as well as engaging in numerous bilateral discussions with 
many countries. Negroponte, Current Developments in U.S. Oceans Policy, Dep't St. Bull., Sept. 
1986, at 84,85; Navigation Rights and the Gulf of Sidra, Dep't St. Bull., Feb. 1987, at 70; Roach, 
Excessive Maritime Claims, 1990 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l L. 288, 290; Roach & Smith, at 4. United 
States responses to excessive maritime claims are discussed in Limits in the Seas No. 112 (1992). 
See 1 O'Connell 38-44 for a discussion of the significance of protest in the law of the sea. Compare 
Colson, How Persistent Must the Persistent Objector Be?, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 957, at 969 (1986): 
First, States should not regard legal statementS of position as provocative political acts. 
They are a necessary tool of the international lawyer's trade and they have a purpose 
beyond the political, since, occasionally, States do take their legal disputes to court. 
Second, there is no requirement that a statement of position be made in a particular 
form or tone. A soft tone and moderate words may still effectively make the necessary 
legal statement. 
Third, action by deed probably is not necessary to protect a State's legal position as a 
persistent objector when that State has otherwise clearly stated its legal position. 
Action by deed, however, promotes the formation oflaw consistent with the action 
and deeds may be necessary in some circumstances to slow erosion in customary legal 
practice. 
Fourth, not every legal action needs an equal and opposite reaction to maintain one's 
place in the legal cosmos. 
Fifth, the more isolated a State becomes in its legal perspective, the more active it 
must be in restating and making clear its position. 
"The exercise of rights-the freedoms to navigate on the world's oceans-is not meant to be a 
provocative act. Rather, in the framework of customary international law, it is a legitimate, 
peaceful assertion of a legal position and nothing more." Negroponte, Who Will Protect the 
Oceans?, Dep't St. Bull., Oct. 1986, at 42. In exercising its navigational rights and freedoms, the 
United States "will continue to act stricdy in conformance with international law and we will 
expect nothing less from other countries." Schachte, The Black Sea Challenge, U.S. Naval Inst. 
Proc., June 1988, at 62. 
"Passage does not cease to be innocent merely because its purpose is to test or assert a right disputed 
or wrongfully denied by the coastal State." Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the 
International Court of Justice, 27 Br. Y.B. Int'l L. 28 (1950), commenting on the Corfu Channel 
Case in which the Court held that the United Kingdom was not bound to abstain from exercising 
its right ofinnocent passage which Albania had illegally denied. 1949 IC] Rep. 4, 4 Whiteman 356. 
The Special Working Committee on Maritime Claims of the American Society oflnternational 
Law has advised that 
programs for the routine exercise of rights should be just that, "routine" rather than 
unnecessarily provocative. The sudden appearance of a warship for the first time in 
years in a disputed area at a time of high tension is unlikely to be regarded as a largely 
inoffensive exercise related solely to the preservation of an underlying legal position. 
Those responsible for relations with particular coastal states should recognize that, so 
long as a program of exercise of rights is deemed necessary to protect underlying legal 
positions, delay for the sake of immediate political concerns may invite a deeper 
dispute at a latter [sic] time. 
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105.( ... continued) 
Am. Soc. Int'l L. Newsletter, March-May 1988, at 6. 
The United States has exercised its rights and freedoms against a variety of objectionable claims, 
including: unrecognized historic waters claims; improperly drawn baselines for measuring 
maritime claims; territorial sea claims greater than 12 NM; and territorial sea claims that impose 
impermissible restrictions on the innocent passage of any type of vessel, such as requiring prior 
notification or authorization. Since the policy was implemented in 1979, the United States has 
exercised its rights against objectionable claims of over 35 nations, including the former-Soviet 
Union, at the rate of some 30-40 per year. Department of State Statement, 26 March 1986, Dep't 
St. Bull., May 1986, at 79; Navigation Rights and the Gulf of Sidra, Dep't St. Bull., Feb. 1987, at 
70. See also, Roach & Smith, at 6. 
Perhaps the most widely publicized of these challenges has occurred with regard to the Gulf of 
Sidra (closing line drawn across the Gulf at 300 30'N). See Figure A2-12 (p. 201) and Annex A2-8 
(p. 188). The actions of the United States are described in Spinatto, Historic and Vital Bays: An 
Analysis ofLibya's Claim to the Gulf of Sidra, 13 Ocean Dev. & Int'l LJ. 65 (1983); N.Y. Times, 
27 July 1984, at 5; and Parks, Crossing the Line, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., Nov. 1986, at 40. 
Other publicized examples include the tranSits of the Black Sea in November 1984 and March 
1986 (Washington Post, 19 March 1986, at 4 & 21; Christian Science Monitor, 20 March 1986, at 
1,40) and in February 1988 (N.Y. Times, 13 Feb. 1988, at 1 & 6) challenging the Soviet limitations 
on innocent passage, see paragraph 2.3.2.1, note 27 (p. 117), and of Avacha Bay, Petropavlovsk in 
May 1987 (straight baseline) (Washington Post, 22 May 1987, atA34). Most challenges, however, 
have occurred without publicity, and have been undertaken without protest or other reaction by 
the coastal nations concerned. 
Some public commentary on the Black Sea operations has incorrecdy characterized the passage as 
being not innocent. Rubin, Innocent Passage in the Black Sea? Christian Sci. Mon., 1 Mar. 1988, 
at 14; Carroll, Murk}' Mission in the Black Sea, Wash. Post Nat'l Weekly Ed., 14-20 Mar. 1988, at 
25; Carroll, Black Day on the Black Sea, Arms Control Today, May 1988, at 14; Arkin, Spying in 
the Black Sea, Bull. of Atomic Scientists, May 1988, at 5. Authoritative responses include 
Armitage, Asserting U.S. Rights On the Black Sea, Arms Control Today, June 1988, at 13; 
Schachte, The Black Sea Challenge, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., June 1988, at 62; and Grunawalt, 
Innocent Passage Rights, Christian Sci. Mon., 18 Mar. 1988, at 15. See also, Note, Oceans Law and 
Superpower Relations: The Bumping of the Yorktown and the Caron in the Black Sea, 29 Va.]. 
Int'l L. 713 (1989); Franckx, Innocent Passage of Warships, Marine Policy, Nov. 1990, at 484-90; 
Rolph, Freedom of Navigation and the Black Sea Bumping Incident: How "Innocent" Must 
Innocent Passage Be? 135 Mil. L. Rev. 137 (1992); and Aceves, Diplomacy at Sea: U.S. Freedom 
of Navigation Operations in the Black Sea, Nav. War ColI. Rev., Spring 1993, at 59. Mere 
incidental observation of coastal defenses could not suffice to render noninnocent a passage not 
undertaken for that purpose. Fitzmaurice, this note, 27 Br. Y.B. Int'l L. 29, n.l, quoted in 4 
Whiteman 357. 
Other claims not consistent with the 1982 LOS Convention that adversely affect freedoms of 
navigation and overflight and which are addressed by the U.S. FON program include: 
- claims to jurisdiction over maritime areas beyond 12 NM which purport to 
restrict non-resource related high seas freedoms, such as in the EEZ (paragraph 2.4.2 
(p. 129» or security zones (paragraph 2.4.4 (p. 132»; 
- archipelagic claims that do not conform with the 1982 LOS Convention 
(paragraph 2.3.4 (p. 127», or do not permit archipelagic sea lanes passage in 
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2.7 RULES FOR NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY FOR VESSELS 
AND AIRCRAFT 
2.7.1 International Rules. Most rules for navigational safety governing surface 
and subsurface vessels, including warships, are contained in the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, known infonnally as the 
"International Rules of the Road" or "72 COLREGS." 106 These rules apply to all 
international waters (i.e., the high seas, exclusive economic zones, and contiguous 
zones) and, except where a coastal nation has established different rules, in that 
nation's territorial sea, archipelagic waters, and inland waters as well. The 1972 
COLREGS have been adopted as law by the United States. (See Title 33 U.S. 
Code, Sections 1601 to 1606). Article 1139, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, directs 
that all persons in the naval service responsible for the operation of naval ships and 
craft "shall diligently observe" the 1972 COLREGS. Article 4-1-11 of U.S. Coast 
Guard Regulations (COMDTINST M5000.3 (series)) requires compliance by 
Coast Guard personnel with all Federal law and regulations. 
2.7.2 National Rules. Many nations have adopted special rules for waters 
subject to their territorial sovereignty (i.e., internal waters, archipelagic waters, 
and territorial seas). Violation of these rules by U.S. government vessels, 
including warships, may subject the U.S. to lawsuit for collision or other 
damage, provide the basis for diplomatic protest, result in limitation on U.S. 
fc . h fc· . 107 access to orelgn ports, or prompt ot er orelgn actlOn. 
2.7.2.1 U.S. Inland Rules. The U.S. has adopted special Inland Rules108 
applicable to navigation in U.S. waters landward of the demarcation lines 
105.( ... continued) 
confonnity with the 1982 LOS Convention, including submerged passage of 
submarines and overflight of military aircraft, and transit in a manner of 
deployment consistent with the security of the forces involved (paragraph 2.3.4.1 
(p. 127)); and 
- territorial sea claims that overlap international straits, but do not permit 
transit passage (paragraph 2.3.3.1 (p. 121)), or that require advance notification or 
authorization for warships and auxiliaries, or apply discriminatory requirements to 
such vessels (paragraph 2.3.2.4 (p. 119)), or apply requirements not recognized by 
international law to nuclear powered warships or nuclear capable warships and 
auxiliaries (paragraph 2.3.2.4, note 32 (p. 119)). 
See also Boma, Troubled Waters off the Land of the Morning Calm: AJob for the Fleet, Nav. War 
ColI. Rev., Spring 1989, at 33. 
106. 28 U.S.T. 3459, T.I.A.S. 8587, 33 U.S.C. sec. 1602 note (1988), 33 C.F.R. part 81, 
app.A. 
107. See U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, art. 1139. 
108. 33 U.S.C. sec. 2001 et seq. (1988), implemented in 33 C.F.R. parts 84-90. 
International Status and Navigation of Warships 147 
established by U.S. law for that purpose. 109 (See U.S. Coast Guard publication 
Navigational Rules, International- Inland, COMDTINST M16672.2 (series), 
Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations part 80, and Title 33 U.S. Code, sections 
2001 to 2073.) The 1972 COLREGS apply seaward of the demarcation lines in 
U.S. national waters, in the U.S. contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone, 
and on the high seas. 
2.7.3 Navigational Rules for Aircraft. Rules for air navigation m 
international airspace applicable to civil aircraft may be found in Annex 2 (Rules 
of the Air) to the Chicago Convention, DOD Flight Infonnation Publication 
(FLIP) General Planning, and OPNAVINST 3710.7 (series) NATOPS. The 
same standardized technical principles and policies of ICAO that apply in 
international and most foreign airspace are also in effect in the continental 
United States. Consequently, U.S. pilots can fly all major international routes 
following the same general rules of the air, using the same navigation equipment 
and communication practices and procedures, and being governed by the same 
air traffic control services with which they are familiar in the United States. 
Although ICAO has not yet established an "International Language for 
Aviation," English is customarily used internationally for air traffic control. 
2.8 U.S.-U.S.S.R. AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF 
INCIDENTS ON AND OVER THE mGH SEAS 
In order better to assure the safety of navigation and flight of their respective 
warships and military aircraft during encounters at sea, the United States and the 
fonner Soviet Union in 1972 entered into the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on the 
Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas. This Navy-to-Navy 
agreement, popularly referred to as the "Incidents at Sea" or "~NCSEA" 
agreement, has been highly successful in minimizing the potential for harassing 
actions and navigational one-upmanship between U.S. and fonner Soviet units 
operating in close proximity at sea. Although the agreement applies to warships 
and military aircraft operating on and over the "high seas," it is understood to 
embrace such units operating in all international waters and international airsgace, 
including that of the exclusive economic zone and the contiguous zone. 11 
109. Such demarcation lines do not necessarily coincide with the boundaries ofintemal waters 
or the territorial sea. For the U.S., they are indicated on navigational charts issued by the United 
States Coast and Geographic Survey. 
110. OPNAVINST C5711.94 (series), Subj: US/USSR Incidents at Sea and Dangerous 
Military Activities Agreements; and U.S. Addendum to volume II of ATP 1. The 1972 INCSEA 
Agreement, 23 U.S.T. 1168, T.I.A.S. 7379, and its 1973 Protocol, 24 U.S.T. 1063, T.I.A.S. 7624, 
are reproduced ;11 AFP 110-20, at 36-4. 
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Principal provisions of the INCSEA agreement include: 
1. Ships will observe strictly both the letter and the spirit of the International 
Rules of the Road. 
2. Ships will remain well clear of one another to avoid risk of collision and, 
when engaged in surveillance activities, will exercise good seamanship so as not to 
embarrass or endanger ships under surveillance. 
3. Ships will utilize special signals for signalling their operation and intentions. 
4. Ships of one party will not simulate attacks by aiming guns, missile 
launchers, torpedo tubes, or other weapons at the ships and aircraft of the other 
party, and will not launch any object in the direction of passing ships nor illuminate 
their navigation bridges. 
5. Ships conducting exercises with submerged submarines will show the 
appropriate signals to warn of submarines in the area. 
6. Ships, when approaching ships of the other party, particularly those engaged 
in replenishment or flight operations, will take appropriate measures not to hinder 
maneuvers of such ships and will remain well clear. 
110.( ... continued) 
The INCSEA Agreement does not prescribe minimum fIxed distances between ships or aircraft; 
rules of prudent seamanship and airmanship apply. 
Similar agreements, incorporating the provisions and special signals from the U.S.-U.S.S.R. INCSEA 
Agreement, entered into force between the former-Soviet Union and the United Kingdom on 15 July 
1986 (U.K.T.S. No.5 (1987», the Federal Republic of Germany on 28 October 1988; Canada on 20 
November 1989; France on 4 July 1989; and Italy on 30 November 1989. 
An agreement on the prevention of dangerous military activities between the armed forces of the 
United States and the former-Soviet Union operating in proximity to each other duringpeacetime 
entered into force on 1 January 1990. The agreement provides procedures for resolving incidents 
involving entry into the national territory, including the territorial sea, of the other nation "O\ving 
to circumstances brought about by force majeure, or as a result of unintentional actions by such 
personnel;" using a laser in such a manner that its radiation could cause harm to the other nation's 
personnel or equipment; hampering the activities of the other nation in Special Caution Areas in a 
manner which could cause harm to its personnel or damage to its equipment; and interference with 
the command and conrrol networks of the other party in a manner which could cause harm to its 
personnel or damage to its equipment. The text of the agreement, entided Agreement Between 
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, which was signed in 
Moscow, 12June 1989, appears in 28 Int'I Leg. Mat'ls 879 (1989); see also Leich, Contemporary 
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law-Prevention of Dangerous Military 
Activities, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 917 (1989). 
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7. Aircraft will use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft 
and ships of the other party, in particular ships engaged in launching and landing 
aircraft, and will not simulate attacks by the simulated use of weapons or perfonn 
aerobatics over ships of the other party nor drop objects near them. 
The IN CSEA agreement was amended in a 1973 protocol to extend certain of 
its provisions to include nonmilitary ships. Specifically, the 1973 protocol 
provided that u.S. and Soviet military ships and aircraft shall not make simulated 
attacks by aiming guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes, and other weapons at 
nonmilitary ships of the other party nor launch or drop any objects near 
nonmilitary ships of the other party in such a manner as to be hazardous to these 
ships or to constitute a hazard to navigation. 
The agreement also provides for an annual review meetinfi between Navy 
representatives of the two parties to review its implementation. 11 The IN CSEA 
agreement continues to apply to U.S. and Russian ships and military aircraft.112 
2.9 MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE 
2.9.1 Outer Space Defined. As noted in paragraph 2.5.1, each nation has 
complete and exclusive control over the use of its national airspace. Except when 
exercising transit passage or archipelagic sea lanes passage, overflight in national 
airspace by foreign aircraft is not authorized without the consent of the territorial 
sovereign. However, man-made satellites and other objects in earth orbit may 
overfly foreign territory freely. Although there is no legally defined boundary 
between the upper limit of national airspace and the lower limit of outer space, 
international law recognizes freedom of transit by man-made space objects at 
earth orbiting altitude and beyond.113 
2.9.2 The Law of Outer Space. International law, including the United 
Nations Charter, applies to the outer space activities of nations. Outer space is 
open to exploration and use by all nations. However, it is not subject to national 
appropriation, and must be used for peaceful purposes.114 The term "peaceful 
111. The results of each annual review meeting are promulgated by the Chief of Naval 
Operations to the operational commanders. Consult appropriate Fleet Commander instructions 
and OPORDS for detailed guidance. 
112. The INCSEA Agreement is also in force between the U.S. and Ukraine. Treaties in 
Force 266 (1995). 
113. See paragraph 1.1, note 1 (p. 1) and Schwetje, The Development of Space Law and a 
Federal Space Law Bar, Fed. B. News &]., Sep. 1988, at 316. 
114. Although a number of nations maintain that "peaceful purposes" excludes military 
measures, the United States has consistendy interpreted "peaceful purposes" to mean nonaggressive 
purposes. Military activity not constituting the use of armed force against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, or political independence of another nation, and not otherwise inconsistent 
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purposes" does not preclude military activity. While acts of aggression in 
violation of the United Nations Charter are precluded, space-based systems may 
lawfully be employed to perform essential command, control, communications, 
intelligence, navigation, environmental, surveillance and warning functions to 
. mili' . . . I d' h' d d d h 115 U f assIst tary actlvltles on an ,m t e alr, an on an un er t e sea. sers 0 
outer space must have due regard for the rights and interests of other users. 
2.9.2.1 General Principles of the Law of Outer Space. International law 
governing space activities addresses both the nature of the activity and the 
location in space where the specific rules apply. As set out in paragraph 2.9.1, 
outer space begins at the undefined upper limit of the earth's airspace and extends 
to infinity. In general terms, outer space consists of both the earth's moon and 
other natural celestial bodies, and the expanse between these natural objects. 
The rules of international law applicable to outer space include the following: 
1 A . fr d all' tt6 . ccess to outer space IS ee an open to nations. 
2. Outer space is free from claims of sovereignty and not otherwise subject to 
. al .. 117 
nation appropnatlOn. 
3. Outer space is to be used for peaceful purposes.tt8 
4. Each user of outer space must show due regard for the rights of others. 119 
114.( ... continued) 
with the U.N. Charter, is permissible. The right of self-defense applicable generally in 
international law also applies in space. For a discussion of the U.S. interpretation of "peaceful 
purposes" and related issues see, De Saussure & Reed, Self-Defense--A Right in Outer Space, 7 
AF JAG L. Rev. (No.5) 38 (1985), and Reed, The Outer Space Threaty: 
Freedoms-Prohibitions-Duties, 9 AF JAG L. Rev. (No.5) 26 (1967). 
115. Naval operations in support of national security objectives are increasingly dependent upon 
space systems support services. Today, virtually every fleet unit relies to some extent on space systems 
for support, and the military applications of space technology are steadily increasing. See Holland, 
The Challenge in Space: The Navy's Case, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., Feb. 1990, at 37; Skolnick, The 
Navy's Final Frontier, id. Jan. 1989, at 28; Howard, Satellites and Naval Warfare, id. April 1988, at 
39; Jones, Photographic Satellite Reconnaissance, id., June 1980, at 41; U.S. Naval Space 
Command: Supporting the Fleet, Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 21,1988, at 38-51; 
Burrows, Deep-Black: Space Espionage and National Security (1986); Yost, Spy-Tech (1985); 
Karas, The New High Ground: Strategies and Weapons of Space-Age War (1983); Canan, War in 
Space (1982); Stine, Confrontation in Space (1981); and Jane's Spaceflight Directory (annual). 
116. Art. I, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 27 January 1967, 18 U.S.T. 
2411; T J .A.S. 6347; 610 U.N. T .S. 205; AFP 110-20 at 6-2 [hereinafter "Outer Space Treaty"]. 
117. ld., art. II. 
118. ld., arts. III & IV. 
119. ld., art. IX. 
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5. No nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction may be stationed in outer 
space.120 
6 N I I ·· hib· d 121 . uc ear exp oSlOns In outer space are pro lte. 
7. Exploration of outer space must avoid contamination of the environment of 
outer space and of the earth's biosphere.122 
8. Astronauts must render all possible assistance to other astronauts in distress.123 
2.9.2.2 Natural Celestial Bodies. Natural celestial bodies include the earth's 
moon, but not the earth. Under international law, military bases, installations 
and forts may not be erected nor may weapons tests or maneuvers be undertaken 
on natural celestial bodies. Moreover, all equipment, stations, and vehicles 
located there are open to inspection on a reciprocal basis. There is no 
corresponding right of physical inspection of man-made objects located in the 
expanse between celestial bodies. Military personnel may be employed on 
natural celestial bodies for scientific research and for other activities undertaken 
124 for peaceful purposes. 
2.9.3 International Agreements on Outer Space Activities. The key 
legal principles governing outer space activities are contained in four widely 
ratified multilateral agreements: the 1967 Outer Sface Treaty; 125 the 1968 
Rescue and Return of Astronauts Agreement; 12 the Liability Treaty of 
120. M., art. IV. 
121. Art. I, Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and 
Under Water, 5 August 1963,14 U.S.T. 1313; T.I.A.S. 5433; 480 U.N.T.S. 43; AFP 110-20 at 4-3. 
122. Note 116, Outer Space Treaty, art. IX. 
123. M., art. V. 
124. See paragraph 2.9.2, note 114 (p. 149) for the U.S. interpretation of " peaceful purposes." 
125. See paragraph 2.9.2.1, note 116 (p. 150), regarding the Outer Space Treaty. 
126. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space, 22 April 1968, 19 U.S. T. 7570; T .LA.S. 6599; 672 U.N.T .5. 
119; AFP 110-20 at 6-34. 
127. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 29 June 
1971,24 U.S.T. 2389; T.I.A.S. 7762, AFP 110-20 at 6-37. The "launching nation" is responsible 
for damage. The launching nation is, for purposes of international liability, the nation launching, 
procuring the launch, or from whose territory the launch is made. Thus, with respect to any 
particular space object, more than one nation may be liable for the damage it causes. The launching 
nation is internationally liable for damages even if the launch is conducted entirely by a private, 
commercial undertaking. 
The launching nation is said to be absolutely liable for space-object damage caused on earth or to an 
aircrafr in flight. Liability can be avoided only if it can be shown that the claimant was grossly 
negligent. The question ofliability for space object damage to another space object, at any location 
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1972; 127 and the Space Objects Registration Treaty of1975.128 A fifth, the 1979 
Moon Treaty,129 has not been widely ratified. The United States is a party to all 
of these agreements except the Moon Treaty.130 
2.9.3.1 Related International Agreements. Several other international 
agreements restrict specific types of activity in outer space. The US-USSR 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of1972 prohibits the development, testing, 
and deployment of space-based ABM systems or components. Also prohibited, 
127.( ... continued) 
other than the surface of the earth, is detennined by the relative negligence or fault of the parties 
involved. The Liability Convention elaborates the general principle of international liability for 
damage set forth in Art. VII of the Outer Space Treaty in Arts. la, II, III and VI. Arts. IV and V 
address joint and several liability. The crash of COSMOS 954 in the Canadian Arctic on 24January 
1978 is discussed in Galloway, Nuclear Powered Satellites: The U.S.S.R. Cosmos 954 and the 
Canadian Claim, 12 Akron L. Rev. 401 (1979), and Christol, International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects, 74 Am.]. Int'l L. 346 (1980). The Canadian claim is set forth in 18 Int'l 
Leg. Mat'Is 899-930 (1979); its resolution is at 20 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 689 (1981) wherein the USSR 
agreed to pay C$3M in setdement. See also Lee & Sproule, Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Debris: The Cosmos 954 Claim, 26 Can. YB. Int'l L. 273 (1988). 
There are no "rules of the road" for outer space to determine which spacecraft has the right ofway. 
The Liability Convention does not distinguish between civil and military space objects. If military 
weapons are involved, the irUured nation may take the view that the principle of self-defense, 
rather than the Liability Convention, applies. Advice and consent to U.S. ratification of the 
Convention came only after the Department of State provided assurances to the Senate that it was 
inapplicable to intentionally caused harm. Christol at 367 dting Senate Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, S. Exec. 
Rep. 92-38, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1972). 
128. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 14 January 1975, 28 
U.S.T. 695; T.I.A.S. 8480; 1023 U.N.T.S. 15; AFP 110-20 at 6-42. In order to enhance safety of 
space operations, a dual system for registering space objects launched from earth has been 
established in the Registration Treaty. 
The first obligation is for each launching nation to maintain a registry containing certain 
information about every space object launched. 
The second obligation is to pass this basic information to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations "as soon as practicable," and to advise the Secretary-General when the object is no longer 
in earth orbit. A United Nations registry is thereby maintained for all space objects launched from 
earth. Objects in space remain subject to the jurisdiction and control of the nation of registry. Arts. 
II(1), II(2), III, IV & VIII, Outer Space Treaty, (paragraph 2.9.2.1, note 116 (p. 150). Ifmore than 
one nation is involved in a launch, one of those nations must agree to act as the nation of registry 
(article II(2)). The term "as soon as practicable" is not defined in the Registration Treaty. State 
practice has established that the extent and timeliness of information given concerning space 
missions may be limited as required by national security. 
129. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, 18 
December 1979, 18 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1434 (1979), reprinted in AFP 110-20 at 6-45. 
130. The United States' objections to the Moon Treaty include those advanced regarding the 
deep seabed provisions of the 1982 LOS Convention. See paragraph 1.6, note 57 (p. 24). See also 
Hosenball, Relevant Treaties Governing Space Activities: A Summary of World Wide 
Agreements, Fed. Bar News &]., April 1991, at 128. 
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is any interference with the surveillance satellites both nations use to monitor 
ABM Treaty compliance.131 The ABM Treaty continues in force between the 
U.S. and Russia. 
The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (a multilateral treaty) includes an 
agreement not to test nuclear weapons or to carry out any other nuclear 
I ·· 132 exp OSlons m outer space. 
The 1977 Environmental Modification Convention (also a multilateral 
treaty) prohibits military or other hostile use of environmental modification 
hni . ral· . I di 133 tec ques m seve enVlronments, mc u ng outer space. 
The 1982 International Telecommunication Convention134 and the 1979 
Radio Regulations135 govern the use of the radio frequency spectrum by 
satellites and the location of satellites in the geostationary-satellite orbit. 
2.9.4 Rescue and Return of Astronauts. Both the Outer Space Treaty and 
the Rescue and Return of Astronauts Agreement establish specific requirements 
for coming to the aid of astronauts. The treaties do not distinguish between 
civilian and military astronauts. 
Astronauts of one nation engaged in outer space activities are to render all 
possible assistance to astronauts of other nations in the event of accident or 
distress. If a nation learns that spacecraft personnel are in distress or have made an 
emergency or unintended landing in its territory, the high seas, or other 
international area (e.g., Antarctica), it must notify the launching nation and the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, take immediate steps to rescue the 
personnel if within its territory, and, ifin a position to do so, extend search and 
131. Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, 26 May 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435; T .LA.S. 7503, reprinted 
ill AFP 110-20 at 4-29. Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative, 99 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1972, and Chayes & Chayes, Testing and Development of'Exotic' Systems Under the ABM 
Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1956 (1986), discuss the 
interpretation of the scope of the obligation in article V of the ABM Treaty not to "develop, test or 
deploy space-based ABM systems or components." See 26 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 282 (1987), ide 1130, 
and ide 1743 for additional debates on this issue, as well as 133 Congo Rec. S6623 (19 May 1987), ide 
S12181 (16 Sep. 1987) (State Department Legal Adviser's report to Congress), and ide S6809 (20 
May 1987) (fourth part of Sen. Nunn's restrictive view). See also the series of articles and 
commentaries in Arms Control Treaty Reinterpretation, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1351-1558 (1989). 
132. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under 
Water, 5 August 1963,14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43, reprinted inAFP 110-20, 
at 4-3. See paragraph 10.2.2.5, note 9 (p. 463). 
133. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques, 18 May 1977, 31 U.S. T. 333; T .LA.S. 9614, reprinted in AFP 11 0-20 at 
4-74. 
134. Sen. Treaty Doc. 99-6, Sen. Ex. Rep. 99-4, entered into force for the United States 10 
January 1986. 
135. Sen. Treaty Doc. 97-21, entered into force for the United States 27 October 1983. 
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rescue assistance if a high seas or other international area landing is involved. 
Rescued personnel are to be safely and promptly returned.136 
Nations also have an obligation to inform the other parties to the Outer Space 
Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United Nations if they discover outer 
h hi h . da 137 space p enomena w c constltute a nger to astronauts. 
2.9.S Return of Outer Space Objects. A party to the Rescue and Return of 
Astronauts Agreement must also notifY the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations ifit learns of an outer space object's return to earth in its territory, on the 
high seas, or in another international area. If the object is located in sovereign 
territory and the launching authority requests the territorial sovereign's 
assistance, the latter must take steps to recover and return the object. Similarly, 
such objects found in international areas shall be held for or returned to the 
launching authority. Expenses incurre in assisting the launching authority in 
either case are to be borne by the launching authority. Should a nation discover 
that such an object is of a "hazardous or deleterious" nature, it is entitled to 
immediate action by the launching authority to eliminate the danger of harm 
fi . . 138 rom Its terntory. 
136. Outer Space Treaty, paragraph 2.9.2.1, note 116 (p. 150). art. V; Rescue and Return 
Agreement, paragraph 2.9.3, note 126 (p. 151), arts. 1 - 4. If the astronauts land during an armed 
conflict between the launching nations and the nations in which they land, the law of armed 
conflict would likely apply and permit retention of the astronauts under the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. See Part II, Chapter 11 of this publication. 
137. Outer Space Treaty, art. V. 
138. Rescue and Return Agreement, art. 5. 
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ANNEXA2-1 
R 020525Z JUN 94 
FM CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI 
TO ALPACFLT 
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI 
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA 
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//NOO// 
BT 
UNCLAS //NOOOOO// 
ALPACFLT 016/94 
SUBJ/SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY POLICY 
REF/A/DOC/OPNAV/050CT89 
REF/B/DOC/SECNAV/14SEP90 
REF/C/DOC/CINCPACFLT/24JAN85 
REF/D/DOC/SECNAV/24JAN92 
NARR/REF A IS PARAS 2.1.2 AND 3.2.3 OF NWP-9A. REF B IS 
ARTS 
0828, 0859, AND 0860 OF U.S. NAVY REGULATIONS 1990. REF 
C IS 
CINCPACFLTINST 5440.3H, ART. 2605. REF D IS SECNAVINT 
6210.2, 
QUARANTINE REGULATIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES, PARA I.5. 
RMKS/1. PURPOSE. TO PROVIDE PERIODIC EMPHASIS ON UNITED 
STATES 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY POLICY. REFS A THROUGH DARE 
PERTINENT POLICY DIRECTIVES. 
2. U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT, WARSHIPS, AND AUXILIARIES 
(INCLUDING USNS VESSELS AND AFLOAT PREPOSITIONED FORCE 
SHIPS) ENJOY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM INTERFERENCE· BY 
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES (E.G., POLICE, HEALTH, 
CUSTOMS, IMMIGRATION, MILITARY, ETC.) WHETHER WITHIN 
FOREIGN TERRITORY, FOREIGN TERRITORIAL SEAS/AIRSPACE, OR 
INTERNATIONAL WATERS/AIRSPACE. THIS IMMUNITY PRECLUDES 
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS SUCH AS SEARCH, INSPECTION, 
OR DETENTION; AND ALSO PROHIBITS FOREIGN GOVERNMENTAL 
OFFICIALS FROM EXERCISING AUTHORITY OVER PASSENGERS OR 
CREW WHEN EMBARKED, OR WITH RESPECT TO OFFICIAL OR 
PRIVATE ACTS PERFORMED ON BOARD. 
3. ALTHOUGH IMMUNE FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY 
FOREIGN AUTHORITIES, U.S. MILITARY SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT 
PROCEEDING TO AND FROM A FOREIGN PORT UNDER DIPLOMATIC 
CLEARANCE SHALL COMPLY WITH REASONABLE HOST COUNTRY 
REQUIREMENTS AND/OR RESTRICTIONS ON TRAFFIC, HEALTH, 
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CUSTOMS, IMMIGRATION, QUARANTINE, ETC. NONCOMPLIANCE, 
HOWEVER, IS SUBJECT ONLY TO BEING ASKED TO COMPLY, 
PURSUING DIPLOMATIC PROTEST, OR TO BEING ORDERED TO 
LEAVE THE HOST COUNTRY'S TERRITORY OR TERRITORIAL 
SEA/AIRSPACE, NOT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS. 
4. WHILE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY FOREIGN OFFICIALS TO 
ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH HOST COUNTRY LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 
ARE NOT PERMITTED, COMMANDING OFFICERS, MASTERS, AND 
AIRCRAFT COMMANDERS MAY THEMSELVES, OR THROUGH THEIR 
REPRESENTATIVES, CERTIFY COMPLIANCE WITH HOST COUNTRY 
LAWS/REQUIREMENTS. IF REQUESTED BY HOST COUNTRY 
AUTHORITIES, CERTIFICATION MAY INCLUDE A GENERAL 
DESCRIPTION OF MEASURES TAKEN BY U.S. OFFICIALS TO 
COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS. AT THE DISCRETION OF THE 
COMMANDING OFFICER, MASTER, OR AIRCRAFT COMMANDER, 
FOREIGN AUTHORITIES MAY BE RECEIVED ON BOARD FOR PURPOSE 
OF ACCEPTING CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE, BUT UNDER NO 
CIRCUMSTANCES MAY THEY BE PERMITTED TO EXERCISE 
GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY, NOR MAY THEY INSPECT THE 
SHIP/AIRCRAFT OR ACT AS AN OBSERVER WHILE U.S. PERSONNEL 
CONDUCT SUCH INSPECTIONS. 
5. BEFORE ENTERING THE TERRITORY, TERRITORIAL SEA, OR 
AIRSPACE OF A FOREIGN COUNTRY, COMMANDING OFFICERS, 
MASTERS, OR AIRCRAFT COMMANDERS SHOULD DETERMINE THE 
NATURE AND EXTENT OF LOCAL LAWS/REQUIREMENTS BY 
REVIEWING APPLICABLE SOURCES OF INFORMATION, E.G., 
FOREIGN CLEARANCE GUIDE, PORT DIRECTORY, OPORDS, LOGREQ 
RESPONSES, NCIS SUMMARIZES OF LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
ISSUES, OR OTHER PERTINENT REFERENCE SOURCES. 
6. GUIDANCE FOR SPECIFIC SITUATIONS IS PROVIDED BELOW: 
SITUATION 
A. FOREIGN AUTHORITIES 
REQUEST 
PERMISSION/DEMAND TO 
SEARCH SHIP, AIRCRAFT, 
OR ANY PART THEREOF, 
INCLUDING PERSONAL 
EFFECTS OR LOCKERS, FOR 
CONTRABAND, EVIDENCE OF 
CRIME, ETC. 
GUIDANCE 
DO NOT PERMIT THE 
SHIP/AIRCRAFT TO BE 
SEARCHED FOR ANY REASON BY 
FOREIGN AUTHORITIES. 
EXPLAIN U.S. SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY POLICY. U.S. 
AUTHORITIES MAY THEMSELVES 
CONDUCT CONSENT, COMMAND 
AUTHORIZED, OR OTHER LAWFUL 
SEARCHES OR INSPECTIONS AND 
PRESERVE EVIDENCE WITHOUT 
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FOREIGN OFFICIALS BEING 
PRESENT, BUT EVIDENCE 
SEIZED SHALL NOT BE TURNED 
OVER TO FOREIGN AUTHORITIES 
ABSENT SPECIFIC DIRECTION 
BY HIGHER AUTHORITY. 
B. FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL OR U.S. AUTHORITIES SHALL 
HEALTH INSPECTIONS 
DEMAND/ REQUEST TO COME 
ON BOARD U.S. AIRCRAFT 
OR SHIP TO CONDUCT 
SPRAYING/INSPECTION lAW 
FOREIGN COUNTRY 
REGULATIONS. 
C. FOREIGN AUTHORITIES 
REQUEST/ DEMAND CREW 
LIST, PERSONNEL RECORDS 
OR PERSONAL INFORMATION 
ON MILITARY PERSONNEL. 
REFUSE FOREIGN OFFICIALS 
ACCESS TO INSPECT OR SPRAY, 
BUT MAY AGREE TO CONDUCT 
REQUIRED 
INSPECTION/SPRAYING 
THEMSELVES AND CERTIFY THAT 
APPROPRIATE REQUIREMENTS 
HAVE BEEN MET. 
COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE 
STATUS OF FORCE AGREEMENTS 
(SOFA), OR OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT. 
ABSENT AN INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENT REQUIRING 
DISCLOSURE, U.S. 
AUTHORITIES MAY NOT PROVIDE 
SUCH INFORMATION, BUT MAY 
CERTIFY COMPLIANCE WITH 
INOCULATION OR OTHER PUBLIC 
HEALTH REQUIREMENTS THAT 
CREW IS FREE OF 
COMMUNICABLE DISEASE. WITH 
RESPECT TO HOST COUNTRY 
INQUIRIES ABOUT HIV 
INFECTION, THE FOLLOWING 
CERTIFICATION MAY BE 
OFFERED: U.S. POLICY 
REQUIRES ALL MILITARY 
PERSONNEL TO BE SCREENED 
FOR SEROLOGICAL EVIDENCE OF 
HIV INFECTION. THOSE 
TESTING POSITIVE FOR HIV 
ARE ASSIGNED WITHIN THE 
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D. FOREIGN AUTHORITIES 
REQUEST/ DEMAND CREW 
LISTS, PERSONNEL 
RECORDS OR PERSONAL 
INFORMATION ABOUT 
NON-MILITARY PERSONNEL, 
INCLUDING CREWMEMBERS 
(CIVIL SERVICE AND 
COMMERCIAL MARINERS), 
OTHER CIVIL CONTRACTOR 
PERSONNEL (E.G. TECH 
REPS) . 
E. FOREIGN AUTHORITIES 
REQUEST/ DEMAND A LIST 
OF STORES OR FIREARMS 
ON BOARD VESSELS/ ACFT. 
F. FOREIGN AUTHORITIES 
UNITED STATES AND NOT TO 
DEPLOYING UNITS. 
COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE SOFA 
OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENT. ABSENT AN 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT 
REQUIRING DISCLOSURE, A 
LIST LIMITED TO NAMES AND 
PASSPORT NUMBERS OF 
NON-MILITARY PERSONNEL ON 
BOARD USN SHIPS (VESSELS)/ 
AIRCRAFT MAY BE PROVIDED TO 
FOREIGN AUTHORITIES. OTHER 
INFORMATION CONCERNING 
EMBARKED NON-MILITARY 
PERSONNEL, SUCH AS HEALTH 
RECORDS, JOB DESCRIPTION, 
OR EMPLOYER, MAY NOT BE 
PROVIDED. 
DO NOT PROVIDE LIST OF 
STORES/ FIREARMS WHICH ARE 
TO REMAIN ON BOARD 
VESSEL/ACFT. LIST OF ITEMS 
TO BE TAKEN OFF VESSEL/ACFT 
MAY BE PROVIDED. 
PAYMENT OF ANY FINES OR 
ATTEMPT TO LEVY FINE OR TAXES IS PROHIBITED 
TAX ON VESSEL/ACFT. 
G. FOREIGN AUTHORITIES 
REQUIRE VESSELS TO FLY 
FOREIGN COUNTRY'S FLAG 
WHILE IN PORT. 
REGARDLESS OF REASONS 
OFFERED FOR IMPOSITION. 
APPROPRIATE CHARGES FOR 
PILOTS, TUGBOATS, SEWER, 
WATER, POWER AND OTHER 
REQUIRED GOODS OR SERVICES 
MAY BE PAID. 
FLYING FOREIGN COUNTRY'S 
FLAG IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT 
IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES AS 
PROVIDED IN NAVY 
H. 
International Status and Navigation of Warships 159 
IN A COUNTRY WHICH DOES 
NOT HAVE A SOFA WITH 
THE U.S., FOREIGN 
AUTHORITIES DEMAND/ 
REQUEST THAT AN 
INDIVIDUAL (MILITARY OR 
EMBARKED CIVILIAN) 
SUSPECTED OF AN OFFENSE 
REGULATIONS. WHEN IN DOUBT 
CONSULT HIGHER AUTHORITY. 
IF AN INDIVIDUAL (MILITARY 
OR EMBARKED CIVILIAN) 
SUSPECTED OF AN OFFENSE 
ASHORE IS ON BOARD, EITHER 
BECAUSE HE HAS RETURNED TO 
THE VESSEL/ACFT BEFORE 
BEING APPREHENDED, OR 
BECAUSE HE WAS RETURNED BY 
BE TURNED OVER FOR LOCAL POLICE OR SHORE 
ARREST OR INVESTIGATION PATROL BEFORE FORMAL DEMAND 
PURPOSES. FOR CUSTODY WAS MADE BY 
FOREIGN AUTHORITIES, DO NOT 
TURN OVER INDIVIDUAL 
WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM 
HIGHER AUTHORITY. IF 
FOREIGN OFFICIALS RETURN 
SOMEONE TO U.S. 
JURISDICTION, U.S. 
OFFICIALS MAY NOT PROMISE 
TO RETURN THE INDIVIDUAL 
UPON LATER DEMAND BY 
FOREIGN AUTHORITIES. 
I. IN A COUNTRY WHICH HAS 
A SOFA WITH THE U.S., 
FOREIGN AUTHORITIES 
REQUEST AN INDIVIDUAL 
WHO IS SUSPECTED OF AN 
OFFENSE BE TURNED OVER 
TO THEM FOR ARREST OR 
INVESTIGATION. 
IAW SOFA, U.S. OFFICIALS 
MAY BE REQUIRED TO 
SURRENDER AN INDIVIDUAL 
SUSPECTED OF COMMITTING AN 
OFFENSE IN THE FOREIGN 
JURISDICTION; TO TURN OVER 
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY 
VESSEL/ACFT INVESTIGATORS; 
OR TO PROVIDE SUSPECTED 
PERSONNEL TO PARTICIPATE IN 
OFF SHIP/ACFT 
IDENTIFICATION OR LINE-UP. 
IF ANY DOUBT EXISTS AS TO 
SOFA TERMS, GUIDANCE SHOULD 
BE SOUGHT FROM HIGHER 
AUTHORITY. 
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J. DURING GENERAL PUBLIC RESTORE ORDER, ESCORT 
VISITING IN FOREIGN OFFENDERS OFF SHIP OR 
PORTS, VISITORS ENGAGE AIRCRAFT AND TURN OVER TO 
IN PROTEST AND/OR LOCAL AUTHORITIES. DO NOT 
DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITY, OR ALLOW/ INVITE FOREIGN 
OTHERWISE VIOLATE POLICE ON BOARD TO ARREST 
CONDITIONS OF ACCESS TO OR TAKE CUSTODY OF THE 
SHIP OR AIRCRAFT. OFFENDERS. 
7. ALL CINCPACFLT PERSONNEL WHO ARE LIKELY TO DEAL WITH 
FOREIGN OFFICIALS (E.G., CO, MASTER OF A SHIP, ACFT 
COMMANDER, SUPPLY OFFICER, SHORE PATROL OFFICER, MEDICAL 
DEPT REPRESENTATIVE, LIAISON PERSONNEL, ETC.) SHOULD 
UNDERSTAND U.S. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY POLICY AND COMPLY 
WITH REQUIREMENTS. IF IN DOUBT ABOUT APPLICATION OF 
PRINCIPLES OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS, 
CONSULT A JUDGE ADVOCATE FOR ADVICE OR ASSISTANCE, 
AND/OR SEEK GUIDANCE FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY. 
8. ADM R. J. KELLY, USN. 
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ANNEXA2-2 
JOINT STATEMENT BY UNIFORM INTERPRETATION OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET GOVERNING INNOCENT PASSAGE 
SOCIALIST REPUBliCS 
Since 1986, representatives of the United 1. The relevant rules of international law 
States of America and the Union of Soviet governing innocent passage of ships in the 
Socialist Republics have been conducting territorial sea are stated in the 1982 United 
friendly and constructive discussions of certain Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
international legal aspects of traditional uses of (Convention of 1982), particularly in Part II, 
the oceans, in particular, navigation. Section 3. 
The Governments are guided by the 2. All ships, including warships, regardless 
provisions of the 1982 United Nations of cargo, annament or means of propulsion, 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which, with enjoy the right ofinnocent passage through the 
respect to traditional uses of the oceans, territorial sea in accordance with international 
generally constitute international law and law, for which neither prior notification nor 
practice and balance fairly the interests of all authorization is required. 
States. They recognize the need to encourage all 3. Article 19 of the Convention of1982 sets 
States to harmonize their international laws, out in paragraph 2 an exhaustive list of activities 
regulations and practices with those provisions. that would render passage not innocent. A ship 
The Governments consider it useful to issue passing through the territorial sea that does not 
the attached Uniform Interpretation of the engage in any of those activities is in innocent 
Rules of International Law Governing passage. 
Innocent Passage. Both Governments have 4. A coastal State which questions whether 
agreed to take the necessary steps to conform the particular passage of a ship through its 
their internal laws, regulations and practices territorial sea is innocent shall inform the ship of 
with this understanding of the rules. the reason why it questions the innocence of the 
passage, and provide the ship an opportunity to 
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF clarify its intentions or correct its conduct in a 
AMERICA: reasonably short period of time. 
5. Ships exercising the right of innocent 
James A. Baker, III passage shall comply with all laws and 
regulations of the coastal State adopted in 
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET conformity with relevant rules ofinternational 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: law as reflected in Articles 21,22,23 and 25 of 
E.A. Shevardnadze 
Jackson Hole, Wyoming 
September 23, 1989 
the Convention of1982. These include the laws 
and regulations requiring ships exercising the 
right of innocent passage through its territorial 
sea to use such sea lanes and traffic separation 
schemes as it may prescribe where needed to 
protect safety of navigation. In areas where no 
such sea lanes or traffic separation schemes have 
been prescribed, ships nevertheless enjoy the 
right of innocent passage. 
Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 
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6. Such laws and regulations of the coastal 
State may not have the practical effect of 
denying or impairing the exercise of the right of 
innocent passage as set forth in Article 24 of the 
Convention of 1982. 
7. If a warship engages in conduct which 
violates such laws or regulations or renders its 
passage not innocent and does not take 
corrective action upon request the coastal State 
may require it to leave the territorial sea, as set 
forth in Article 30 of the Convention of 1982. 
In such case the warship shall do so 
immediately. 
8. Without prejudice to the exercise of 
rights of coastal and flag States, all differences 
which may arise regarding a particular case of 
passage of ships through the territorial sea shall 
be settled through diplomatic channels or other 
agreed means. 
International Status and Navigation of Warships 163 
ANNEXA2-3 
STATEMENT OF POLICY 
BY 
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 
AND 
THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 
CONCERNING 
EXERCISE OF 
THE RIGHT OF ASSISTANCE ENTRY 
I. purpose. To establish a unifonn policy for the exercise of the right of 
assistance entry by United States military ships and aircraft. 
II. Background. For centuries, mariners have recognized a humanitarian duty to 
rescue others, regardless of nationality, in danger or distress from perils of the sea. 
The right to enter a foreign territorial sea to engage in bona fide efforts to render 
emergency assistance to those in danger or distress from perils of the sea 
(hereinafter referred to as the right of assistance entry) has been recognized since 
the development of the modem territorial sea concept in the eighteenth century. 
Acknowledgment of the right of assistance entry is evidenced in customary 
international law. The right of assistance entry is independent of the rights of 
innocent passage, transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passages. 
III. Rjght of Assjstance Entry. The right of assistance entry is not dependent 
upon seeking or receiving the permission of the coastal State. While the 
permission of the coastal State is not required, notification of the entry should be 
given to the coastal State both as a matter of comity and for the purpose of 
alerting the rescue forces of that State. The right of assistance entry extends only 
to rescues where the location of the danger or distress is reasonably well known. 
The right does not extend to conducting searches within the foreign territorial 
sea without the permission of the coastal State. The determination of whether a 
danger or distress requiring assistance entry exists properly rests with the 
operational commander on scene. 
IV.~. 
a. Assistance Entry by Military Vessels. When the operational commander of 
a United States military vessel determines or is infonned that a person, ship, or 
aircraft in a foreign territorial sea (12nm or less) is in danger or distress from perils 
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of the sea, that the location is reasonably well known, and that the United States 
military vessel is in a position to render assistance, assistance may be rendered. 
Notification of higher authority and the coastal State will be as specified in 
applicable implementing directives. Implementing directives will provide for 
prompt notification of the Department of State. 
b. Assistance Entry by Military Aircraft. In accordance with applicable 
implementing directives, when the appropriate operational commander 
determines or is informed that a person, ship, or aircraft in a foreign territorial sea is 
in danger or distress from perils of the sea, that the location is reasonably well 
known, and that he is in a position to render assistance by deploying or employing 
military aircraft, he shall request guidance from higher authority by the fastest 
means available. Implementing directives will provide for consultation with the 
Department of State prior to responding to such requests. If, in the judgment of the 
operational commander, however, any delay in rendering assistance could be 
life-threatening, the operational commander may immediately render the 
assistance. Notification of higher authority and the coastal State will be as specified 
in applicable implementing directives. Implementing directives will provide for 
prompt notification of the Department of State. 
V. Application. This statement of policy applies only in cases not covered by prior 
agreement with the coastal State concerned. Where the rendering of assistance to 
persons, ships, or aircraft in a foreign territorial sea is specifically addressed by an 
agreement with that coastal State, the terms of the agreemen.t are controlling. 
VI. Implementation. The parties to this statement of policy will implement the 
policy in directives, instructions, and manuals promulgated by them or by 
subordinate commands and organizatinus. 
Tune 27. 1986 
Date 
July 20. 1986 
Date 
Aug 8. 1986 
Date 
lSI 
for the Department of State 
Abraham Sofaer, Legal Adviser 
lSI 
for the Department of Defense 
Hugh O'Neill, Oceans Policy Adviser 
lSI 
for the U.S. Coast Guard 
P.A. Yost 
Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard 
Commandant 
J-5 
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ANNEXA2-4 
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT 
CHIEFS OF STAFF 
INSTRUCTION 
DISTRIBUTION: A,C,S 
ClCSI2410.01A 
23 APRIL 1997 
GUIDANCE FOR THE EXERCISE OF RIGHT OF 
ASSISTANCE ENTRY 
References: a. "Statement of Policy by the Department of 
State, the Department of Defense, and the United States Coast Guard 
Concerning Exercise of the Right of Assistance Entry," 8 August 1986 
b. Joint Pub 3-50/COMDTINST M1620.5 (Coast Guard), 1 February 
1991, "National Search and Rescue Manual," Volume 1 
c. DOD 2500.1M, 6 January 1997, "Maritime Claims Reference Manual" 
d. CJCSI 3121.01, "Standing rules of Engagement for US Forces," 
Enclosure A, subpragraph 8(e) 
1. purpose. This instruction establishes uniform policy for the exercise of the 
right of assistance entry (RAE) by US ships or aircraft within the territorial seas or 
archipelagic waters of foreign states. 
2. Cancellation. ClCSI 2410.01,20 July 1993, "Guidance for the Exercise of 
right of Assistance Entry" is hereby canceled. 
3. Applicability. This instruction applies to the CINCs, Services, and the 
Directors for Operations and Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint staff. Copies are 
provided to the Secretary of State and the Commandant of the Coast Guard for 
information and use as appropriate. 
4. Background. 
a. For centuries, mariners have recognized a humanitarian duty to rescue 
persons in distress due to perils of the sea, regardless of their nationality or 
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location. The international community has long accepted the right of vessels of 
any nation to enter a foreign state's territorial sea to engage in good faith efforts to 
render emergency assistance. RAE is independent of the customary 
international legal rights of innocent passage, transit passage, and archipelagic sea 
lanes passage. 
b. Following incidents in which US vessels on scene failed to assist ships in 
distress because of excessive concern about entry into the territorial sea of 
another state, the Department of Defense, DOS and US Coast Guard reviewed 
US Government policy. The result was a unified statement of policy concerning 
RAE within the territorial sea of another state, issued in August 1986 
(reference a). 
c. The UN Law of the Sea Convention provides that ships of all states enjoy 
the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of other states. Article 18 
of the Convention provides that passage includes stopping and anchoring for the 
purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships, or aircraft in danger or distress. 
As the regime of innocent passage now applies in archipelagic waters, and given 
the longstanding duty of mariners to render assistance to persons in distress due to 
perils of the sea, it follows that the right of assistance entry is equally applicable to 
archipelagic waters. 
d. This instruction implements the 1986 statement of policy and extends it 
to include archipelagic waters. This instruction applies in all cases except those 
specifically covered by prior agreements with foreign states that address assistance 
to persons, ships, or aircraft in their territorial seas or archipelagic waters. The 
enclosure discusses bilateral RAE agreements with Canada and Mexico. 
5.~. 
a. RAE applies only to rescues in which the location of the persons or 
property in danger or distress is reasonably well known. The right does not 
extend to conducting area searches for persons or property in danger or distress 
when their location is not yet reasonably well known. US forces will conduct 
area searches within a U.S. recognized foreign territorial sea or archipelagic 
waters only with the permission of the coastal state. Such permission may be by 
international agreement, such as a search and rescue (SAR) agreement with that 
state, as listed in Appendix B of reference b. When considering or conducting 
area searches within a claimed or U.S. recognized foreign territorial sea or 
archipelagic waters, commanders should inform those agencies listed in 
Enclosure A, subparagraph 4a. 
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b. RAE into the territorial sea or archipelagic waters of a foreign state 
involves two conflicting principles: (1) the right of nations to regulate entry into 
and the operations within territory under their sovereignty, and (2) the 
time-honored mariners' imperative to render rapid and effective assistance to 
persons, ships, or aircraft in imminent peril at sea without regard to nationality or 
location. 
c. The operational commander on the scene must determine whether RAE 
is appropriate under the circumstances. The test is whether a person, ship, or 
aircraft, whose position within the territorial sea or archipelagic waters of 
another state is reasonably well known, is in danger or distress due to perils of the 
sea and requires emergency assistance. 
d. In determining whether to undertake RAE actions, commanders must 
consider the safety of the military ships and aircraft they command, and of their 
crews, as well as the safety of persons, ships, and aircraft in danger or distress. 
e. Commanders should also consider whether other rescue units, capable 
and willing to render timely and effective assistance, are on the scene or 
immediately en route. 
£ The customary international law of RAE is more fully developed for 
vessels than for aircraft. Therefore, the military commander must consider the 
possible reaction of the coastal or archipelagic state, especially if the commander 
intends to employ military aircraft within its territorial sea or its archipelagic 
waters. 
g. Although exercise of RAE does not require the permission of the foreign 
coastal or archipelagic state, US commanders should notify the state's authorities 
of the entry in order to promote international comity, avoid misunderstanding, 
and alert local rescue and medical assets. 
h. Because of the implications for international relations and for US security, 
commanders should keep appropriate authorities and the NM CC informed. See 
subparagraph 8d(1) below. 
i. RAE actions should comply with any applicable bilateral RAE and SAR 
agreements (Enclosure B), including those listed in Appendix B of reference b. 
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J. Reference c is the DOD source document for determining the scope of a 
particular maritime claim (e.g., extent of a claimed territorial sea) and whether or 
not that particular maritime claim is recognized by the United States. The fact 
that the United States has conducted an operational freedom of navigation 
assertion or sent a protest note regarding a particular coastal state claim can be 
taken as nonrecognition of the claim in question. Otherwise, the territorial sea of 
a coastal state or the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state will be regarded as 
presumptively valid for the purpose of this instruction. The DOS "Limits of the 
Seas" series and the Naval War College ~'Blue Book, Vol. 66," are secondary 
sources for determining whether and to what extent a particular country's 
maritime claims are considered excessive by the United States. 
k. The policy set forth in this instruction is consistent with the current 
standing rules of engagement for US forces pursuant to reference d. 
6. Definitions. 
a. Operational commander on the scene. The senior officer in tactical 
command of the unites) capable of rendering meaningful and timely assistance; 
this commander is responsible for coordinating rescue efforts at the site. 
b. Territorial sea. The belt of ocean measured seaward up to 12 nm from a 
state's baselines determined in accordance with intemationallaw and subject to 
the state's sovereignty. The U.S. does not recognize the portions of claimed 
territorial sea more than 12 nm from properly drawn baselines. 
c. Archipelagic waters. An archipelagic state is a state that is constituted 
wholly of one or more groups of islands. Such states may draw straight 
archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of their outermost islands, 
providing the ratio of water to land within the baselines is between 1 to 1 and 
9 to 1. The waters enclosed within properly drawn archipelagic baselines are 
called archipelagic waters and are subject to the archipelagic state's sovereignty. 
d. Danger or distress. A clearly apparent risk of death, disabling injury, loss, 
or significant damage. 
e. Perils of the sea. Accidents and dangers peculiar to maritime activities, 
including storms, waves, and wind; grounding; fire, smoke and noxious fumes; 
flooding, sinking, and capsizing; loss of propulsion or steering; and other hazards 
of the sea. 
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£ Emergency assistance. Rescue action that must be taken without delay to 
avoid significant risk of death or serious injury or the loss of or major damage to a 
ship or aircraft. 
g. Military ships and aircraft. For the purposes of this instruction, a US 
military ship is either a warship designated "USS" or an auxiliary in the Military 
Sealift Command (MSC) force. For the purposes of this instruction, a US 
military aircraft is an aircraft operated by a unit of the US Armed Forces, other 
than the Coast Guard (except when operating as part of the Navy), bearing 
military markings and commanded and manned by personnel of the Armed 
Forces. 
7. Responsibilities. 
a. The Chairman of the Joint ChiefS of Staff will monitor the exercise of 
RAE and develop further procedural guidance for the CINCs and the Chiefs of 
the Services under the overall DOD policy guidance. 
b. The combatant commanders will issue policy guidance and specific 
procedural reporting requirements tailored to their areas of regional 
responsibility and the forces under their operational controL 
c. The NMCC will follow routine procedures to coordinate with cognizant 
DOS and US Coast Guard officials to ensure timely notification, review, and 
response to CINCs and operational commanders in RAE situations. 
d. The Military Services will provide training on RAE operations, 
coordination, and communications procedures. 
e. Guidance for operational commanders is contained in Enclosure A. 
8. Summary ofCbanges. This revision updates qCSI 2410.01 to include the 
right of assistance entry within archipelagic waters, clarifies that RAE only 
applies within a foreign state's US-recognized territorial sea or archipelagic 
waters and clarifies that the instruction applies to auxiliaries in the MSC Force. 
9. Effectiye Date. This instruction is effective upon receipt. 
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Enclosures: 
For the Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 
/s/ 
Dennis C. Blair 
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy 
Director, Joint Staff 
A-Guidance for Operational Commanders 
B-Bilateral Agreements Affecting Right of Assistance Entry 
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ENCLOSURE A 
GUIDANCE FOR OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS 
1. The operational commander of a US military ship should exercise RAE and 
immediately enter a foreign state's US-recognized territorial sea or archipelagic 
waters when all three following conditions are met: 
a. A person, ship, or aircraft within the foreign territorial sea or archipelagic 
waters is in danger or distress from perils of the sea and requires emergency 
assistance. 
b. The location is reasonably well known. 
c. The US military ship is in a position to render timely and effective 
assistance. 
Although not a required condition, the operational commander should also 
consider whether other rescue units, capable and willing to render timely and 
effective assistance, are on the scene or immediately en route. Military ships 
conducting RAE operations will not deploy aircraft (including helicopters) 
within a US-recognized foreign territorial sea or archipelagic waters unless 
paragraphs 2 or 3 below apply. 
2. An operational commander may render emergency assistance employing US 
military aircraft in a US recognized foreign territorial sea or archipelagic waters 
under RAE only when the commander determines that all four following 
conditions apply: 
a. A person, ship, or aircraft in the foreign territorial sea or archipelagic 
waters is in danger or distress from perils of the sea and requires emergency 
assistance. 
b. The location is reasonably well known. 
c. The US military aircraft is able to render timely and effective assistance. If 
available, unarmed aircraft will be used to conduct RAE activities. 
d. Any delay in rendering assistance could be life threatening. 
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Although not a required condition, the operational commander should also 
consider whether other rescue units, capable and willing to render timely and 
effective assistance, are on the scene or immediately en route. 
3. An operational commander may render assistance in non-life-threatening 
situations employing US military aircraft in a US-recognized foreign territorial 
sea or archipelagic waters under RAE when the following two conditions are 
met: 
a. The Conditions in subparagraphs 2a, b, and c above are met. 
b. The cognizant CINC or other appropriate authority in the operational 
chain of command has specifically authorized the exercise of RAE employing 
aircraft. Before authorizing RAE employing aircraft, such higher authority will 
consult with the DOS (Operations Center) by contacting the NMCC. 
4. When a commander enters or authorizes entry into the claimed or 
US-recognized territorial sea or archipelagic waters of a foreign state under 
RAE, the commander will immediately notify: 
a. Appropriate authorities and the NMCC by an OPREP-3 PINNACLE. 
The OPREP-3 PINNACLE will describe location; unit(s) involved; nature of 
the emergency assistance; reaction by the coastal or archipelagic state, including 
efforts to deny entry or offers of assistance; and estimated time to complete the 
mission. The NMCC will immediately inform the DOS (Operations Center) 
and Headquarters, US Coast Guard (Flag Plot). (USCG HQ is prepared to 
facilitate contacting foreign state rescue authorities to notify them of the RAE 
operation, as appropriate.) The cogninnt Chief of Mission and US Defense 
Attache Office (USDAO) will be information addresses. 
b. The coastal or archipelagic state, by the fastest means available, of the 
location, unit(s) involved, nature of the emergency and assistance required, 
whether any assistance is needed from that government, and estimated time of 
departure from the territorial sea or archipelagic waters. Contact will normally 
be with the Rescue Coordination Center of the foreign state involved. 
Enclosure A 
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ENCLOSUREB 
BIT..ATERAL AGREEMENTS AFFECTING 
RIGHT OF ASSISTANCE ENTRY 
International agreements to which the United States is a party and that modify 
the application of this guidance are discussed below. (For more information, see 
Appendix B of reference b.) 
a. Canada. "Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States 
Coast Guard, the United States Air Force, the Canadian Forces and the Canadian 
Coast Guard on Search and Rescue," 24 March 1995. 
(1) This understanding states that in accordance with customary 
international law, solely for the purposes of rendering emergency rescue 
assistance to persons, vessels, or aircraft in danger or distress, when the location is 
reasonably well known, SAR units of either country may immediately enter 
onto or over the territory or the territorial seas of the other country, with 
notification of such entry made as soon as practicable. 
(2) Pursuant to this understanding, commanders should notify the nearest 
Canadian Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC). (Upon receipt by the NMCC 
of the OPREP-3 required in subparagraph 4a, Enclosure A of this instruction, 
the NMCC will notify US Coast Guard Headquarters, which will arrange 
contact with the appropriate Canadian RCC.) 
b. Mexico. Treaty to Facilitate Assistance to and Salvage of Vessels In 
Territorial Waters," 13 June 1935, T.I.A.S. No. 905,49 Stat. 3359. 
(1) This treaty permits vessels and rescue equipment of either country to 
assist vessels (and crews) of their own nationals that are disabled or in distress 
within the territorial waters or on the shores of the other country: 
(a) Within a nO-nm radius of the intersection of the international 
boundary line and the Pacific Coast. 
(b) Within a 200-nm radius of the intersection of the international 
boundary line and the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. 
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(2) The treaty requires the commander to send notice of entry to assist a 
distressed vessel to appropriate authorities of the other country at the earliest 
possible moment. Assistance efforts may proceed unless the authorities advise 
that such assistance is unnecessary. 
(3) In this treaty, assistance means any act that helps prevent injury arising 
from a marine peril to persons or property, and the term vessel includes aircraft. 
Enclosure B 
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ANNEXA2-5 
R 061630Z JUN 88 
FM NAVY JAG ALEXANDRIA VA 
TO AIG NINE NINE ZERO TWO 
BT 
UNCLAS //N05800// 
SUBJ: GUIDANCE FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES CONCERNING THE 
TRANSIT PASSAGE REGIME IN INTERNATIONAL STRAITS 
1. PASS TO ASSIGNED JUDGE ADVOCATES. 
2. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES GUIDANCE AND AMPLIFYING 
INFORMATION CONCERNING THE RIGHT OF TRANSIT PASSAGE 
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL STRAITS AS IT EXISTS IN CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS REFLECTED IN THE 1982 U.N. 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (HEREINAFTER REFERRED 
TO AS "THE 1982 CONVENTION"). THE US IS NOT A SIGNATORY 
TO THE 1982 CONVENTION DUE TO ITS SEABED MINING 
PROVISIONS. HOWEVER, IN HIS STATEMENT ON UNITED STATES 
OCEANS POLICY OF MARCH 10, 1983, PRESIDENT REAGAN 
ANNOUNCED THAT THE US CONSIDERS THE NON-SEABED 
PROVISIONS OF THE 1982 CONVENTION AS REFLECTIVE OF 
EXISTING MARITIME LAW AND PRACTICE AND THAT THE US WOULD 
ACT ACCORDINGLY. 
3. THE REGIME OF TRANSIT PASSAGE IS DEFINED IN PART III 
(ARTICLES 34 THROUGH 45) OF THE 1982 CONVENTION. TRANSIT 
PASSAGE MEANS THE EXERCISE OF THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION 
AND OVERFLIGHT, SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONTINUOUS AND 
EXPEDITIOUS TRANSIT OF A STRAIT. THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT 
OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION TO OR AUTHORIZATION OF THE STATE 
OR STATES BORDERING A STRAIT. WITH VERY FEW EXCEPTIONS, 
SOME NOTED IN PARAGRAPH 8 BELOW, THE REGIME APPLIES TO 
ALL STRAITS USED FOR INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION BETWEEN 
ONE PART OF THE HIGH SEAS OR AN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 
(EEZ) AND ANOTHER PART OF THE HIGH SEAS OR AN EEZ, IF 
EITHER OF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS EXIST: (A) THE 
TERRITORIAL SEA CLAIMS (OF 12 NM OR LESS) OF THE STATE 
OR STATES BORDERING THE STRAIT OVERLAP SO THAT THERE IS 
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NO HIGH SEAS OR EEZ ROUTE THROUGH THE STRAIT, OR (B) 
THERE IS NO OVERLAP, BUT THE RESULTING CORRIDOR BETWEEN 
THE AREAS OF TERRITORIAL SEA IS UNSUITABLE FOR SURFACE 
OR SUBSURFACE TRANSIT BECAUSE OF ITS NAVIGATIONAL AND 
HYDROGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS. 
4. THE GEOGRAPHICS OF STRAITS VARY. THE AREAS OF 
OVERLAPPING TERRITORIAL SEAS IN MANY CASES DO NOT 
ENCOMPASS THE ENTIRE AREA OF THE STRAIT IN WHICH THE 
TRANSIT PASSAGE REGIME APPLIES. THE REGIME APPLIES NOT 
ONLY IN OR OVER THE WATERS OVERLAPPED BY TERRITORIAL 
SEAS BUT ALSO THROUGHOUT THE STRAIT AND IN ITS 
APPROACHES, INCLUDING AREAS OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA THAT 
ARE OVERLAPPED. THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ PROVIDES A CASE IN 
POINT; ALTHOUGH THE AREA OF OVERLAP OF THE TERRITORIAL 
SEAS OF IRAN AND OMAN IS RELATIVELY SMALL, THE REGIME OF 
TRANSIT PASSAGE APPLIES THROUGHOUT THE STRAIT AS WELL AS 
IN ITS APPROACHES INCLUDING AREAS OF THE OMANI AND THE 
IRANIAN TERRITORIAL SEAS NOT OVERLAPPED BY THE OTHER. 
(NOTE: THE ESSENCE OF TRANSIT PASSAGE IS THAT A VESSEL 
OR AIRCRAFT IN A STRAIT CONTINUOUSLY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY 
MOVING BETWEEN TWO BODIES OF WATER (IN WHICH THE FREEDOM 
OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT IS THE APPLICABLE REGIME) 
NEED NOT BECOME SUBJECT TO THE REGIME OF INNOCENT 
PASSAGE WHEN REQUIRED TO ENTER A TERRITORIAL SEA IN THE 
STRAIT OR ITS APPROACHES.) 
5. SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN TRANSIT PASSAGE ARE 
SUBJECT TO THE RESTRICTIONS AND OBLIGATIONS DESCRIBED IN 
ARTICLE 39 OF THE 1982 CONVENTION. THEY MUST REFRAIN 
FROM ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN THOSE INCIDENT TO THEIR 
"NORMAL MODES" OF CONTINUOUS AND EXPEDITIOUS TRANSIT. 
THUS, SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT MAY PROCEED IN THEIR NORMAL 
MODES, I.E., SUBMARINES MAY TRANSIT SUBMERGED, SHIPS MAY 
DEPLOY AIRCRAFT, AND NAVAL/AIR FORCES GENERALLY MAY BE 
DEPLOYED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE NORMAL SECURITY 
NEEDS OF THOSE FORCES WHILE IN THE STRAIT. ALSO, THEY 
MUST PROCEED WITHOUT DELAY, REFRAIN FROM ANY THREAT OR 
USE OF FORCE, COMPLY WITH ACCEPTED INTERNATIONAL (I.E., 
IMO-TYPE) REGULATIONS, ETC. THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR 
STATE (INCLUDING MILITARY) AIRCRAFT (ARTICLE 39) OR FOR 
SUBMERGED NAVIGATION TO FOLLOW ANY PARTICULAR ROUTE 
WHILE EXERCISING THE RIGHT OF TRANSIT PASSAGE. 
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6. THE REGIME OF TRANSIT PASSAGE DOES NOT IN OTHER 
RESPECTS AFFECT THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE WATERS FORMING 
THE STRAITS (ARTICLE 34.1). JURIDICALLY, INTERNAL WATERS 
REMAIN INTERNAL WATERS; TERRITORIAL SEAS REMAIN 
TERRITORIAL SEA; EEZ'S AND HIGH SEAS AREAS REMAIN EEZ'S 
AND HIGH SEAS. (ARTICLE 35). ANY ACTIVITY WHICH IS NOT 
AN EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF TRANSIT PASSAGE REMAINS 
SUBJECT TO WHATEVER LEGAL REGIME IS APPLICABLE UNDER THE 
1982 CONVENTION TO THE WATER AREA OF THE STRAIT IN WHICH 
THE ACTIVITY OCCURS. (ARTICLE 38.3). THUS, IF NOT 
ENGAGED IN TRANSIT PASSAGE, E.G., IF THE SHIP IS NOT 
TRANSITING CONTINUOUSLY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY THROUGH THE 
STRAIT, THE SHIP IS SUBJECT TO THE RULES FOR NAVIGATING 
IN INTERNAL WATERS, TERRITORIAL SEAS, EEZ'S, AND HIGH 
SEAS, AS THE CASE MAY BE. 
7. IN SUMMARY, THE REGIME OF TRANSIT PASSAGE CONFERS 
CERTAIN RIGHTS AND IMPOSES CERTAIN DUTIES ON SHIPS AND 
AIRCRAFT EXERCISING THE RIGHT OF TRANSIT PASSAGE. THESE 
RIGHTS AND DUTIES COMMENCE AS SOON AS THE SHIP OR 
AIRCRAFT ENTERS THE APPROACHES TO AN INTERNATIONAL 
STRAIT FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONTINUOUS AND EXPEDITIOUS 
TRANSIT OF THE STRAIT, AND THEY CEASE AS SOON AS THE 
SHIP OR AIRCRAFT DEPARTS THE APPROACHES ON THE OTHER 
SIDE. HOWEVER, THE PROVISIONS FOR TRANSIT PASSAGE DO NOT 
ALTER THE UNDERLYING JURIDICAL NATURE OF THE WATERS 
WHICH MAKE UP THE STRAIT. 
8. AS NOTED IN PARAGRAPH 3, ABOVE, THE 1982 CONVENTION 
PROVIDES THAT THERE ARE A FEW STRAITS USED FOR 
INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION IN WHICH THE REGIME OF TRANSIT 
PASSAGE DOES NOT APPLY. ONE CATEGORY (ARTICLE 35(C)) IS 
STRAITS SPECIFICALLY REGULATED BY LONG-STANDING 
CONVENTIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE BOSPORUS AND DARDANELLES, 
WHICH ARE GOVERNED BY PROVISIONS OF THE MONTREUX 
CONVENTION. ANOTHER CATEGORY (ARTICLE 38.1) IS STRAITS 
FORMED BY AN ISLAND AND THE MAINLAND OF A STATE, IF 
THERE EXISTS, SEAWARD OF THE ISLAND, A HIGH SEAS OR EEZ 
ROUTE OF SIMILAR NAVIGATIONAL AND HYDROGRAPHIC 
CONVENIENCE. THE PRIME EXAMPLE OF THIS LATTER CATEGORY 
IS THE STRAIT OF MESSINA; IN SUCH A STRAIT, THE REGIME 
OF NON-SUSPENDABLE INNOCENT PASSAGE APPLIES. (ARTICLE 
45.1 (A) ) . 
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9. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE DEPARTMENT 
OF STATE AND REFLECTS OFFICIAL US POLICY. QUESTIONS 
SHOULD BE REFERRED TO CODE 10 (DSN: 227-9161, 
COMMERCIAL: 202-697-9161). 
BT 
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ANNEXA2-6 
(In draft as of 1 November 1997) 
FM 
TO 
INFO 
BT 
UNCLAS//NOOOOO// 
MSGID/GENADMINXXXXXXXXX/-// 
SUBJ/TRANSIT PASSAGE IN INTERNATIONAL STRAITS POLICY// 
REF/A/DOD 4500.54~G/-/NOTAL// 
NARR/REF A IS DOD FOREIGN CLEARANCE GUIDE. CHAPTER FIVE 
CONTAINS JOINT STAFF GUIDANCE ON MILITARY FLIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE, INTERNATIONAL STRAITS AND 
ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES.// 
RMKS/1. SUMMARY. RECENT CHALLENGES TO U.S. TRANSIT 
RIGHTS THROUGH THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ BY OMAN AND IRAN 
HAVE MADE IT NECESSARY TO CLARIFY GUIDANCE ON POLICY AND 
PROCEDURES FOR U.S. SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS ENGAGED IN 
TRANSIT PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL STRAITS. U.S. 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS ENJOY A RIGHT OF TRANSIT 
PASSAGE THROUGHOUT THE STRAIT (SHORELINE TO SHORELINE), 
AS WELL AS ITS APPROACHES (INCLUDING THE TERRITORIAL SEA 
OF ADJACENT COASTAL STATES). ALTHOUGH U.S. SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNE VESSELS WILL NORMALLY USE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME 
ORGANIZATION (IMO)-APPROVED TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEMES 
(TSS) AND COMPLY WITH RULE 10 OF COLREGS WHILE 
TRANSITING AN INTERNATIONAL STRAIT, THERE IS NO LEGAL 
REQUIREMENT TO DO SO IF SUCH VESSELS DO NOT ELECT TO 
VOLUNTARILY USE THE TSS. TRANSITS THAT DO NOT MAKE USE 
OF A TSS SHALL BE CONDUCTED WITH DUE REGARD FOR THE 
SAFETY OF NAVIGATION. IF CHALLENGED BY COASTAL STATE 
AUTHORITIES, A U.S. SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSEL SHOULD 
RESPOND THAT IT IS A U.S. WARSHIP OR OTHER SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNE VESSEL AND STATE, "I AM ENGAGED IN TRANSIT 
PASSAGE IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW." A 
DETAILED LEGAL ANALYSIS FOLLOWS IN PARAGRAPHS 3 THROUGH 
6 FOR USE BY COMMAND JUDGE ADVOCATES. 
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2. PURPOSE. 
A. TO CLARIFY GUIDANCE AND PROVIDE AMPLIFYING 
INFORMATION ON U.S. POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR U.S. 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS ENGAGED IN TRANSIT PASSAGE 
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL STRAITS CONNECTING ONE PORTION OF 
THE HIGH SEAS/EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEZ) WITH ANOTHER 
PORTION OF THE HIGH SEAS/EEZ. 
B. THIS GUIDANCE DOES NOT APPLY TO STRAITS 
SPECIFICALLY REGULATED BY LONG-STANDING CONVENTIONS 
(SUCH AS THE TURKISH STRAITS), TO STRAITS FORMED BY AN 
ISLAND AND THE MAINLAND OF A STATE, IF THERE EXISTS, 
SEAWARD OF THE ISLAND, A HIGH SEAS/EEZ ROUTE OF SIMILAR 
NAVIGATIONAL AND HYDROGRAPHIC CONVENIENCE (SUCH AS THE 
STRAIT OF MESSINA) OR TO STRAITS IN WHICH THERE EXISTS A 
HIGH SEAS/EEZ CORRIDOR OF SIMILAR NAVIGATIONAL AND 
HYDROGRAPHIC CONVENIENCE (SUCH AS THE FEMER BELT) . 
C. GUIDANCE ON MILITARY FLIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
STRAITS IS PROVIDED IN REF A. 
D. NOTHING IN THIS GUIDANCE IS INTENDED TO IMPAIR THE 
ABILITY TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS CONSISTENT WITH SAFETY OF 
NAVIGATION OR THE COMMANDER'S INHERENT AUTHORITY AND 
OBLIGATION TO USE ALL NECESSARY MEANS AVAILABLE AND TO 
TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE ACTION IN SELF-DEFENSE OF THE 
COMMANDER'S UNIT AND OTHER U.S. FORCES IN THE VICINITY. 
3. BACKGROUND/REGULATORY REGIME. 
A. THE 1982 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
THE SEA (1982 LOS CONVENTION). 
(1) THE UNITED STATES IS NOT YET A PARTY TO THE 
1982 LOS CONVENTION. HOWEVER, IN HIS STATEMENT ON U.S. 
OCEAN POLICY OF MARCH 10, 1983, PRESIDENT REAGAN 
ANNOUNCED THAT THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERS THE 
NON-SEABED PROVISIONS OF UNCLOS AS REFLECTIVE OF 
EXISTING MARITIME LAW AND PRACTICE AND THAT THE UNITED 
STATES WOULD ACT ACCORDINGLY. THIS VIEW HAS BEEN 
REITERATED BY EVERY SUCCESSIVE ADMINISTRATION. 
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(2) THE REGIME OF TRANSIT PASSAGE IS SET OUT IN 
PART III OF THE 1982 LOS CONVENTION (ARTICLES 37 THROUGH 
44). TRANSIT PASSAGE IS DEFINED AS THE FREEDOM OF 
NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
CONTINUOUS AND EXPEDITIOUS TRANSIT OF THE STRAIT IN THE 
NORMAL MODE OF OPERATION. THIS MEANS THAT SUBMARINES MAY 
TRANSIT SUBMERGED; MILITARY AIRCRAFT MAY OVERFLY IN 
COMBAT FORMATION AND WITH NORMAL EQUIPMENT OPERATION; 
AND SURFACE SHIPS MAY TRANSIT IN A MANNER NECESSARY FOR 
THEIR SECURITY, INCLUDING FORMATION STEAMING AND THE 
LAUNCHING AND RECOVERY OF AIRCRAFT, WHERE CONSISTENT 
WITH SOUND NAVIGATIONAL PRACTICES. ALL SHIPS AND 
AIRCRAFT, REGARDLESS OF CARGO, ARMAMENT OR MEANS OF 
PROPULSION, ENJOY THIS NONSUSPENDABLE RIGHT OF TRANSIT 
PASSAGE, WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL BY OR NOTIFICATION TO 
THE COASTAL STATES BORDERING THE STRAIT. 
(3) COASTAL STATES BORDERING INTERNATIONAL STRAITS 
MAY DESIGNATE SEA LANES AND TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEMES 
(TSS) FOR NAVIGATION IN STRAITS WHERE NECESSARY TO 
PROMOTE THE SAFE PASSAGE OF SHIPS. SUCH ROUTING MEASURES 
SHALL CONFORM TO IMO STANDARDS (I.E., REGULATION V/8 OF 
THE 1974 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE 
AT SEA (SOLAS) AND ITS ASSOCIATED GUIDELINES AND 
CRITERIA) AND SHALL BE REFERRED TO THE IMO FOR ADOPTION 
PRIOR TO THEIR DESIGNATION. SHIPS IN TRANSIT PASSAGE 
SHALL RESPECT APPLICABLE SEA LANES AND TSS ESTABLISHED 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH IMO STANDARDS. (NOTE: IMO-APPROVED 
ROUTING MEASURES APPLICABLE IN INTERNATIONAL STRAITS ARE 
SET OUT IN IMO PUBLICATION "SHIPS' ROUTEING" (SIXTH 
EDITION), AS AMENDED.) 
(4) SHIPS IN TRANSIT PASSAGE SHALL COMPLY WITH 
GENERALLY ACCEPTED INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS, PROCEDURES 
AND PRACTICES FOR SAFETY AT SEA, INCLUDING THE 1972 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS FOR PREVENTING COLLISIONS AT 
SEA (COLREGS). SHIPS IN TRANSIT PASSAGE SHALL ALSO 
PROCEED WITHOUT DELAY THROUGH THE STRAIT, REFRAIN FROM 
ANY THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE SOVEREIGNTY, 
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE 
STATES BORDERING THE STRAIT; AND REFRAIN FROM ANY 
ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN THOSE INCIDENT TO THEIR NORMAL 
MODE OF CONTINUOUS AND EXPEDITIOUS TRANSIT UNLESS 
RENDERED NECESSARY BY~ORCE MAJEURE OR BY DISTRESS. 
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B. THE 1974 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY 
OF LIFE AT SEA (SOLAS), AS AMENDED. 
(1) REGULATION VIS OF SOLAS RECOGNIZES THE 
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION (IMO) AS THE ONLY 
INTERNATIONAL BODY RESPONSIBLE FOR ESTABLISHING AND 
ADOPTING SHIPS' ROUTING MEASURES, INCLUDING TSS, ON AN 
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL. 
(2) RULES GOVERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SHIPS' 
ROUTING MEASURES ARE CONTAINED IN REGULATION VIS OF 
SOLAS AND ITS ASSOCIATED GUIDELINES AND CRITERIA (I.E., 
IMO ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION A.572(14), AS AMENDED). 
REGULATION viS AND RESOLUTION A.572(14) DO NOT APPLY TO 
WARSHIPS, NAVAL AUXILIARIES OR OTHER GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR 
OPERATED VESSELS USED ONLY FOR NON-COMMERCIAL SERVICE. 
HOWEVER, SUCH SHIPS ARE ENCOURAGED TO PARTICIPATE IN 
IMO-APPROVED SHIPS' ROUTING SYSTEMS. 
(3) ADDITIONALLY, NOTHING IN REGULATION VIS NOR 
ITS ASSOCIATED GUIDELINES AND CRITERIA SHALL PREJUDICE 
THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
OR THE LEGAL REGIMES OF STRAITS USED FOR INTERNATIONAL 
NAVIGATION AND ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES. 
(4) THE UNITED STATES IS A PARTY TO SOLAS. 
C. THE 1972 INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS FOR PREVENTING 
COLLISIONS AT SEA (COLREGS), AS AMENDED. 
(1) PURSUANT TO RULE 1, COLREGS APPLY TO ALL 
VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS AND IN ALL WATERS CONNECTED 
THEREWITH NAVIGABLE BY SEAGOING VESSELS, INCLUDING 
VESSELS ENTITLED TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. 
(2) RULE 10 OF COLREGS PRESCRIBES THE CONDUCT OF 
VESSELS WITHIN OR NEAR TSS ADOPTED BY THE IMO IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATION viS OF SOLAS. PURSUANT TO 
RULE 10 OF COLREGS, A VESSEL USING A TSS SHALL NOT USE 
AN INSHORE TRAFFIC ZONE WHEN IT CAN SAFELY USE THE 
APPROPRIATE TRAFFIC LANE WITHIN THE ADJACENT TSS, EXCEPT 
THAT A VESSEL MAY USE AN INSHORE TRAFFIC ZONE WHEN EN 
ROUTE TO OR FROM A PORT, OFFSHORE INSTALLATION OR 
STRUCTURE, PILOT STATION OR ANY OTHER PLACE SITUATED 
WITHIN THE INSHORE TRAFFIC ZONE, OR TO AVOID IMMEDIATE 
DANGER. VESSELS NOT USING A TSS SHALL AVOID THE 
SEPARATION SCHEME BY AS WIDE A MARGIN AS IS PRACTICABLE. 
(NOTE: A VESSEL RESTRICTED IN HER ABILITY TO MANEUVER 
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WHEN ENGAGED IN AN OPERATION (1) FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF 
SAFETY OF NAVIGATION IN A TSS OR (2) FOR THE LAYING, 
SERVICING OR PICKING UP OF A SUBMARINE CABLE, WITHIN A 
TSS IS EXEMPT FROM COMPLYING WITH RULE 10 TO THE EXTENT 
NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE OPERATION.) 
(3) THE UNITED STATES IS A PARTY TO COLREGS. 
D. U.S. NAVY REGULATIONS (1990). 
(1) PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 1139, ALL PERSONS IN THE 
NAVAL SERVICE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OPERATION OF NAVAL 
SHIPS AND CRAFT SHALL DILIGENTLY OBSERVE COLREGS AND THE 
INLAND NAVIGATION RULES, WHERE SUCH RULES AND 
REGULATIONS ARE APPLICABLE TO NAVAL SHIPS. 
(2) IN THOSE SITUATIONS WHERE SUCH RULES OR 
REGULATIONS ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO NAVAL SHIPS OR CRAFT, 
THEY SHALL BE OPERATED WITH DUE REGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF 
OTHERS. 
4. ANALYSIS. 
A. FOR TRANSIT PASSAGE TO HAVE ANY MEANING, SURFACE, 
SUBSURFACE AND OVERFLIGHT NAVIGATION OF WATERS 
CONSTITUTING THE APPROACHES TO THE STRAIT MUST BE 
INCLUDED. IF THE RIGHT OF OVERFLIGHT OR SUBMERGED 
TRANSIT APPLIED ONLY WITHIN THE GEOGRAPHICAL DELINEATION 
OF A CERTAIN STRAIT, BUT NOT TO AREAS LEADING INTO/OUT 
OF THE STRAIT, IT WOULD EFFECTIVELY PREVENT THE EXERCISE 
OF THE RIGHT OF OVERFLIGHT AND SUBMERGED TRANSIT. 
MOREOVER, REQUIRING SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT TO CONVERGE AT 
THE HYPOTHETICAL ENTRANCE TO THE STRAIT WOULD BE 
INCONSISTENT WITH SOUND NAVIGATIONAL PRACTICES. THE 
RIGHT OF TRANSIT PASSAGE THEREFORE APPLIES NOT ONLY TO 
THE WATERS OF THE STRAIT ITSELF, BUT ALSO TO ALL 
NORMALLY USED APPROACHES TO THE STRAIT. 
B. THE 1982 LOS CONVENTION RECOGNIZES THE AUTHORITY 
OF COASTAL STATES TO DESIGNATE, AND REQUIRES SHIPS IN 
TRANSIT PASSAGE TO RESPECT, IMO-APPROVED TSS IN 
INTERNATIONAL STRAITS, PROVIDED SUCH ROUTING MEASURES 
CONFORM TO IMO STANDARDS SET OUT IN REGULATION V/8 OF 
SOLAS AND RESOLUTION A.572(14). HOWEVER, AS DISCUSSED 
ABOVE, ROUTING MEASURES ADOPTED PURSUANT TO REGULATION 
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VIS AND ITS ASSOCIATED GUIDELINES AND CRITERIA (I.E., 
RESOLUTION A.572(14)) DO NOT APPLY TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNE 
VESSELS. HENCE, COMPLIANCE WITH AN IMO-APPROVED TSS IN 
AN INTERNATIONAL STRAIT IS NOT LEGALLY REQUIRED OF 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS. 
C. SIMILARLY, RULE 1 OF COLREGS PROVIDES THAT TSS MAY 
BE ADOPTED BY THE IMO FOR THE SAFETY OF NAVIGATION. RULE 
10 OF COLREGS APPLIES TO ANY TSS ADOPTED BY THE IMO, 
PURSUANT TO ITS AUTHORITY UNDER REGULATION viS OF SOLAS 
AND ITS ASSOCIATED GUIDELINES: HOWEVER, AS PREVIOUSLY 
DISCUSSED, SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS ARE SPECIFICALLY 
EXEMPT FROM COMPLIANCE WITH IMO-APPROVED ROUTING 
MEASURES. SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS ARE ENCOURAGED TO 
COMPLY VOLUNTARILY WITH SUCH MEASURES, BUT THERE IS NO 
LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO DO SO. HENCE, COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 
10 OF COLREGS, WHICH PROHIBITS THE USE OF AN INSHORE 
TRAFFIC ZONE WHEN A SHIP CAN SAFELY USE THE APPROPRIATE 
TRAFFIC LANE WITHIN THE ADJACENT TSS AND REQUIRES SHIPS 
NOT USING THE TSS TO AVOID IT BY AS WIDE A MARGIN AS IS 
PRACTICABLE, IS NOT LEGALLY REQUIRED OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNE 
VESSELS THAT HAVE ELECTED NOT TO USE THE TSS. 
ACCORDINGLY, TRANSIT PASSAGE APPLIES THROUGHOUT THE 
STRAIT, SHORELINE TO SHORELINE. 
5. POLICY. 
A. FOR SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS, THE RIGHT OF TRANSIT 
PASSAGE APPLIES THROUGHOUT THE STRAIT (SHORELINE TO 
SHORELINE), AS WELL AS IN ITS APPROACHES (INCLUDING THE 
TERRITORIAL SEA OF AN ADJACENT COASTAL STATE) . 
B. ALTHOUGH U.S. SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS WILL 
NORMALLY USE IMO-APPROVED TSS (WHEN PRACTICABLE AND 
COMPATIBLE WITH THE MILITARY MISSION) AND COMPLY WITH 
RULE 10 OF COLREGS (INCLUDING ITS PROHIBITION ON THE USE 
OF INSHORE TRAFFIC ZONES) WHILE TRANSITING AN 
INTERNATIONAL STRAIT, THERE IS NO LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO 
DO SO IF SUCH VESSELS DO NOT ELECT TO VOLUNTARILY USE 
THE TSS. WHEN VOLUNTARILY USING AN IMO-APPROVED TSS, 
RULE 10 OF COLREGS MUST BE OBSERVED. 
C. SITUATIONS WHICH MAY NOT LEND THEMSELVES TO 
COMPLIANCE WITH AN IMO-APPROVED ROUTING MEASURE INCLUDE: 
MILITARY CONTINGENCIES; CLASSIFIED MISSIONS; POLITICALLY 
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SENSITIVE AREA MISSIONS; FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION 
ASSERTIONS; ROUTINE AIRCRAFT CARRIER OPERATIONS; MINE 
CLEARANCE OPERATIONS; SUBMERGED OPERATIONS; OR VARIOUS 
OTHER LEGITIMATE PURPOSES/MISSIONS. SUCH OPERATIONS 
SHALL BE CONDUCTED WITH DUE REGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF 
NAVIGATION. 
D. IF CHALLENGED BY AUTHORITIES OF A COASTAL STATE 
WHILE TRANSITING AN INTERNATIONAL STRAIT, U.S. SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNE VESSELS SHOULD ADVISE COASTAL STATE AUTHORITIES 
THAT IT IS A U.S. WARSHIP OR OTHER SOVEREIGN IMMUNE 
VESSEL AND STATE, "I AM ENGAGED IN TRANSIT PASSAGE IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW." THE VESSEL SHOULD 
THEN CONTINUE ON ITS PLANNED TRACK. 
6. CONCLUSION. THE REGIME OF TRANSIT PASSAGE CONFERS 
CERTAIN RIGHTS AND IMPOSES CERTAIN DUTIES ON SHIPS AND 
AIRCRAFT EXERCISING THE RIGHT OF TRANSIT PASSAGE. THESE 
RIGHTS AND DUTIES COMMENCE AS SOON AS THE SHIP OR 
AIRCRAFT ENTERS THE APPROACHES TO AN INTERNATIONAL 
STRAIT FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONTINUOUS AND EXPEDITIOUS 
TRANSIT OF THE STRAIT, AND THEY CEASE AS SOON AS THE 
SHIP OR AIRCRAFT DEPARTS THE APPROACHES ON THE OTHER 
SIDE. THERE IS NO LEGAL REQUIREMENT FOR SOVEREIGN IMMUNE 
VESSELS TO COMPLY WITH IMO-APPROVED ROUTING MEASURES IN 
INTERNATIONAL STRAITS. SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS ARE ONLY 
LEGALLY OBLIGATED TO EXERCISE DUE REGARD FOR THE SAFETY 
OF NAVIGATION WHILE ENGAGED IN TRANSIT PASSAGE. HOWEVER, 
SUCH VESSEL MAY VOLUNTARILY COMPLY WITH IMO-APPROVED 
ROUTING MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL STRAITS WHEN 
PRACTICABLE AND COMPATIBLE WITH THE MILITARY MISSION. 
WHILE VOLUNTARILY USING AN IMO-APPROVED TSS, RULE 10 OF 
COLREGS MUST BE OBSERVED. 
7. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE DEPARTMENT 
OF STATE AND REFLECTS OFFICIAL U.S. POLICY. QUESTIONS 
SHOULD BE REFERRED TO DOD REPOPA (DSN 227-9161, COMM 
703-697-9161) OR N3L/N5L (DSN 227-0835, COMM 
703-697-0835) . 
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ANNEXA2-7 
A quick reference aid on U S foreign relations 
Not a comprehensive policy statement 
Bureau of Public AfErirs 0 Department of State 
US Freedom of Navigation Program December 1988 
Background: US interests span the world's oceans geopolitically and 
economically. US national security and commerce depend gready upon the 
internationally recognized legal rights and freedoms of navigation and overflight 
of the seas. Since World War II, more than 75 coastal nations have asserted 
various maritime claims that threaten those rights and freedoms. These 
"objectionable claims" include unrecognized historic waters claims; improperly 
drawn baselines for measuring maritime claims; territorial sea claims greater than 
12 nautical miles; and territorial sea claims that impose impermissible restrictions 
on the innocent passage of military and commercial vessels, as well as ships 
owned or operated by a state and used only on government noncommerical 
servIce. 
US policy: The US is committed to protecting and promoting rights and 
freedoms of navigation and overflight guaranteed to all nations under 
international law. One way in which the US protects these maritime rights is 
through the US Freedom of Navigation Program. The program combines 
diplomatic action and operational assertion of our navigation and overflight 
rights by means of exercises to discourage state claims inconsistent with 
international law and to demonstrate US resolve to protect navigational 
freedoms. The Departments of State and Defense are joindy responsible for 
conducting the program. 
The program started in 1979, and President Reagan again outlined our position 
in an ocean policy statement in March 1983: 
... the United States will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and 
freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of 
interests reflected in the [1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea]. The 
United States will not, however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states 
designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in 
navigation and overflight and other related high seas uses. 
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The US considers that the customary rules of international law affecting 
maritime navigation and overflight freedoms are reflected and stated in the 
applicable provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
Nature of the program: The Freedom of Navigation Program is a peaceful 
exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by international law and is not 
intended to be provocative. The program impartially rejects excessive maritime 
claims of allied, friendly, neutral, and unfriendly states alike. Its objective is to 
preserve and enhance navigational freedoms on behalf of all states. 
Diplomatic action: Under the program, the US undertakes diplomatic action at 
several levels to preserve its rights under international law. It conducts bilateral 
consultations with many coastal states stressing the need for and obligation of all 
states to adhere to the international law customary rules and practices reflected in 
the 1982 convention. When appropriate, the Department of State files formal 
diplomatic protests addressing specific maritime claims that are inconsistent with 
international law. Since 1948, the US has filed more than 70 such protests, 
including more than 50 since the Freedom of Navigation Program began. 
Operational assertions: Although diplomatic action provides a channel for 
presenting and preserving US rights, the operational assertion by US naval and 
air forces of internationally recognized navigational rights and freedoms 
complements diplomatic efforts. Operational assertions tangibly manifest the US 
determination not to acquiesce in excessive claims to maritime jurisdiction by 
other countries. Although some operations asserting US navigational rights 
receive intense public scrutiny (such as those that have occurred in the Black Sea 
and the Gulf of Sidra) , most do not. Since 1979, US military ships and aircraft 
have exercised their rights and freedoms in all oceans against objectionable 
claims of more than 35 nations at the rate of some 30-40 per year. 
Future intentions: The US is committed to preserve traditional freedoms of 
navigation and overflight throughout the world, while recognizing the 
legitimate rights of other states in the waters off their coasts. The preservation of 
effective navigation and overflight rights is essential to maritime commerce and 
global naval and air mobility. It is imperative if all nations are to share in the full 
benefits of the world's oceans. 
For further infoDDation: See also GISTs, "Law of the Sea," June 1986, and 
"Navigation Rights and the Gulf of Sidra," December 1986. 
Harriet Culley, Editor (202) 647-1208 
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Navigation Rights 
and the Gulf of Sidra 
Background 
In October 1973, Libya 
announced that it considered 
all water in the Gulf of Sidra 
south of a straight baseline 
drawn at 32° 30' north latitude 
to be internal Libyan waters 
because of the gulfs 
geographic location and 
Libya's historic control over it. 
The United States and other 
countries, including the 
U.S.S.R., protested Libya's 
claim as lacking any historic or 
legal justification and as 
illegally restricting freedom of 
navigation on the high seas. 
Further, the U.S. Navy has 
conducted many operations 
within the gulf during the past 
12 years to protest the Libyan 
claim. These exercises have 
resulted in two shooting 
incidents between Libyan and 
U.S. forces. The first was in 
1981, when two Libyan 
aircraft fired on U.S. aircraft 
and were shot down in 
air-to-air combat, and the 
second in March 1986, when 
the Libyans fired several 
missiles at U.S. forces and the 
United States responded by 
attacking Libyan radar 
installations and patrol boats. 
Barbary Coast History 
This is not the first time that 
the United States has 
contended with navigational 
hindrances imposed by North 
African states. After the 
American Revolution, the 
United States adhered to the 
ANNEXA2-8 
[See map at Figure A2-12 
(p. 2-82)] 
then common practice of 
paying tribute to the Barbary 
Coast states to ensure safe 
passage of U.S. merchant 
vessels. In 1796, the United 
States paid a one-time sum 
(equal to one-third of its 
defense budget) to Algiers with 
guarantees of further annual 
payments. In 1801, the United 
States refused to conclude a 
similar agreement with 
Tripoli, and the Pasha of 
Tripoli declared war on the 
United States. After 
negotiations failed, the United 
States blockaded Tripoli, in the 
autumn of 1803 Commodore 
Edward Preble led a squadron, 
including the U.S.S. 
Constitution ("Old Ironsides"), 
to the Mediterranean to 
continue the blockade. Shortly 
after the squadron arrived off 
Tripoli, a U.S. frigate, the 
Philadelphia, ran aground and 
was captured. Lt. Stephen 
Decatur led a team into Tripoli 
harbor and successfully burned 
the Philadelphia. InJune 1805, 
the Pasha agreed to terms 
following a ground assault led 
by U.S. marines that captured a 
port near Tripoli. In 1810 
Algiers and Tripoli renewed 
raids against U.S. shipping, and 
in 1815, Commodore 
Decatur's squadron caught the 
Algerian fleet at sea and forced 
the Dey of Algiers to agree to 
terms favorable to the United 
States. Decatur then proceeded 
to Tunis and Tripoli and 
obtained their consent to 
similar treaties. A U.S. 
squadron remained in the 
Mediterranean for several years 
to ensure compliance with the 
treaties. 
Current Law and Custom 
By custom, nations may lay 
historic claim to those bays and 
gulfS over which they have 
exhibited such a degree of 
open, notorious, continuous, 
and unchallenged control for 
an extended period of time as 
to preclude rraditional high 
seas freedoms within such 
waters. Those waters (closed 
off by srraight baselines) are 
treated as if they were part of 
the nation's land mass, and the 
navigation of foreign vessels is 
generally subject to complete 
control by the nation. Beyond 
lawfully closed-off bays and 
other areas along their coasts, 
nations may claim a "territorial 
sea" of no more than 12 
nautical miles in breadth 
(measured 12 miles out from 
the coast's low water line--or 
legal srraight baseline) within 
which foreign vessels enjoy the 
limited navigational "right of 
innocent passage." Beyond the 
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Since Libya cannot make a maritime claims. This program 
valid historic waters claim and includes diplomatic protests 
meets no other international (delivered to more than 50 
law criteria for enclosing the countries since 1975) and ship 
Gulf of Sidra, it may validly and aircraft operations to 
claim a 12-nautical-mile preserve those navigation 
the U.S. exercise of traditional 
navigation rights was 
regrettable and without any 
basis in international law. 
u.s. Intentions 
territorial sea as measured from rights. Illegal maritime claims The United States will pursue 
the normal low-water line to which the United States actively its efforts to preserve 
along its coast (see map). responds include: traditional navigation rights 
Libya also may claim up to a and freedoms that are equally 
20D-nautical-mile exclusive • Excessive territorial sea guaranteed to all nations. The 
economic zone in which it claims; preservation of rights is 
may exercise resource • Improperly drawn essential to maritime 
jurisdiction, but such a claim baselines for measuring commerce and global naval 
would not affect freedom of maritime claims; and and air mobility and is 
navigation and overflight. Attempts to require imperative if all nations are to 
(The United States has notification or permission share equally in the benefits of 
confined its exercises to areas before foreign vessels can the world's oceans. As always, 
beyond 12 miles from Libya's transit a nation's territorial sea the United States will exercise 
coast.) under the right of innocent its rights and freedoms fully in 
U.s. Position 
The United States supports 
and seeks to uphold the 
customary law outlined above, 
and it has an ongoing global 
program of protecting 
traditional navigation rights 
and freedoms from 
encroachment by illegal 
passage. accord with international law 
Thus Libya has not been 
singled out for special 
consideration but represents 
simply one instance in the 
continuing U.S. effort to 
preserve worldwide 
navigational rights and 
freedoms. The fact that Libya 
chose to respond militarily to 
and hopes to avoid futther 
military confrontations, but it 
will not acquiesce in unlawful 
maname claims and is 
prepared to defend itself if 
circumstances so require. 
Taken from the GIST series of 
December 1986, published by the 
Bureau of Public AfEIirs, 
Department of State. 
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FIGURE A2-1 
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FIGURE A2-3 
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FIGURE A2-S 
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FIGURE A2-6 
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FIGURE A2-7 
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Source: Roach & Smith, at 66. 
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FIGURE A2-8 
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Source: Roach & Smith, at 208. 
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FIGURE A2-9 
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International Status and Navigation of Warships 199 
FIGURE A2-10 
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FIGURE A2-11 
AFRICAN NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE 
Source: Rosen, Nav. War ColI. Rev., Autumn 1996 at 50. 
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Nation 
Albania 
Algeria 
TABLE A2-1 
Restrictions on Warship Innocent Passage 
(As of 1 January 1997) 
u.s. 
B,estriction Year of !:;I!!im Protest 
Special permission; 1946 1989 
a 
Prior permission; 1963 1964 
Antigua & Barbuda Prior permission; 1982 1987 
Bangladesh Prior permission; 1974 1982 
Barbados Prior permission; 1979 1982 
Brazil Prior permission; 1954 
Bulgaria Limited to sea lanes; 1987 1982 
Burma Prior permission; 1977 1982 
Cambodia Prior permission; 1982 
Cape Verde Prior permission; 1982 1989 
a 
China (PRC) Prior permission; 1958; 1992, 1996 1992 
Congo Prior permission; 1977 1987 
Croatia Prior notification; 1995 
Denmark Prior permission; 1976 1991 
Djibouti Nuclear power/materials; 1979 1989 
Egypt Prior notification; 1983 1985 
Nuclear power/materials; 1982 1983 
Finland Prior notification; 1981 1989 
a 
Grenada Prior permission; 1978 1982 
Guyana Prior notification; 1977 1982 
a 
India Prior notification; 1976 1976 
Indonesia Prior notice; 1962 
a 
Iran Prior permission; 1982, 1994 1987 
a 
Korea, South Prior notification; 1978 1977 
Libya Prior notice; 1985 1985 
Maldives Prior permission; 1976 1982 
a 
Malta Prior notification; 1981 1981 
Mauritius Prior notification; 1977 1982 
Oman Prior permission; 1989 1991 
Nuclear power/materials; 1989 1991 
Pakistan Prior permission; 1976 1982 
Nuclear power/materials; 1976 1982 
Philippines Prior permission; 1968 1969 
u.S. Assertion 
of Right of 
Innocent Passage 
a 
1985 
a 
1979 
1987 
1996 
a 
1982 
a 
1985 
a 
1986 
1991 
a 
1986 
a 
1993 
1988 
1988 
a 
1985 
a 
1989 
a 
1981 
a 
1991 
a 
1986 
1994 
a 
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Poland 
Romania 
St. Vincent & the 
TABLE A2-1 (cent.) 
Restriction Year of Claim 
Prior permission; 1968 
Prior permission; 1956 
Grenadines Prior permission; 1983 
Seychelles Prior notification; 1977 
Somalia Prior permission; 1972 
Sri Lanka Prior permission; 1977 
Sudan Prior permission; 1970 
Syria Prior permission; 1963 
United Arab Emirates Prior permission; 1993 
Vietnam Prior permission; 1980 
Limit on number; 1980 
Yemen Prior permission (PDRY); 1967 
Nuclear power/materials (PDRY); 1977 
Prior notification (Y AR); 1978 
Nuclear power (YAR); 1982 
Yugoslavia, Former Prior notification; 1965 
Limit on number; 1986 
Multiple protests or assertions 
U.S. Assertion 
U.S. of Right of 
1989 
1989 
1982 
1982 
1986 
1989 
1989 
1982 
1982 
1982 
1982 
1986 
1986 
1986 
1986 
a 
Innocent Passage 
a 
1985 
a 
1979 
a 
1985 
a 
1979 
a 
1984 
1995 
a 
1982 
a 
1982 
a 
1979 
1990 
Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of Ocean Affairs; Roach & Smith, at 158-9. 
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TABLE A2-2 
Straits Formed by an Island of a Nation and the Mainland Where 
There Exists Seaward of the Island a. Route Through the High Seas 
or an Exclusive Economic Zone of Similar Convenience 
Coastal Nation Strait Island Alternative Route 
Argentina Estrecho de la Maire Isla de los Estados high seas! eez 
route east of Isla de los Estados 
Canada Canso Cape Breton Cabot Strait 
Canada Georgia Vancouver high seas! eez 
route west of Vancouver Island 
Canada Jacques Cartier Passage Anticosti Cabot Strait 
Canada Johnstone Vancouver high seas! eez 
route west of Vancouver Island 
Canada Northumberland Prince Edward high seas! eez 
route north of Prince Edward Island 
Canada Queen Charlotte Vancouver high seas! eez 
route west of Vancouver Island 
China Hainan Hainan high seas! eez 
route south ofHainan Island 
France IIe d'Yeu IIe d'Yeu high seas! eez 
route west of IIe d'Yeu 
Greece Elafonisou 1 Kithira Kithira or Andirkithiron Straits 
Italy Messina Sicily high seas! eez 
route south of Sicily 
Japan Okushiri-kaikyo Okushiri high seas! eez 
route west of Okushiri Island 
Japan Rishiri-suido Rishiri high seas! eez 
route west of Rishiri Island 
Japan Sado-kaikyo Sado high seas! eez 
route west of Sado Island 
New Zealand Foveaux Stewart high seas! eez 
route south of Stewart Island 
Russia Provirv Litke Karaginsky high seas! eez 
route east of Ostov Karaginsky 
Sweden Kalmar Sund Oland high seas! eez 
route east of Oland Island 
Tanzania Mafia Mafia high seas! eez 
route east of Mafia Island 
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TABLE A2-2 (cant.) 
Coastal Nation Wit Island Alternative Route 
Tanzania Zanzibar Channel Zanzibar high seas/ eez 
route east of Zanzibar Island 
Turkey Imroz Imroz high seas/ eez 
route west ofImroz Island 
United Kingdom Pentland Firth Orkney Islands high seas/ eez 
route north of the Orkneys 
United Kingdom The Solent Isle of Wight high seas/ eez 
route south of the Isle of Wight 
Andikithiron Strait has a least width of16 miles. Given Greece's 6-mile territorial sea claim, this leaves a high 
seas/eez corridor of 4 miles through the strait. 
Source: Alexander, at 206-7. 
TABLEA2-3 
Straits in Which Passage is Regulated by Long-Standing 
Conventions in Force 
Bosoms 
Dardanelles 
Magellan 
Oresund 
Source: Alexander, Navigational Restrictions, at 205. 
Store Baelt 
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TABLE A2-4 
Straits Which do not Connect Two Parts of the High Seas or an 
Exclusive Economic Zone with One Another 
(1) Straits Connecting the High Seas or an Exclusive Economic Zone with the Territorial Sea of a 
Foreign State 
Bahran-Qatar Passage 
Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Passage 
Head Harbour Passage 
Strait ofTiran 
(2) Straits Connecting the High Seas or an Exclusive Economic Zone with Claimed Historic Waters 
Strait State Claimed Historic Waters 
Amundsen Gulf Canada Arctic Archipelago 
Barrow Strait Canada Arctic Archipelago 
Entrance to the Bay D'Amatique Guatemala Bay D' Amatique 
Geographe Channel Australia Shark Bay 
Hainan Strait* China Gulf of Tonkin 
Hudson Strait Canada Hudson Bay 
Investigator Strait Australia Gulf of St. Vincent 
Kerch Strait USSR Sea of Azov 
Lancaster Sound Canada Arctic Archipelago 
M'Clure Strait Canada Arctic Archipelago 
Naturaliste Channel Australia Shark Bay 
Palk Strait India Gulf of Manaar 
Pohai Strait China Gulf ofPohai 
Prince of Wales Strait Canada Arctic Archipelago 
Viscount Melville Sound Canada Arctic Archipelago 
·China Claims the strait itself as historic, rather than the gulf with which it connects. 
(3) Straits Connecting with Claimed "Special Status" Waters 
Provliv Blagoveshchenskiy 
Provliv Dmityra Lapteva 
Provliv Karskiye Vorota 
Source: Alexander, at 207-8. 
Provliv Longa 
Provliv Sannikova 
Provliv Shokal'skogo 
Provliv Vilkit'skogo 
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TABLEA2-5 
International Straits: Least Width 
Less than Six Miles in Width (52) 
Alalakeiki Channel Icy Strait 
Apolima Sttait Johnstone Sttait 
Bali Channel KalmarSund 
Beagle Channel Kerch Strait 
Bonifacio, Sttait of Kuchinoshima-suido 
Bosporus Lamma Channel 
Canso Sttait Langeland Belt 
Chatham Strait Little Belt 
Clarence Strait [U.S.] Magellan,Straitof 
Corfu Channel Maqueda Channel 
Dardanelles Massawa Strait 
Dragon's Mouths Messina, Strait of 
Durian Strait Oresund 
Eafonisou Sttait Palk Strait 
Gaspar Strait Pentland Firth 
Georgia, Strait of Prince of Wales Strait 
Goschen Strait Provliv Nevel'skogo 
Head Harbour Passage Queen Charlotte Strait 
Berween Six and Twenty-four Miles in Width (153) 
Adak Strait 
Agattu Sttait 
Aland's Hav 
Alas Sttait 
Andikithiron Strait 
Api Passage 
Aruba-Paraguana Passage 
Auau Channel 
Bab el Mandeb 
Babuyan Channel (Luzon Strait) 
Bahrain-Qatar Passage 
Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Passage 
Balabac Strait 
Balintang Channel (Luzon Strait) 
Bangka Passage 
Bangka Strait 
Banks Strait 
Barrow Strait 
Basilan Strait 
Bass Strait 
Belle Isle, Strait of 
Berhala Strait 
Bering Strait, East 
Bering Strait, West 
Boeton Passage 
Bomholmsgat 
Bougainville Strait 
Bristol Channel 
Cameroon Strait 
Cheju Strait 
Clarence Strait [Australia] 
Coco Channel 
Cook Strait 
Dampier Strait 
Dominica Channel 
Dover Strait 
Dundas Strait 
Entrance to Bay d'Amatique 
Entrance to the Gulf of Finland 
Enttance to Gulf of Fonseca 
Estrecho de la Maire 
Etolin Strait 
Etorofu-kaikyo 
FehmamBelt 
Foveaux Strait 
Freu de Menorca 
Galleons Passage 
Geographe Channel 
Gibraltar, Strait of 
Greyhound Strait 
Hainan Strait 
Herbert Pass 
Hecate Strait 
The Hole 
HuksanJedo 
lie d'Yeu 
Rosario Sttait 
Roti Sttait 
Saipan Channel 
San Bernardino Strait 
Sape Strait 
Serpent's Mouth 
Singapore Sttait 
The Solent 
Store Baelt 
Sumner Strait 
Sunda Strait 
Tiran, Strait of 
Torees Strait 
Vatu-I-Ra Channel 
Verde Island Passage 
Vieques Passage 
Imroz Strait 
Indispensable Strait 
Investigator Strait 
Isumrud Strait 
Jacques Chartier Passage 
Jailolo Passage 
Juan de Fuca, Strait of 
Jubal, Strait of 
Kadet Channel 
Kafireos Strait 
Kaiwi Channel 
Kalohi Channel 
Kandavu Strait 
Karpathos Strait 
Kasos Strait 
Kasos Strait 
KauJakahi Channel 
Kealaikahiki Channel 
Keas Strait 
Kennedy Channel 
Kithira Strait 
Korea Strait, West 
Koti Passage 
Kunashiri-suido 
Little Minch 
Lombok Strait 
Maemel Sudo 
Mafia Strait 
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TABLE A2-5 (cont.) 
Between Six and Twenty-four Miles in Width (cont.) 
Malacca Strait Polillo Strait 
Manipa Strait Provliv Alaid 
Manning Strait Provliv Diany 
Martinique Channel Provliv Blagoveschenskiy 
Mayaguana Passage Provliv Golovnina 
Mindoro Strait Provliv Krenitsyna 
Mouchoir Passage Provliv Litke 
Nakanoshima-suido Provliv Luzhinka 
Nanuku Passage Provliv Nadezhedy 
Nares Strait Provliv Rikorda 
Naturaliste Channel Provliv Severgina 
Neumuro-kaikyo Provliv Shokal'skogo 
North Channel Provliv Urup 
North Minch Provliv Yevreinova 
Northumberland Strait Rishiri-suido 
Notsuke-suido Robeson Channel 
Obi Strait Sado-kaikyo 
Okushiri-kaikyo St. George's Channel 
Old Bahama Channel St. Lucia Channel 
Ombai Strait St. Vincent Passage 
Osurni-kaikyo Samalga Pass 
Pailolo Channel Samsoe Belt 
Pervyy Kuril'sky Provliv Santa Barbara Channel 
Pescadores Channel Sapudi Strait 
Pohai Strait 
More than Twenty-four Miles in Width (60) 
Alenuihaha Channel 
Amami Passage 
Amchitka Pass 
Amundsen Gulf 
Amutka Pass 
Anegada Passage 
Balut Channel 
Bashi Channel (Luzon Strait) 
Cabot Strait 
Caicos Passage 
Chetvertyy Kuril'sky Provliv 
Corsica-Elba Passage 
Crooked Island Passage 
Davis Strait 
Denmark Strait 
Detroit d'Honguedo 
Dixon Entrance 
Eight Degree Channel 
Florida, Straits of, East 
Florida, Straits of, South 
Formosa Strait 
Source: Alexander, at 202-3. 
Gorlo Strait 
Great Channel 
Grenada-Tobago Passage 
Guadeloupe Passage 
Hormuz, Strait of 
Hudson Strait 
Jamaica Passage 
Kamchatsky Provliv 
Karimata Strait 
Kauai Channel 
Korea Strait,East 
Lancaster Sound 
Makassar Strait 
Malta Channel 
M'Clure Strait 
Mona Passage 
Moxambique Channel 
Otranto, Strait of 
Pemba Channel 
Preparis North Channel 
Pre paris North Channel 
Seguam Pass 
Serasan Passage 
Shelikof Srrait 
Shikotan-siudo 
Sibutu Passage 
Soya-kaikyo 
Surigao Strait 
Suwanose-suido 
Tanaga Pass 
Tanegashima-kaikyo 
Taraku-suido 
Tokara-kaikyo 
Tsugaru-kaikyo 
Turks Island Passage 
Unimak Pass 
Virgin Passage 
Vitiaz Strait 
Wetar Strait 
Yakushima-kaikyo 
Yunaska Pass 
Zanzibar Channel 
Preparis South Channel 
Providence Channel, Northeast 
Providence Channel, Northwest 
Provliv Bussol 
Provliv Dmitrya Lapteva 
Provliv Karskiye Vorota 
Provliv Kruzenshtema 
Provliv Longa 
Provliv Sannikova 
Provliv Tatarskiy 
Provliv Vil'kitskogo 
St. George's Channel 
(U.K.-Ireland) 
Sicily, Strait of 
Silver Bank Passage 
Sumba Strait 
Ten Degree Channel 
Viscount Melville Sound 
Windward Passage 
Yucatan Channel 
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TABLEA2-6 
Straits, Less Than 24 Miles in Least Width, in Which There Exists a 
Route Through the High Seas or an Exclusive Economic Zone of 
Sitnilar Convenience With Respect to Navigational or 
Hydrographical Characteristics 
Andikithiron Strait-4 (Greece) 
Bahrain-Qatar Passage-13 
(Bahraini Qatar) 
Banks Strait-3 (Australia) 
Bass Strait-17 (Australia) 
BomhoImsgat-6.5 (Denmark) 
Bristol Channel-4 (U.K.) 
Dover Strait-6 (U.K.) 
Entrance to Gulf of 
Finland-3.4 (Finland) 
Fehmarn Belt-4 (Denmark! 
Gennany) 
The Hole-14 (U.K.) 
Kadet Channel-12 
(Denmark!F.R.G.) 
Karpathos Strait-ll (Greece) 
Kasos Strait-ll.8 (Grc;ece) 
Kennedy Channel-4.5 
(Denmark) 
Korea Strait West-7 (South 
KorealJapan) 
Litrle Minch-3 (U.K.) 
Mayaguana Passage-14 (The 
Bahamas) 
Mouchoir Passage-17 (U.K.) 
Nares Strait-4 (Denmark) 
North Channel-5 (U.K.) 
Old Bahama Channel-3 (Bahamas) 
Osumi-kaikyo-ll (Japan) 
Robeson Channel-2 (Denmark) 
Sarnsoe Belt-l (Denmark) 
Soya-kaikyo-7.5 (Japan/Russia) 
Tsugaru-kaiky0-4 (Japan) 
Turks Island Passage-12 (U.K.) 
Distance given is for least width of the belt of high seaslEEZ, assuming current breadths claimed for 
territorial seas continue. Countries named are those off whose coasts the belt of high seaslEEZ exists. 
Source: Alexander, at 206. 
210 Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations 
TABLEA2-7 
States Whose EEZ Proclamations and/or National Laws Appear 
Inconsistent with the Convention Provisions Regarding Freedoms of 
Navigation and Overflight 
Bangladesh-a, c, f Indonesia---c Russia-d 
Burma-e Ivory Coast-f Samoa---c, f 
Cape Verde-b, c, f Kampuchea---c Sao Tome & Principe-a 
Colombia-a, c, e Kenya---c Seychelles-d, e, f 
Comoros-a, c Malaysia-a, c Spain-f 
Cook Islands-a, c, f Maldives-a, d Sri Lanka---c 
Costa Rica-a Mauritania-d Suriname-a, f 
Cuba-a Mauritius-d, e Togo-a, c 
Dominican Republic-a Mexico-a Trinidad & Tobago-a 
Fiji-a Mozambique-a, c United Arab Ernirates-a 
France---c New Zealand-a, c -Uruguay-b 
Guinea-Bissau-a, c Nigeria-a, d Vanuatu---c, e 
Guyana-a, d, e Norway-a, f Venezuela-a 
Haiti-b Oman-a,c Vietnam---c 
Iceland---c Pakistan-d, e, f Yemen (Aden)-e 
India-d, e Portugal-f 
a. States silent on the question of residual rights in their EEZ. 
b. States claiming possession of residual rights in their EEZ. 
c. States whose EEZ proclamations and/or national laws are silent on foreign rights to navigation and 
overflight in their EEZ. 
d. States whose EEZ proclamations and/or national laws allow the government to regulate the 
navigation offoreign vessels in the EEZ or in nationally designated zones of the EEZ (see Table A2-8 (p. 
2-89». 
e. States claiming "exclusive jurisdiction" over environemtnal protection in their EEZ. 
( States having special formulations with respect to environmental protection in their EEZ. 
Source: Alexander, at 91. 
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TABLEA2-8 
State Proclamations Regarding Navigation and Overflight 
in and over the EEZ 
A. States whose EEZ proclamations and! or laws explicitly recognize the right of foreign navigation 
through and overflight over their national EEZ. 
Barbados 
Bunna 
Cuba 
Democratic Yemen 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Ivory Coast 
Mexico 
Norway 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Spain 
Suriname 
Thailand 
Trinidad and Tobago 
United Arab Emirates (1) 
United States 
Venezuela 
(1) The UAE legislation provides that national rights in the EEZ "shall not prejudice international 
navigation rights exercised by states in accordance with the rules of international law." It is not clear if 
this provision applies to aircraft. 
B. States whose EEZ proclamations and! or laws are silent on foreign navigation through and overflight 
over their national EEZ. 
Bangladesh Iceland Oman 
Cape Verde Indonesia Sri Lanka 
Colombia Kampuchea Togo 
Comoros Kenya Vanuatu 
Cook Islands Malaysia Vietnam 
France Mozambique Western Samoa 
Guinea-Bissau New Zealand 
C. States whose EEZ proclamations and! or laws explicitly allow the government to regulate the navigation 
of foreign vessels in the EEZ or nationally designed zones of the EEZ (article citations refers to the 
respective national legislation). 
Guyana: The President may declare any area of the EEZ to be a designated area and make provisions he 
deems necessary with respect to "entry into and passage through the designated area offoreign ships by the 
establishment of fairways, sealanes, traffic separation schemes or any other mode of ensuring freedom of 
navigation which is not prejudicial to the interests of Guyana." [article 18(a) and (b) (vi») 
India: The government may provide for regulation of entry passage through designated area "by 
establishment of fairways, sealanes, traffic separation schemes or any other mode of ensuring freedom of 
navigation which is not prejudicial to the interests ofIndia." [article 7(6) (Explanation») 
Maldives: "Ships of all States shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial waters and 
other exclusive economic zone of the Republic of the Maldives ... [No) foreign fishing vessel shall enter its 
economic zone without prior consent of the Government of the Maldives." [article 1) 
Mauritania: In its EEZ the rights and freedoms of States with respect to navigation, overflight, the laying of 
cables and pipelines, as provided for on the high seas, shall not be amended unless they adversely affect the 
provisions of Article 185 above [treating Mauritania's sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the EEZ) and the 
security of the Mauritanian State." [article 186) 
Mauritius: The Prime Minister may provide in designated areas of the EEZ or continental shelf necessary 
provisions with respect to "the regulation of entry into the passage of foreign ships through the designated 
area" and "the establishment offairways, sealanes, traffic separation schemes or any other mode of ensuring 
freedom of navigation which is not prejudicial to the interest of Mauritius." [article 9(a) and (b) (vi») 
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TABLE A2-8 (cont.) 
Nigeria: The government "may, for the purpose of protecting any installation in a designated area ... prohibit 
ships ... from entering without its consent such part of that area as may be specified." [article 392)] 
Pakistan: The government may declare any area of the EEZ to be a designated area and make provisions as it 
deems necessary with respect to "the regulation of entry into the passage through the designated area of 
foreign ships by the establishment of fairways, sealanes, traffic separation schemes or any other mode of 
ensuring freedom of navigation which is not prejudicial to the interest of Pakistan." [article 6(a) and (b) (vi)] 
Seychelles: The President may declare any area of the continental shelf or EEZ to be a designated area and 
make provisions as he considers necessary with respect to "the regulation of entry into and passage offoreign 
ships through the designated area [and] the establishment of fairways, sealanes, traffic separation schemes or 
any mode of ensuring freedom of navigation which is not prejupjcial to the interest of Seychelles." [article 
9(a) and (b) (vii)] 
Russia: "In connection with certain specifically bounded regions of the economic zone of the USSR in 
which, for technical reasons connected with oceanographic and ecological conditions, as well as for the use of 
these regions or for the protection of their resources, or because of the special requirements for navigation in 
them, it is necessary that special obligatory measutes shall be taken to prevent pollution from vessels, such 
measures, including those connected with navigation practices, may be established by the Council of 
Ministers of the USSR in regions determined by it. The borders of these special regions should be noted in 
'Notification to Mariners' .. " [article 13] 
Source: Alexander, at 91-92. 
